crisis-management - MTÜ Kriisiuuringute Keskus

We commented on the state of Estonia’s food reserves on the Aktuaalne Kaamera Nädal programme

kruk — Sun, 01 Feb 2026 18:24:00 +0000

We commented on the state of Estonia’s food reserves on the Aktuaalne Kaamera Nädal programme

On February 1, Hannes Nagel, Head of the Crisis Research Centre, gave an interview on Aktuaalne Kaamera Nädal, the Estonian Public Broadcasting programme, on the topic of Estonia’s state food reserves for civil protection.

We have previously pointed out that the Estonian Stockpiling Agency does not fulfill the task given by the government: a nationwide 14-day state food reserve covering the entire population has not been established, and in reality the existing reserves amount to only approximately three days. We emphasise that although the state has begun supplying shops and fuel stations with generators and working to improve the resilience of food producers, an audit by the National Audit Office has revealed serious shortcomings and inexplicable ad-hoc practices in the activities of the Stockpiling Centre.

We stress that it is important for every person, according to their means, to have at home at least a one-week supply of food, and preferably a two-week supply. At the same time, it is unthinkable that the responsibility for building crisis reserves should rest solely on ordinary citizens. If we look at the average Estonian, they live in an apartment where space is inevitably limited. This places clear constraints on how much and what type of emergency supplies can realistically be stored at home. Therefore, it is not realistic to expect the average Estonian resident—especially in the context of rising living costs—to begin stockpiling months’ worth of food and drinking water in their apartment.

🟠 The programme can be rewatched here from 24:48 to 30:55.

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National food reserve only for a few: sounds like The Hunger Games

kruk — Wed, 28 Jan 2026 17:15:16 +0000

National food reserve only for a few: sounds like The Hunger Games

The National Audit Office has audited the state of the country’s food reserves: whether the reserves exist and to what extent they can be put into use in a crisis. It emerged that even in 2026 the country does not have food reserves to the extent the government has set as a goal—14 days’ worth of food for the entire population, i.e. about 1.3 million people. Instead, the managers of the Estonian Stockpiling Centre have come up with their own goal—a food reserve for a small part of society.

Food reserves are a critically important part of food security—compared to the healthcare system, they are like emergency medical services, which must be immediately available in a crisis. The National Audit Office’s aim was precisely to verify the existence of the food reserves and how quickly they can be brought into use. The report shows that the country still does not have food reserves to the extent the government has set as a goal. There is no 14-day food reserve for the entire population, the creation of which the government has tasked the Estonian Stockpiling Centre (ESC) with.

ESC has, on its own initiative, instead pursued a different target, under which ca 130,000 people—i.e. only a few, just 10% of the population—are covered by food reserves for 30 days. The National Audit Office also doubts whether even this reserve aligns with reality: it has stated clearly that “the set target level does not take into account the possible needs of any specific emergency or national defence crisis,” meaning that as a goal it is, as Auditor General Janar Holm noted, “plucked out of thin air.”¹ In the post-audit counter-communication by the Estonian Stockpiling Centre (ESC), however, there is an attempt to divert attention away from the very serious lack of reserves, talking about everything other than the lack of reserves itself.²

To illustrate the seriousness of the situation, it is appropriate to use a few real-life examples. Applied to a similar situation in a family, this would mean that although the plan was to buy a food reserve for the entire family, only, for example, the father buys it for himself. The remaining family members can figure out on their own how to cope. Probably no further explanation is needed to understand that this is not a normal way to behave.

One can also imagine a parallel from military, national defence, where the Ministry of Defence gives the Estonian Centre for Defence Investments (ECDI) the task of procuring 100 000 shells, 155mm calibre. ECDI decides instead to procure something else altogether, and in a different quantity—for example, 122mm calibre and 500 000 pieces—saying that “it’s almost the same anyway” or that it is some kind of “interim goal”. Since the Estonian Defence Forces cannot actually use what was purchased (because the 122mm howitzers were long ago given to Ukraine; with the wrong calibre there is nothing you can do) and the client’s assignment was ignored, at least two things would likely happen: non-performance would be established and someone would be held responsible. It is obvious that such an error cannot be left uncorrected in any serious way. Otherwise, if indifference is also the norm on the military national defence side, one must ask—where is the credibility of national defence?

Lack of food reserves means hunger

Food reserves are important in themselves: their existence affects every person’s life and the functioning of society at the start of a crisis, when the risk of panic is greatest and, in the case of war, the state could even collapse. From a longer-term perspective, concern about the entire food-security chain is of course justified. Local production and the movement of goods across the border are important, but the risks associated with those, too, are mitigated at the beginning of a crisis by that same on-site food reserve. Therefore, shortcomings in food reserves must not be buried under the argument that there are problems in areas X and Y as well and that we shouldn’t talk only about food reserves. We must talk about them, because they are also independently very important.

At this point it is important to emphasise that most of the national food reserve must be deployable relatively quickly (preferably immediately). If food cannot be obtained from shops and household supplies run out, dissatisfaction inevitably arises, followed by panic. If the reserve requires energy and large-scale processing (turning grain into flour) or complex distribution, it may exist on paper but still fail to reach people in time.

