Prague teaches how to develop civil protection
Similar to Helsinki, the Czech capital has a large civil protection infrastructure complex, which, unlike the stagnation in this field here, is constantly developing and expanding. In this overview, we take a closer look at what is happening in Czech shelters and what conditions await people seeking refuge from danger there.
There are plenty of Ochranný Systém Metra security system facilities in underground Prague, which are given standard code names such as K-111 or Klárov,1 which was secret for a long time. This is the first station of the Prague metro. Despite the fact that it has escalators to function as a normal station, it never started operating.
Object K-111 is shrouded in thick fog, and the only reliable information about it comes from the period 1970-1980, when it was one of the areas of civil defense in the capital within the OSM network. The Czech public only discovered it in 2002, when floodwaters in Prague inundated the long-abandoned metro station, which was subsequently renovated a decade later.
Today, this facility is modestly referred to as the Klárovi converter station,2 whose only entrance is located directly in front of Strakova Akademie (the residence of the Czech Republic’s government). Behind the steel door, an escalator leads from the entrance hall to the connecting corridors, and another escalator tunnel leads to a vaulted chamber that resembles Kobylisy station. Since the station was built before the metro system as we know it today, some details reveal its function as a government shelter, such as the station’s only exit, which does not lead to the busy Klárovi Street, but to a narrow side street.
Why would anyone build a metro station away from a publicly known and reasonable location? It is likely that this object is also connected to other key links in the extensive OSM network, especially Prague Castle and the Czech Ministry of Defense building.
Another unique object is KO-17, which marks the underground hospital beneath Thomayer University Hospital (Fakultní Thomayerova nemocnice). Translated to Estonia, this could mean that Tartu University Hospital or the planned Tallinn Hospital would have similar capabilities. After an alarm is triggered, KO-17 becomes operational within an hour. Incidentally, there is a similar underground hospital beneath the Bulovka University Hospital (Fakultní nemocnice Bulovka).
In contrast, the facility known as K-116 in the Prokop Valley (Prokopské údolí) is one of the least known military facilities in the Czech Republic,3 where the VÚ2508 military unit operates and about which there is practically no information available. During the German occupation, an extensive network of tunnels and underground production complexes was built there, which gives an idea of its strategic value.4 It is believed that it is also connected to the Prague metro (line B is only 5.8 km away) and the OSM network and Mrazovka tunnel, which leads to the vicinity of Kbely Airport.
Czech early warning systems
Unlike Tallinn and Estonia in general, Prague and its surroundings have many warning sirens, the reliability of which is checked regularly on the first Wednesday of every month.5 To test them, they are switched on for several minutes to ensure that they are working properly. In Estonia, however, this is not possible because there is no siren network, despite promises that it will be completed by 2022.6
It is important to note here that although the OSM network and other STOÚ (Stálý Tlakově Odolný Úkryt, or permanent pressure-resistant) shelters are not all fully equipped with water, food, medicine, and beds, the reality of civil protection in the Czech Republic is still at a very good level—the infrastructure is real and tangible, and it is currently being expanded.
The worst option, which Estonia is practicing, is to focus only on soft activities and fail to build the necessary dedicated infrastructure, which also runs counter to European practice.
This is because it is relatively easy for the Czechs to obtain the necessary equipment for the OSM network for the population if the right orders are given in good time, based on proactive crisis management and political responsibility. Similar to shelters, this is also lacking in Estonia. The path chosen by the Czechs is similar to that of the Finns and is based on the understanding that prevention is cheaper and easier than managing a crisis situation without a system, the development of which requires long-term commitment and consistency. Therefore, it is important for Estonia to follow the example of the Czechs and take the first real steps in this direction.
This would allow the Czech Army Medical Service, which recently set up field hospitals during the COVID-19 pandemic, to provide medical supplies if necessary. In Estonia, on the other hand, civilians are seen by the military as a cumbersome and burdensome burden that must be removed. But where to, if there is no system to support the rear?
Systems need political accountability
Therefore, the Czech Armed Forces are increasing the protection of key infrastructure by creating territorial defense battalions, which are responsible for protecting critical infrastructure necessary for comprehensive national defense. How does this work in Estonia, and will the Defense League take on this role, even though it would be possible to form such rear units on the basis of the civil defense service, which does not exist in Estonia today?
The aforementioned floods of 2002 and proactive crisis management, together with the assumption of political responsibility, also highlight the shortcomings of the Czech system, which are identical to those in Estonia, at least in the case of the latter two factors, when similar scenarios arise. Although Czech politicians did not activate the OSM system in time during the worst floods of the century, resulting in several parts of it being flooded (e.g., the Klárov shelter complex), it was a costly lesson for the Czechs, from which they learned, and the system was supplemented and improved.
In this regard, it is crucial to recognize the crisis, accept it, and learn from it, which includes auditing and, if necessary, taking appropriate action and sometimes making painful decisions, where politicians suppress their egos and serve their people based on the mandate they have received from them.
In the conditions of the Czech capital, the response time in the event of a major flood scenario is very short. Nevertheless, it is possible to activate and deactivate the OSM network in a timely manner. Although Prague’s civil protection system is functioning and developing, supplemented by learning from mistakes, it offers decent protection and multifunctional crisis management capabilities for the entire region, from which Estonia can also learn.
× Hannes Nagel’s op-ed was previously published on March 16, 2024, in the Postimees online portal. Photo: Czech rescue workers (Ministry of the Interior, Fire Rescue Service of the Czech Republic, 2021).
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