This is not an ordinary administrative relocation, but a decision with direct implications for civil protection and the state’s crisis management capacity. If such a move is treated purely as a real estate matter, rather than assessed through security considerations, the priorities are fundamentally misplaced. The Estonian Ministry of the Interior oversees the police, rescue services and crisis response system. Civil protection is not only about instructions and public communication; it also means ensuring that leadership of the state’s most critical internal security functions can physically operate during an emergency. The location of the ministry, as a key internal security crisis manager, must guarantee uninterrupted access, evacuation options and operational response.

The selected area, the Kopli peninsula, is a location with restricted access. Traffic congestion in the area is not decreasing; with new developments, it is growing rapidly. There are only a few routes for entering and leaving the peninsula, and their capacity is already under pressure. By car, access is effectively limited to Sõle Street and Kalaranna Street. Even a minor traffic accident on one of the main connections can halt movement and prevent rescue and police units from arriving or leaving quickly. If an ordinary rush-hour accident can paralyse traffic, the impact in a crisis — for example during a large-scale evacuation or simultaneous incidents — would be far greater.

Civil protection leadership cannot rely on infrastructure whose functioning depends on a few easily blocked nodes, especially when new developments are planned and traffic pressure is set to increase further. Nor should it be forgotten that the Kopli peninsula is home to the Mine Harbour, which has strategic significance. The proximity of military infrastructure as a strategic target increases the area’s vulnerability in crisis scenarios. A basic principle of national defence is to disperse critical functions, not concentrate them in an area whose strategic importance makes it a higher-risk zone.

The government’s lack of crisis awareness, and its failure to set a credible example in civil protection, is also illustrated by the fact that the Ministry of the Interior closed the Kopli rescue unit only in 2024 — a unit that would have been able to respond first on site in a crisis. Outside the capital, however, the new norm has become the construction of joint internal security buildings, where the police, rescue services and possibly other functions are placed under one roof. This is a classic case of putting all eggs in one basket to save on real estate costs, but in a crisis the price may be severe.

Ukraine is not living through a hypothetical crisis. Russia has deliberately and systematically attacked thermal power plants, boiler houses, substations, and pumping stations — infrastructure objects that are critically necessary for providing essential services. The goal is not to cause isolated disruptions, but to make cities uninhabitable in a systematic way: cold, darkness, and stalled infrastructure.² In such conditions, the crisis is no longer about whether a building has electricity for a circulation pump, but whether heat can be produced at all and fed into the network.

This leads to an inevitable question: if the solution were truly this simple and cost only a few hundred euros, why has it not resolved the cold-season hardships of Ukraine’s civilian population? The answer is uncomfortable but honest. This solution works only under one very specific condition — the heating plant must still exist and be able to produce heat. Ukraine’s experience shows that in a crisis, this is not a condition you can reliably count on.

If the solution cost only 300 euros, Ukraine wouldn’t have a problem with the cold

Concerns are often met with the argument that production plants have black start capability and that air defence protects the infrastructure. But here too we must look at reality. Ukraine’s air defence is strong and effective, yet even there it cannot intercept all attacks, and the reliability of energy infrastructure remains a constant struggle. Moreover, the primary task of air defence is to protect military units and critical military assets. In our geopolitical reality, energy production inevitably remains vulnerable.

Getting heat into people’s homes is not rocket science for specialists in the field, but large Vital Service Providers (VSP) should recognise that in a military crisis they are key targets — the kind that will be blown up. This too is not rocket science, but a method designed to inflict maximum damage in the rear at minimal cost. For this reason, crisis preparedness cannot be limited to a scenario in which electricity is temporarily down but everything else continues to function

We must also ask the essential, more difficult questions that have so far been left unasked. What happens if the thermal power plant no longer exists? If the boiler house has been physically destroyed, not just taken offline?

If the network cannot be restored for days or even weeks? It must be understood that the greatest enemy of a district heating network is a flying object filled with explosives, not a mild power outage that merely stops water circulation. In such a situation, a plug in the basement or a small generator will not help. They may buy time, but they do not replace production. Indeed, generators, battery solutions, and temporary systems are widely used in Ukraine as well. But they are used knowingly as limited tools, not as a promise that the problem is solved in all possible scenarios.