Food shortages during a crisis, however, pose an internal security threat, because the risk increases of moving toward theft and looting. A food reserve is therefore also a very important objective for internal security, as it helps prevent a large share of the problems that tend to arise quickly in crises when food is scarce. Thus, a food reserve is a very important objective for the state in order to ensure the state’s ability to function and the continued functioning of society even in the most difficult times.

High-paid insubordinate freelancing

It is also important to note that ESC was created precisely to end a situation where each ministry dealt with reserves on its own and the result was uneven capability and diffuse responsibility.³ The idea of a central system was to consolidate tasks and responsibility in one place. However, no one seems to have foreseen that the central administrator, a “strategic enterprise”, would begin rewriting the government’s objectives itself, once it becomes clear that it cannot cope with meeting those objectives.

In addition, if you independently dilute the objective, you can of course also say that we coped, we got it done! This is how one can read in ESC’s 2024 annual report that “the tasks set upon the company’s establishment to form the state’s operational reserves have by now been fulfilled.”⁴ As regards food reserves, that task has not been fulfilled, as the National Audit Office has pointed out. Someone is lying, or ESC has created for itself a complete parallel world with its own objectives that has no contact with reality.

At the same time, ESC is, among state-owned enterprises, the institution with by far the highest average salary—nearly 5700€ per month. Alongside their other tasks, they have also found time to conduct satisfaction surveys, from which they have learned that “partners assess ESC as a professional, fast-acting and competent organisation, staffed by helpful people who take into account the needs of society and partners, who are open and have good communication skills”.⁴

Unfortunately, the highly paid managers there have overlooked the client’s expectation—and, more broadly, society’s as well: not to starve to death in the event of a crisis.

A body that considers itself a centre of competence, however, unfortunately radiates a lack of competence and highly paid, insubordinate ineptitude. If the food reserve has not been created in line with the assignment given by the state and with actual needs, then there is indeed reason to speak of a loss of trust in the management. In any other field, an insubordinate, highly paid manager who engages in freelance improvisation would be sent to the Unemployment Insurance Fund (not to run it). The substantive absence of food reserves for most of society affects everyone. Taking responsibility for the resulting Russian-style bardak is entirely appropriate—perhaps even expected—though it will probably once again require a signal from somewhere above (if it comes at all). Will anyone actually take that responsibility?

There is a leadership crisis in civil protection

The food-reserves case is a symptom of a leadership crisis in the field of civil protection. It shows what happens when different ministries and agencies have to cooperate on a single task—the creation of a food reserve. ESC is indeed under the area of governance of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications, but the input for the food reserve comes from the Ministry of Regional Affairs and Agriculture. On the one hand, this is a bureaucratic nightmare in which responsibility is lacking; on the other, it is an ideal scenario for an aggressor, where, to knock over the house of cards of food security, the defenders do the preparatory work themselves, doing the work at best half-heartedly, in a slapdash manner.

There has also been talk of “exiling” the food-reserves field under the Ministry of Regional Affairs and Agriculture as a way to solve the problem.⁵ This is not a solution and will not produce results; it is the last place to take the field. More broadly, however, the problem is that civil protection in general is scattered helter-skelter across the silo towers of ministries and agencies, and this has not produced results elsewhere either—for example, according to the Rescue Board’s latest data, evacuation capability is 1.5% of the population—again, for very few. Narva alone has more people living there.

Shuttling the field back and forth between ministries and chopping it up has not produced the desired results in any aspect of civil protection. Strengthening comprehensive national defence can be done effectively, for example, in the Swedish manner, where both military national defence and civil protection have been placed under the Ministry of Defence, with each of the two fields having its own responsible minister.^A

The never-ending ‘let’s patch the potholes’ dress rehearsal for civil protection is about to enter its fifth year—with the targets still nowhere in sight. Until civil protection and national defence are brought together under the Ministry of Defence, as in Sweden,⁶ there is no real solution and there will not be one. Managing comprehensive national defence from a single ministry is indispensable for achieving real results, because then the front-line and rear-area perspectives—and their mutual support—gain a strategic outlook in practice. In that case, the resource base is also shared. The Ministry of Defence’s situational-awareness radar sees clearly to the horizon, knows what needs to be done, and does not live in a fantasy world. But if the leadership crisis in civil protection is not resolved, then we will find ourselves in the new decade still having to state that the state remains unable to help its residents.

Remarks:

^AIn Estonia’s context, these ministers inevitably have to come from the same party; otherwise, the result is the all-too-familiar tradition of day-to-day politics overriding the state’s and society’s strategic objectives.

Sources:

🟠 The op-ed (by Hannes Nagel) was first published in Delfi’s opinion portal on January 27 in Estonian and January 28 in Russian. Photo: food-reserve cartoon (Kriisiuuringute Keskus, 2026).

¹Hallismaa, M. 2026. Riigi ootused varude keskusele irduvad tegelikkusest. 16.01.2026, ERR.

