We talked on the programme about the actual state of civil protection in Estonia and focused on the main points of concern. We began with (bomb) shelters. Nothing has changed since spring – not a single technically engineered shelterhas been built in Estonia to this day. Although the law requires new buildings whose construction permits are issued from July 1, 2026 onward to include a shelter, builders still cannot act, because the technical implementing acts have not yet been released. In practice, this means there is an obligation, but the substance of that obligation remains unknown.

The draft requirements for shelters and hiding places that do exist have not been approved. As long as precise requirements are missing, the construction sector has no way of knowing what the real content of these requirements will be.

Public hiding places have been chosen “intuitively”

Next, we discussed the topic of hiding places, which in existing buildings are the only practically feasible solution. However, Estonia also lacks a final regulation on hiding places. As long as the requirements are unknown, each property owner can essentially decide for themselves what should be considered a “hiding place.”

The selection of public hiding places, which according to the explanatory memorandum to the amendment of the Emergency Act has been chosen by the Estonian Rescue Board, is based on fire safety considerations and the intuitive assumption that these places would protect people. No engineering assessment has been carried out to evaluate their actual protective capacity. For example: even if a building appears strong, this does not automatically mean it can withstand blast-wave pressure or protect against fragments. Nevertheless, this intuitive judgment is currently the basis for selecting such places.

In addition, there is a contradiction in the law that effectively nullifies the entire solution. The obligation to establish a hiding place is formulated conditionally – only “if possible.” If an owner concludes that it is not possible to establish a hiding place (which is easy to justify, since buildings were not designed with this principle in mind), they can simply prepare a hiding plan (which does not include a hiding place), and the obligation is considered fulfilled. This results in a capability that exists only on paper but not in reality. It is an example of a formal obligation that is, in practice, voluntary.

We then moved on to the question of how vulnerable Estonia actually is. The (bomb) shelter requirement does not apply to buildings whose construction permit applications are submitted before July 1, 2026. This creates two parallel worlds: strict requirements for future buildings, while more than 90% of Estonia’s housing stock will remain without (bomb) shelters even in the future. And even if the implementing acts were published tomorrow, the first buildings with (bomb) shelters would likely be completed only in 2029–2030. If delays continue, the timeline will shift to 2031–2032. By that time, the war in Ukraine will have lasted an entire decade – a parallel that illustrates how naïvely unrealistic it is to hope that threats will wait for our procedural timelines. In the programme, we proposed the following order of solutions:

• first, the implementing acts that set out the requirements for hiding places and (bomb) shelters must be approved and published without delay;
• second, the state must allocate significantly more resources to programmes that help adapt existing buildings for hiding. The support scheme for apartment associations in Tallinn (and the similar scheme planned by the state) shows that solutions are possible, but the current scale is marginal compared to the actual need. The amount of support per residential building must be higher than 10,000 euros in order to carry out meaningful structural reinforcements;
• third, a clear political message is needed: (bomb) shelters can and must be built immediately, not only once the legal deadline arrives. This is especially important for schools, kindergartens, and care institutions – they cannot be left waiting until the middle of 2030. However, this depends on the previous two points: the regulations that define the requirements must accompany the law, and adequate support measures are needed for those who want to move faster on sheltering.

Finally, we assessed the outlook for 2026 – (bomb) shelters are still lacking; in a military crisis the state will not have the capacity to assist the population; the best thing individuals can do is maintain personal crisis preparedness, which should serve as the foundation for building community-level capability to help one another; the core problem lies in the absence of political will and understanding, and in decisions that have been repeatedly postponed.

🎙️ Listen to an excerpt from the program here.  

Photo: Visit to Äripäev radio (Kriisiuuringute Keskus, 2025).