Evacuation is one of the real scenarios

There is another nuance that is rarely discussed. Crisis preparedness does not only mean technical solutions but also the readiness to make the hardest decisions, including evacuation. Honest crisis planning must take into account the possibility that an essential service may be disrupted for an extended period. The message “don’t worry, a plug in the basement will fix everything” creates a false sense of security.

Saying that nothing can go wrong with heating in panel buildings if a 300–500€ solution is installed works at least partly against the efforts of the Rescue Board and municipal authorities, whose aim is to make people acknowledge disruptions, prepare for them, and think through very uncomfortable scenarios. Preparing for a crisis cannot be based on reassuring people at any cost — it must include an honest explanation of what could happen in scenarios A, B and C, and what must be done then. This applies even when Vital Service Providers (VSP) are targeted from the first days of a conflict and are therefore unable to provide services for a prolonged period.

Indeed, a few hundred euros can improve preparedness and buy extra time in the case of a simple power outage. A backup plug and generator are useful tools in more limited crises. Unfortunately, they are of no help when the heating plant simply no longer exists. This is precisely the question that should be asked and considered — what is the plan in such a case, rather than believing in convenient miracle solutions.

🟠 This op-ed (Hannes Nagel) was originally published on December 16, 2026 in the Delfi portal. Photo: large apartment building blocks in Lasnamäe (Kriisiuuringute Keskus, 2025).

Sources:

¹ Raig, T. & Reivart, A. 2025. INTERVJUU | Utilitase kaugküttejuht: Lasnamäe külmumise jutt on jama. Soojakriisi lahendamiseks piisab fööni jagu elektrist. Ärileht, 16.12.2025. 

² Harding, L. 2025. ‘They decided to kill us with cold’: Ukrainians struggle against Russian assault on power network. The Guardian, 22.11.2025.

Photo: recording the episode at the National Library (Kriisiuuringute Keskus, 2025).

At the meeting, we presented our previous international and Estonian projects (in Tallinn and Kohtla-Järve, supported by the Civil Society Endowment Fund) as well as the Community Civil Protection Handbook for Apartment Buildings, published earlier this year. We also handed over its English version to our Czech colleague. The handbook aims to support apartment building communities with practical guidelines and tools to help them better prepare for crises and strengthen neighbourhood cohesion and continuity.

The meeting builds on our earlier work within the PIMA project (funded by the Swedish Institute), where we explored the concept of resilience hubs in Estonia, Ukraine, and Sweden, and their potential role within civil protection systems. These hubs serve as local support points that can provide information, supplies, and coordination during crises — and, in peacetime, foster cooperation and awareness among communities.

“Strengthening civil protection begins with communities themselves. When residents know how to act, how to support one another, and where to turn in times of crisis, the entire system becomes more resilient. At the meeting with the Czech Ministry of the Interior, it was mutually emphasized that many of these challenges — from floods to hybrid threats — require not only infrastructure, but also trust and local engagement for an effective response,” noted Hannes Nagel, CEO of the Crisis Research Centre.

Like Estonia, the Czech Republic is moving toward a more comprehensive approach to crisis preparedness. The main concerns highlighted by representatives of the Ministry were large-scale floods and major power outages, along with the growing risks associated with hybrid attacks. During the discussion, it was noted that stronger cooperation at the community level and increasing public awareness are key to building resilience.

Nagel pointed out that civil preparedness in Estonia remains limited. Many households would struggle to cope with a crisis lasting more than three days. “We need to think of security as a common good – not just something maintained by the army and our allies, but something that also depends on our homes, our neighborhoods, and our everyday readiness,” he said.

He also highlighted that for many people, the lack of preparedness is not due to ignorance, but due to limited financial and physical resources. “For some, stockpiling emergency supplies is simply not an option – if you’re already struggling with daily expenses, buying extra food and water isn’t realistic. And in many apartment buildings, there just isn’t enough space to store emergency provisions,” Nagel explained. That’s why broader solutions are needed – not just at the individual level, but through community efforts and public policy as well.

As head of the Crisis Research Centre, Nagel contributed a research-based perspective and stressed the importance of collaboration. Raising awareness, sharing practical skills, and building trust at the community level are all key to strengthening society’s resilience in the face of crises.