²Metsalu-Nurminen, I. 2026. Riigi tegevusvaru eesmärk on jätkuvalt täitmata. 23.01.2026, ERR.

³[Anon.], 2021. Valitsus toetas Eesti Varude Keskuse loomist. 11.03.2021, Vabariigi Valitsus.

⁴ [Anon.], 2025. Majandusaasta aruanne 2024. AS Eesti Varude Keskus.

⁵ Ojakivi, M. & Peegel, M. 2026. Terras: minu vastutus on tuua rasked teemad arutellu. 22.01.2026, ERR.

⁶ [Anon.], 2026. Ministry of Defence. Government Office of Sweden.

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If the power plant has been blown up, the plug won’t help

kruk — Thu, 18 Dec 2025 09:02:30 +0000

If the power plant has been blown up, the plug won’t help

There has been a claim¹ that the heating problem in large panel buildings during a major crisis is actually simple and inexpensive to solve: a backup power plug installed in the basement along with a small generator is said to ensure that apartments in massive Lasnamäe blocks remain warm even in an emergency. It is an appealing idea because it offers a concrete and comforting answer to a complex and frightening problem. However, it is worth pausing for a moment and looking at the reality — which does not need to be sought far — the Ukrainian experience.

Ukraine is not living through a hypothetical crisis. Russia has deliberately and systematically attacked thermal power plants, boiler houses, substations, and pumping stations — infrastructure objects that are critically necessary for providing essential services. The goal is not to cause isolated disruptions, but to make cities uninhabitable in a systematic way: cold, darkness, and stalled infrastructure.² In such conditions, the crisis is no longer about whether a building has electricity for a circulation pump, but whether heat can be produced at all and fed into the network.

This leads to an inevitable question: if the solution were truly this simple and cost only a few hundred euros, why has it not resolved the cold-season hardships of Ukraine’s civilian population? The answer is uncomfortable but honest. This solution works only under one very specific condition — the heating plant must still exist and be able to produce heat. Ukraine’s experience shows that in a crisis, this is not a condition you can reliably count on.

If the solution cost only 300 euros, Ukraine wouldn’t have a problem with the cold

Concerns are often met with the argument that production plants have black start capability and that air defence protects the infrastructure. But here too we must look at reality. Ukraine’s air defence is strong and effective, yet even there it cannot intercept all attacks, and the reliability of energy infrastructure remains a constant struggle. Moreover, the primary task of air defence is to protect military units and critical military assets. In our geopolitical reality, energy production inevitably remains vulnerable.

Getting heat into people’s homes is not rocket science for specialists in the field, but large Vital Service Providers (VSP) should recognise that in a military crisis they are key targets — the kind that will be blown up. This too is not rocket science, but a method designed to inflict maximum damage in the rear at minimal cost. For this reason, crisis preparedness cannot be limited to a scenario in which electricity is temporarily down but everything else continues to function

We must also ask the essential, more difficult questions that have so far been left unasked. What happens if the thermal power plant no longer exists? If the boiler house has been physically destroyed, not just taken offline?

If the network cannot be restored for days or even weeks? It must be understood that the greatest enemy of a district heating network is a flying object filled with explosives, not a mild power outage that merely stops water circulation. In such a situation, a plug in the basement or a small generator will not help. They may buy time, but they do not replace production. Indeed, generators, battery solutions, and temporary systems are widely used in Ukraine as well. But they are used knowingly as limited tools, not as a promise that the problem is solved in all possible scenarios.

Evacuation is one of the real scenarios

There is another nuance that is rarely discussed. Crisis preparedness does not only mean technical solutions but also the readiness to make the hardest decisions, including evacuation. Honest crisis planning must take into account the possibility that an essential service may be disrupted for an extended period. The message “don’t worry, a plug in the basement will fix everything” creates a false sense of security.

Saying that nothing can go wrong with heating in panel buildings if a 300–500€ solution is installed works at least partly against the efforts of the Rescue Board and municipal authorities, whose aim is to make people acknowledge disruptions, prepare for them, and think through very uncomfortable scenarios. Preparing for a crisis cannot be based on reassuring people at any cost — it must include an honest explanation of what could happen in scenarios A, B and C, and what must be done then. This applies even when Vital Service Providers (VSP) are targeted from the first days of a conflict and are therefore unable to provide services for a prolonged period.

Indeed, a few hundred euros can improve preparedness and buy extra time in the case of a simple power outage. A backup plug and generator are useful tools in more limited crises. Unfortunately, they are of no help when the heating plant simply no longer exists. This is precisely the question that should be asked and considered — what is the plan in such a case, rather than believing in convenient miracle solutions.

🟠 This op-ed (Hannes Nagel) was originally published on December 16, 2026 in the Delfi portal. Photo: large apartment building blocks in Lasnamäe (Kriisiuuringute Keskus, 2025).

Sources:

¹ Raig, T. & Reivart, A. 2025. INTERVJUU | Utilitase kaugküttejuht: Lasnamäe külmumise jutt on jama. Soojakriisi lahendamiseks piisab fööni jagu elektrist. Ärileht, 16.12.2025.

