Food reserves are a critically important part of food security—compared to the healthcare system, they are like emergency medical services, which must be immediately available in a crisis. The National Audit Office’s aim was precisely to verify the existence of the food reserves and how quickly they can be brought into use. The report shows that the country still does not have food reserves to the extent the government has set as a goal. There is no 14-day food reserve for the entire population, the creation of which the government has tasked the Estonian Stockpiling Centre (ESC) with.

 

ESC has, on its own initiative, instead pursued a different target, under which ca 130,000 people—i.e. only a few, just 10% of the population—are covered by food reserves for 30 days. The National Audit Office also doubts whether even this reserve aligns with reality: it has stated clearly that “the set target level does not take into account the possible needs of any specific emergency or national defence crisis,” meaning that as a goal it is, as Auditor General Janar Holm noted, “plucked out of thin air.”¹ In the post-audit counter-communication by the Estonian Stockpiling Centre (ESC), however, there is an attempt to divert attention away from the very serious lack of reserves, talking about everything other than the lack of reserves itself.²

 

To illustrate the seriousness of the situation, it is appropriate to use a few real-life examples. Applied to a similar situation in a family, this would mean that although the plan was to buy a food reserve for the entire family, only, for example, the father buys it for himself. The remaining family members can figure out on their own how to cope. Probably no further explanation is needed to understand that this is not a normal way to behave.

 

One can also imagine a parallel from military, national defence, where the Ministry of Defence gives the Estonian Centre for Defence Investments (ECDI) the task of procuring 100 000 shells, 155mm calibre. ECDI decides instead to procure something else altogether, and in a different quantity—for example, 122mm calibre and 500 000 pieces—saying that “it’s almost the same anyway” or that it is some kind of “interim goal”. Since the Estonian Defence Forces cannot actually use what was purchased (because the 122mm howitzers were long ago given to Ukraine; with the wrong calibre there is nothing you can do) and the client’s assignment was ignored, at least two things would likely happen: non-performance would be established and someone would be held responsible. It is obvious that such an error cannot be left uncorrected in any serious way. Otherwise, if indifference is also the norm on the military national defence side, one must ask—where is the credibility of national defence?

 

 

At this point it is important to emphasise that most of the national food reserve must be deployable relatively quickly (preferably immediately). If food cannot be obtained from shops and household supplies run out, dissatisfaction inevitably arises, followed by panic. If the reserve requires energy and large-scale processing (turning grain into flour) or complex distribution, it may exist on paper but still fail to reach people in time.

 

Food shortages during a crisis, however, pose an internal security threat, because the risk increases of moving toward theft and looting. A food reserve is therefore also a very important objective for internal security, as it helps prevent a large share of the problems that tend to arise quickly in crises when food is scarce. Thus, a food reserve is a very important objective for the state in order to ensure the state’s ability to function and the continued functioning of society even in the most difficult times.