²Harding, L. 2025. ‘They decided to kill us with cold’: Ukrainians struggle against Russian assault on power network. The Guardian, 22.11.2025.

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INTERVIEW | The age of polycrises demands a new mindset from crisis managers

kruk — Fri, 12 Dec 2025 08:53:58 +0000

INTERVIEW | The age of polycrises demands a new mindset from crisis managers

The Crisis Research Center spoke with Hendrik Priisaar, one of the first Estonians to be admitted to one of Finland’s newer programmes in strategic crisis management and security policy. Tampere University’s SAFER programme shapes a way of thinking suited to the era of polycrises — a world in which demographic pressures, economic shocks, and security threats do not unfold as separate crises but merge into a single, multi-layered systemic problem.

The new programme offers tools for understanding, preventing, and strategically managing these interconnections — skills for which demand is growing across the entire Northern European security space.

How did you end up studying in Tampere University’s SAFER programme?

I was still in the final year of my bachelor’s studies when it was time to look a bit into the future and also inward, to consider what I would like to pursue after graduating from the University of Tartu. I searched for master’s programmes both in Estonia and abroad, and Tampere University’s SAFER programme — Security Management and Politics — caught my attention. There were two tracks to choose from: Security Governance within administrative sciences and International Security within social sciences. I chose the latter as my preference and was selected in a highly competitive admissions process. I moved to Finland already in mid-August this year and so far I have been very satisfied with my studies.

Which topics or courses have so far had the greatest impact on your understanding of crisis management and resilience?

Our curriculum includes a course specifically focused on crisis management and resilience, but more broadly these themes run through all courses. In lectures and seminars we acquire new “tools” for understanding different crises, but applying them in the era of polycrises — where, for example, ageing populations, high inflation, and military threats must be addressed simultaneously — is far from simple. Every crisis requires definition, management, and stakeholder engagement. Most importantly, it matters how a situation is framed as a crisis, and even more so, who does the framing. President Donald Trump’s efforts to deploy National Guard forces primarily to Democrat-led cities to combat alleged high crime rates are, in my view, a clear example of failed framing. Defining crises in ways that are not grounded in facts only adds complexity to assessing crises and their management appropriately.

What has surprised you or made you rethink crisis management?

Crisis management is often thought to concern only how leaders respond during a crisis and how organizations implement decisions once a crisis is underway. In reality, a very large part of crisis management lies in prevention and in building resilience. An organization’s first priority should be to avoid the emergence of crises: to identify potential risks to its operations, develop plans to mitigate them, and practice based on those plans. However, crises cannot always be prevented, which is why crisis managers must also think about how to make institutional processes as resilient and at the same time flexible as possible in order to cope with different types of crises.

Looking to the future — in what role or field do you see yourself applying your crisis management education?

I believe that both professionally and personally it is beneficial to test oneself in a variety of roles and fields. Fortunately, as a student I have already been able to gain experience in all three sectors, and in each of them the nature of potential crises differs. I have been most drawn to experience in the public sector, where impact and responsibility are greatest. Seeing the existential threat posed by Estonia’s eastern neighbour, I also feel a strong personal motivation to help prevent the outbreak of a military crisis. For this reason, I hope to be working in foreign and defence policy–related roles in the future.

The questions were answered by Hendrik Priisaar, a student in Tampere University’s SAFER programme.

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We discussed the state of civil protection and crisis preparedness in Estonia on Äripäev radio’s morning program

kruk — Fri, 05 Dec 2025 18:27:44 +0000

We discussed the state of civil protection and crisis preparedness in Estonia on Äripäev radio’s morning program

On December 5, Hannes Nagel, head of the Crisis Research Center, gave an overview of the state of civil protection and crisis preparedness on Äripäev’s morning program, focusing on the actual situation of Estonia’s sheltering and bomb shelter capacity. Several details emerged during the talk: the core problem with the system is not individual shortcomings, but overall preparedness.

We talked on the programme about the actual state of civil protection in Estonia and focused on the main points of concern. We began with (bomb) shelters. Nothing has changed since spring – not a single technically engineered shelterhas been built in Estonia to this day. Although the law requires new buildings whose construction permits are issued from July 1, 2026 onward to include a shelter, builders still cannot act, because the technical implementing acts have not yet been released. In practice, this means there is an obligation, but the substance of that obligation remains unknown.

The draft requirements for shelters and hiding places that do exist have not been approved. As long as precise requirements are missing, the construction sector has no way of knowing what the real content of these requirements will be.

Public hiding places have been chosen “intuitively”

Next, we discussed the topic of hiding places, which in existing buildings are the only practically feasible solution. However, Estonia also lacks a final regulation on hiding places. As long as the requirements are unknown, each property owner can essentially decide for themselves what should be considered a “hiding place.”

The selection of public hiding places, which according to the explanatory memorandum to the amendment of the Emergency Act has been chosen by the Estonian Rescue Board, is based on fire safety considerations and the intuitive assumption that these places would protect people. No engineering assessment has been carried out to evaluate their actual protective capacity. For example: even if a building appears strong, this does not automatically mean it can withstand blast-wave pressure or protect against fragments. Nevertheless, this intuitive judgment is currently the basis for selecting such places.

In addition, there is a contradiction in the law that effectively nullifies the entire solution. The obligation to establish a hiding place is formulated conditionally – only “if possible.” If an owner concludes that it is not possible to establish a hiding place (which is easy to justify, since buildings were not designed with this principle in mind), they can simply prepare a hiding plan (which does not include a hiding place), and the obligation is considered fulfilled. This results in a capability that exists only on paper but not in reality. It is an example of a formal obligation that is, in practice, voluntary.

We then moved on to the question of how vulnerable Estonia actually is. The (bomb) shelter requirement does not apply to buildings whose construction permit applications are submitted before July 1, 2026. This creates two parallel worlds: strict requirements for future buildings, while more than 90% of Estonia’s housing stock will remain without (bomb) shelters even in the future. And even if the implementing acts were published tomorrow, the first buildings with (bomb) shelters would likely be completed only in 2029–2030. If delays continue, the timeline will shift to 2031–2032. By that time, the war in Ukraine will have lasted an entire decade – a parallel that illustrates how naïvely unrealistic it is to hope that threats will wait for our procedural timelines. In the programme, we proposed the following order of solutions:

first, the implementing acts that set out the requirements for hiding places and (bomb) shelters must be approved and published without delay;
second, the state must allocate significantly more resources to programmes that help adapt existing buildings for hiding. The support scheme for apartment associations in Tallinn (and the similar scheme planned by the state) shows that solutions are possible, but the current scale is marginal compared to the actual need. The amount of support per residential building must be higher than 10,000 euros in order to carry out meaningful structural reinforcements;
third, a clear political message is needed: (bomb) shelters can and must be built immediately, not only once the legal deadline arrives. This is especially important for schools, kindergartens, and care institutions – they cannot be left waiting until the middle of 2030. However, this depends on the previous two points: the regulations that define the requirements must accompany the law, and adequate support measures are needed for those who want to move faster on sheltering.

Finally, we assessed the outlook for 2026 – (bomb) shelters are still lacking; in a military crisis the state will not have the capacity to assist the population; the best thing individuals can do is maintain personal crisis preparedness, which should serve as the foundation for building community-level capability to help one another; the core problem lies in the absence of political will and understanding, and in decisions that have been repeatedly postponed.

🎙️ Listen to an excerpt from the program here.

Photo: Visit to Äripäev radio (Kriisiuuringute Keskus, 2025).

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Apartment building community crisis preparedness textbook ordering form

kruk — Thu, 04 Dec 2025 19:56:20 +0000

Apartment building community crisis preparedness textbook ordering form

Order a free “Apartment Building Community Crisis Preparedness Textbook,” designed for residents of apartment buildings, the majority of Estonia’s population, whose living conditions are characterised by a strong reliance on centralised services, making them especially vulnerable in crisis situations.

Published in May, the textbook covers three core pillars of crisis preparedness in apartment buildings: relationships, supplies, and skills. It is based on the premise that achieving crisis preparedness in an apartment building is most effective at the community level — primarily within the housing cooperative. Until now, the state has focused on individuals’ personal supplies and skills, where major gaps still remain, but the community dimension of crisis preparedness has been largely overlooked.

The textbook is intended for people who want to begin developing crisis preparedness in their apartment building. It addresses both strengthening individual preparedness and initiating community-level preparedness within the cooperative. The emphasis is on communication, creating a shared crisis plan, and mobilising human resources — large buildings house many people who, with thoughtful organisation, could support one another.

The textbook also discusses personal crisis preparedness as a prerequisite for helping others. Chapter by chapter, it explains the importance of preparing for crises in an urban environment, the role of the community in a city setting, and how to begin building community-level preparedness. It also covers what to do if living in the city becomes impossible due to a crisis and evacuation becomes necessary.

The textbook can be ordered in print HERE for the cost of postage. Its development and printing were supported through the Väike-Õismäe community civil protection project by the National Foundation of Civil Society and the Estonian Ministry of the Interior, and the content has been reviewed and approved by the Estonian Rescue Board.

Photo: Estonia’s first apartment building community crisis preparedness textbook (Kriisiuuringute Keskus, 2025).

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Meeting with the Czech Ministry of the Interior: the role of community civil protection and resilience hubs

kruk — Mon, 27 Oct 2025 10:00:00 +0000

Meeting with the Czech Ministry of the Interior: the role of community civil protection and resilience hubs

On 27 October, we met with Jaroslav Valuch, a representative of the Czech Ministry of the Interior, to discuss strengthening community civil protection and the role of resilience hubs in enhancing local communities’ capacity to cope with crises. The discussion focused on how to improve citizens’ preparedness for various emergencies and what practical community-level solutions can be applied to achieve this

At the meeting, we presented our previous international and Estonian projects (in Tallinn and Kohtla-Järve, supported by the Civil Society Endowment Fund) as well as the Community Civil Protection Handbook for Apartment Buildings, published earlier this year. We also handed over its English version to our Czech colleague. The handbook aims to support apartment building communities with practical guidelines and tools to help them better prepare for crises and strengthen neighbourhood cohesion and continuity.

The meeting builds on our earlier work within the PIMA project (funded by the Swedish Institute), where we explored the concept of resilience hubs in Estonia, Ukraine, and Sweden, and their potential role within civil protection systems. These hubs serve as local support points that can provide information, supplies, and coordination during crises — and, in peacetime, foster cooperation and awareness among communities.

“Strengthening civil protection begins with communities themselves. When residents know how to act, how to support one another, and where to turn in times of crisis, the entire system becomes more resilient. At the meeting with the Czech Ministry of the Interior, it was mutually emphasized that many of these challenges — from floods to hybrid threats — require not only infrastructure, but also trust and local engagement for an effective response,” noted Hannes Nagel, CEO of the Crisis Research Centre.

Like Estonia, the Czech Republic is moving toward a more comprehensive approach to crisis preparedness. The main concerns highlighted by representatives of the Ministry were large-scale floods and major power outages, along with the growing risks associated with hybrid attacks. During the discussion, it was noted that stronger cooperation at the community level and increasing public awareness are key to building resilience.

We have previously provided comprehensive overviews of Prague’s civil protection facilities, which can be read here and here. These provide a good overview of the country’s crisis preparedness infrastructure and approaches, against which our recent discussion is even more relevant.

Photo: meeting on October 27 (Kriisiuuringute Keskus, 2025).

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How do we know if Estonian local governments are prepared for crises?

kruk — Wed, 15 Oct 2025 10:00:00 +0000

How do we know if Estonian local governments are prepared for crises?

It is in the interests of every outgoing and incoming local government leader, as well as residents, to know how Estonian local governments are doing in terms of crisis preparedness. The state assesses this through a service level model across local governments over a number of years, and the results are available for each local government on the minuomavalitsus.ee portal. At first glance, everything seems positive – the service level of local governments is calculated on the basis of data, which is becoming greener on the map every year, as if confirming that crisis preparedness is improving rapidly.

The assessment is based on crisis preparedness criteria, in which it is possible to achieve a basic, advanced, or exemplary level. For example, there is a criterion called “The crisis committee is functional,” in which the local government is assessed according to its activities to determine how well it is performing. Based on the fulfillment of the criteria, the overall service level is calculated on a scale of 0–9 (the better you are, the higher the final score). Looking at the service levels, it seems that local governments are increasingly prepared for crises, but a closer look reveals that an increasingly green map can be misleading.

There are serious methodological questions about how this data has been collected, particularly from the point of view of comparability. It appears that the wording of the levels used as the basis for assessment has been partially changed and reworded from year to year, and new criteria have also been added. This is a problem because, by changing an important part of the methodology in this way, the data can no longer be considered fully comparable. It is no longer possible to be certain about the extent to which development has actually taken place over the years.

There may be situations where local governments appear to be increasingly competent, but their actual readiness remains stagnant. The problem lies in the inconsistency of the methodology used. Firstly, as mentioned above, the descriptions of the criteria levels have been changed. For example, in 2022, local governments were assessed according to 26 criteria, and in 2024, according to 27. One criterion was added and the level descriptions were changed for as many as seven (nearly a third!) criteria. In practice, this means that if a local government achieved the advanced level for fulfilling one requirement in one year, it later achieved it for a slightly different activity. As a real-life example, I would like to compare a situation where in one year the criterion for graduating with a gold medal is a grade of “5” in all subjects, but in the next year, half of the grades can be “4” and the medal is still awarded. In this case, the school would say that we are getting better and better, there are more medalists.

In this method, the scale itself (basic level–advanced level–exemplary) has remained formally the same, but what is understood by, for example, exemplary level may have changed from year to year. For example, if in 2022 the criterion “Assistance is guaranteed to risk groups in emergency situations” at the basic level meant that “risk groups as defined by the Social Welfare Act have been mapped,” then by 2024, the wording was limited to the general phrase “persons belonging to risk groups have been mapped.” The result is two essentially different indicators. In 2022, some criteria did not have an “exemplary” level at all, but by 2024, this had appeared. This means that there could be a sudden increase in the number of local governments that are suddenly exemplary (and receive more points) because a new assessment level has been created. Such seemingly minor shifts can tip some local governments into being more advanced, and others into being exemplary – or perhaps more competent.

Secondly, some of the indicators have become less stringent over time. In 2021, an exemplary, or highest-level, local government had to be able to guarantee evacuation sites for at least 10% of the population under the criterion of “extent of evacuation sites” (Kaal & Lillo, 2023, p. 23). By 2024, this had disappeared: it is sufficient to have 2% of places, with the actual scope describing only the “basic level.” A municipality can now be considered exemplary even if the scope of evacuation sites, i.e., the capacity to accommodate people, has not been increased, but other issues have been addressed. Thus, some local governments may once again “rise” from one level of crisis preparedness to another without their actual capabilities having improved.

Thirdly, the methodology for collecting data has been inconsistent. In 2018–2019, information was collected solely on the basis of documents, while in 2021, interviews were conducted by officials from the Rescue Board themselves – the very same people who are supposed to be monitoring local governments. It was not until 2023 that a method combining document analysis and surveys was introduced, which its creators have said will help reduce the influence of officials as interviewers on the results (Kaal & Lillo, 2023, p. 18). Thus, it is not possible to speak of a uniform and comparable data series.

The fourth problem is that the criteria levels are used to calculate the service levels of local governments and, in turn, the median level for Estonia, with both measured in terms of development over the years. However, given the problems, it cannot really be said that the averages reflect the actual situation. If the content of the levels changes over time, the aggregate levels cannot be used for decision-making or comparison. To put it bluntly, the map may become greener and greener, but this does not guarantee that preparedness has actually improved.

The problem is that decisions are made based on crisis preparedness service levels. When politicians or government agencies see that the average level is rising and the maps are turning greener, they are tempted to declare success and reduce attention and resources (money) in the area. But what does it mean for citizens if we have a false understanding of local governments’ crisis preparedness, even if only partially? For example, in the context of a military crisis, this could mean the following: the evacuation plan is “exemplary” on paper, but at the critical moment, there are no people to implement it; the list of public hidings places is available on the web portal, but the doors are closed; the crisis committee has met three times a year, but the actual development of the field is questionable. This means an illusion of preparedness.

However, a separate question is why we claim to be ready at all. The current system treats all crises with the same yardstick – storms, cyber incidents, and drone warfare are all placed on the same scale, regardless of their scope. In reality, no local government is ready for drone warfare, but the map may give the impression that they are at an “exemplary” level.

A database that purports to show the comparability of local governments may create a false sense of security, which in turn may lead to the misallocation of resources, leave actual shortcomings unresolved, and undermine the credibility of both local governments and the state in crisis management. In summary, due to methodological confusion, no one can reliably say today to what extent the crisis preparedness of local governments has improved in recent years. This is not just a technical or wording problem – if the underlying data is not comparable, conclusions about improvements in preparedness cannot be reliable. This can lead to false positive results.

Crisis preparedness assessments can only be reliable if the methodology is stable and transparent. In order to ensure comparability, the descriptions of the levels must not be reworded from year to year, and if this is done, the changes must be clearly highlighted and their impact on comparability must be demonstrated. Only by doing so can decision-makers obtain an adequate data-based overview and residents an honest picture of the crisis preparedness of their home region.

× The op-ed (by Hannes Nagel) was first published on October 10, 2025 on the Estonian Daily web portal. Photo: portal screens (Kriisiuuringute Keskus, 2025).

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Reflections on crisis management: panel discussion at Tampere University

kruk — Tue, 07 Oct 2025 11:00:00 +0000

Reflections on crisis management: panel discussion at Tampere University

On October 7, a panel discussion was held at Tampere University (Finland) to open the crisis management course of the SAFER programme. The discussion took place within the framework of the OVERCOME project, funded by Nordplus.

Anne-May Nagel, from the Crisis Research Centre, participated in the panel as one of TalTech’s representatives. The discussion focused on students’ questions concerning the nature and practical challenges of crisis management and resilience. The panel marked the launch of a course in which TalTech, together with colleagues from Tampere University and the University of Agder, is testing a new learning materials bank developed for a microcredential in crisis management and resilience.

The discussion was primarily based on questions submitted by students before and during the session. Prior to the panel, students also took part in a short survey on crises, the results of which showed strong interest in various types of crises – most often political, economic, health-related, and operational. As key solutions, students emphasized clear communication, flexible pre-agreed action plans, network cooperation, and learning from mistakes.

Throughout the discussion, the panelists underlined that crisis management is not only about reacting, but also about learning, adapting, and recovering. As was noted during the discussion, a crisis is not merely a breaking point, but also an opportunity to find a new balance and strengthen resilience – at the individual, organizational, and societal levels alike.

The Crisis Research Centre thanks the OVERCOME project partners for a meaningful discussion and looks forward to receiving feedback from students who will engage with the microcredential materials during the course.

Photo: discussion at Tampere University (Taltech, 2025).

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Drills on paper, chaos in the field — where is the civil protection culture?

kruk — Wed, 03 Sep 2025 14:51:50 +0000

Drills on paper, chaos in the field — where is the civil protection culture?

The aftermath of the saga of a drone that veered off its trajectory is invaluable teaching material for policymakers and practitioners in the field of internal security. The incident vividly shows that Estonia lacks a systematic civil protection culture — suffice it to note that the municipality learned of its own crisis after the fact, via the media.1

On an early August morning, the aftermath of a drone that fell and exploded exposed more than a few embarrassing details. There were quite a number of security and law-enforcement agencies that responded (albeit only after a conscientious farmer’s call), yet the municipality and residents were essentially left uninformed about what had happened—or it was simply not deemed necessary to tell them.

In either case, this raises questions about the role of municipalities and communities in crisis management. On the one hand, municipalities are being assigned ever more tasks in crisis preparedness. Tabletop and field exercises follow one after another to practise cooperation. Yet it turns out that this much-rehearsed, multi-level cooperation does not work literally out in the field, where realistic scenarios actually unfold. This points to the absence of a deeper civil protection culture—one that is ingrained and operates, so to speak, on muscle memory.

Why involve the local government?

As long as the local government is not even informed about what happened, we cannot speak of a functioning, broad-based civil protection system. Such a system exists only when there is effective multi-level cooperation. Estonia’s crisis management must not drift into a situation where demands are placed on local governments, yet in a real crisis they are seen—put bluntly—as a superfluous actor. Or worse: they are simply not trusted to be entrusted with important information.

The late involvement of the local government is regrettable, because it deprived responsible officials there—and the community—of the chance to learn under real conditions how to handle the situation. In hindsight one can, of course, think through what the municipality would have done, but that strips away the pressure and stress that would show how the system functions under pressure, in real-life conditions.

We must also discuss the individual’s role in the incident. Part of a civil-protection culture is that every person reports a suspected bomb or explosion to the authorities—primarily by calling the emergency centre. Thanks to journalists’ work, it has emerged that several local residents thought a bomb had exploded or even that war had begun.² Yet none of those who heard the early-morning blast called the emergency centre. This failure to report raises questions chiefly about whether the state’s communication—regarding the possibility of drones falling in Estonia and the correct actions to take in such a case—came too late. There has been much talk about the need to alleviate fear of war and that the state should not frighten people unnecessarily,³ yet the practical skill—calling the emergency centre when an explosion is suspected—has not been convincingly conveyed.

A civil protection culture also includes speaking realistically about different hazards and teaching what to do in specific situations—especially in a region where drone warfare has been going on for years. People need to know that when there is a state next door that uses all manner of explosive devices against another country every day, it is only elementary to educate the population to cope with such risks. Since the state’s messaging has so far said that it is essentially impossible for any drone to end up here—figuratively, that every bush would start firing from the very first centimetre (of airspace)—people do not believe the drone threat is real at all and therefore do not think through an action plan in advance. Hence individuals do not report, because “this cannot happen.” In this respect, the fault lies not with the person but with inadequate communication.

No drone, no problem?

In this case, it wasn’t only the drone that veered off course; crisis management also departed from what has been practiced for years—above all multilayered coordination and inclusion. The drone incident once again highlights deficiencies in the internal security system. This is a problem that needs solving, because in a modern military crisis such incidents are frequent. Clearly, you can’t respond to every case in wartime with major force—and perhaps you don’t need to. But the public must know what to do—or whether to do anything at all—and the municipality must know what to tell people to prevent greater harm.

One might think that you should inform the public only when there is a real danger, but wait. To do that, you first have to know about the danger. How would even that work without a radar network? Just as it takes two to tango, effective warning also needs two parties—a threat that has been detected and a notifier. We are still stuck in a catch-22. Besides, what would have happened if the municipality had been the first to spot the drone and announced it on social media? When there are no guidelines, nothing is ruled out.

The lack of clear instructions is one of the main obstacles to coping with a crisis—especially when public-safety resources are scarce.

Inevitably, at the start of a crisis, local people have to manage on their own for a while, but without understandable guidance and an ingrained culture of civil protection, that isn’t realistic. Therefore, the systematic development of guidelines and skills is unavoidable, particularly in the already pared-down field of internal security, where frontline workers’ pay, promises, and negotiations are accompanied by consistency⁴ and the stench of manure.

Both the virtually non-existent funding and the culture around civil protection are the result of the sector’s continued undervaluation — next to buying missiles, it is still seen as a playground for “softies.” Let this serve as a cautionary prediction: in a serious crisis, everyone who does not have the option, like a high-ranking government official, to send their family off to Brussels or elsewhere will feel the absence of civil protection.³ And that will painfully eat away at approval ratings, defence capability, and overall morale.

× The op-ed (by Hannes Nagel) was first published on August 29, 2025 on the Estonian Daily web portal. Photo: attack drone in the air (Crisis Research Centre, 2025).

Sources:

¹ Viita-Neuhaus, A. 2025. Kohalikku omavalitsust ründedrooni juhtumist ei teavitatud. Postimees, 26.08.2025.

² Muraveiski, K. 2025. SELGITAJA | Kuidas pääses ohtlik ründedroon üle Eesti piiri ning miks PPA ega kaitsevägi seda ei märganud. Delfi, 26.08.2025.

³ Epner, E. ja Tamme, S. 2025. Saatanlik lõks. Kuidas kujunes sõnum, et Eesti on järgmine. Eesti Ekspress,25.08.2025.

⁴ Lomp, L.-E. 2025. RESi tuliseim arutelu tuleb palkade üle läbi rääkides. Postimees, 25.08.2025.

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