No drone, no problem?

The lack of clear instructions is one of the main obstacles to coping with a crisis—especially when public-safety resources are scarce.

× The op-ed (by Hannes Nagel) was first published on August 29, 2025 on the Estonian Daily web portal. Photo: attack drone in the air (Crisis Research Centre, 2025).

Sources:

¹ Viita-Neuhaus, A. 2025. Kohalikku omavalitsust ründedrooni juhtumist ei teavitatud. Postimees, 26.08.2025. 

² Muraveiski, K. 2025. SELGITAJA | Kuidas pääses ohtlik ründedroon üle Eesti piiri ning miks PPA ega kaitsevägi seda ei märganud. Delfi, 26.08.2025. 

³ Epner, E. ja Tamme, S. 2025. Saatanlik lõks. Kuidas kujunes sõnum, et Eesti on järgmine. Eesti Ekspress,25.08.2025.

⁴ Lomp, L.-E. 2025. RESi tuliseim arutelu tuleb palkade üle läbi rääkides. Postimees, 25.08.2025.

If it seems that preparing for a crisis has been talked about loudly for years, how is it possible that an average storm can knock out a large part of Estonia for a week? Are we prepared for a serious crisis at all?

In the programme, we pointed out that Estonia’s crisis management and civil defence today can only be measured on the axis of problematic to inadequate. The recent storms in October, which left many people without electricity for a week, showed that we are already struggling to cope with storm crisis management.

Separately, the absurdity of the closure of the Kopli fire depot that has special capacities, which has been repeatedly pointed out by the Estonian Rescue Workers Union, as well as the City of Tallinn and one of the largest companies in the Northern Tallinn district, BLRT (Baltic Ship Repair Works), was also discussed.

For national defence to be comprehensive, it is necessary to see the protection of the state and its people as a whole, rather than as two completely different and unrelated areas. One complements the other, neither can exist without the other. Unfortunately, Estonia is practising the latter, a completely contradictory approach, where people are without a civil defence system and civilians seem to be encouraged to be for themselves.

If such an approach is ruled out in the military for obvious reasons, then for some reason the leadership of the country believes that civil defence is a self-perpetuating phenomenon that can emerge and organise itself from nothing.  Well it doesn’t quite work like that. 

You can listen the programme here!

(Photo: Kirke Ert/ERR).

In the podcast, we pointed out that Estonia has done a good job of presenting itself as a NATO frontrunner in terms of military spending, but has neglected other commitments that need to be fulfilled too. Specifically, Estonia is not fulfilling all its NATO obligations, such as those set out in article 3.

We also went into details with simple examples, e.g. a shelter and a hiding place are two very different things:

• “public hiding places“ (an Estonian local surrogate from Scandinavian and European shelters) are places in public spaces where people can temporarily take cover. However, they are not suitable for long-term stays;
• a shelter is an underground structure with specific engineering and technical requirements. There are none in Estonia.

This state of affairs is the result of the political decisions of the last 30 years, which have unfortunately been continued by the last two governments at a time when Russia is waging a full-scale war of conquest in Europe against Ukraine.

The non-existence of civil defence in Estonia urgently needs attention and real action. You can watch the podcast episode here!

It is also forgotten or deliberately left out of the discussion that since 1992, when civil protection was merged with the fire service, there has been and still is no political will in Estonia to build up the latter, a civil defence system that actually protects the population.1,2 Although this was the starting point for the growth of the Rescue Board into a modern rescue and prevention organisation,2 in the course of this ‘optimisation’, the protection of the population simply disappeared into thin air.

Non-military protection of Estonia’s population has never been a priority for our state, rather we have a half-baked solution that is good for putting out forests and a few major fires, but in the event of a serious crisis and military attack, the available resources will be exhausted in a matter of days. To put it bluntly, they will be down in the dumps, as Hardi Tiitus, the head of the Mõniste fire depot, described at the last warning protest for rescue workers in front of the government building.8

The seriousness of the situation is acknowledged not only by line managers but also by development documents in the field. The Internal Security Development Plan 2030 states that “failure to obtain additional funding may lead to problems in fully achieving the objectives“.5 However, more money is needed for the following: a sectoral pay rise to prevent rescuers and police officers from evacuating to the private sector here or across the Gulf to Finland; for the state to continue to open up courses on rescue and police curricula; to combat cybercrime, etc. 

The analysis of the situation in the field of civil protection is based on a number of factors.6Aviation and naval capabilities also need additional funding, as the annexes to the development plan sound a refrain of “we have the machines, but no money is available or will be provided to maintain them“. Just as has happened with the air alert system – our bar of expectations is so low today that we can buy modern technology, but it is problematic to find budget to keep it running. We could guess it is a force majeure – who would have thought that helicopters would have to take off and pilots would be needed? Who, after all, is behind these insane deliberations?

The cornerstones of new depots laid in recent years and the gorgeous narrative that has sprouted from it, combined with modern technology, have created the ideal Potjomkin village, which will last just as long as the wolf blows around this “least is best” project-based shed. The much-talked-about endless loyalty of internal security personnel to the state won’t help to counter this – you actually need a system that works.

Values and promises 

A little over a year ago, the current Minister of the Interior, Lauri Läänemets, gave a speech at the opinion festival about his vision for Estonia’s future – a speech that described how Estonia stands at a crossroads of significant change, and how in the years to come, Estonia’s great story will be rewritten. The political promise was “a strong Estonia without no one left behind, secure, caring and prosperous.”3 We heard how we must dare to take real steps to reduce injustice. The Minister of the Interior is now expected to do no more and no less in his field than to stand by his words, to assert himself. Otherwise, these words will prove to be nothing but warm air.

But what did Mart Võrklaev, the current Minister of Finance, who at the same time was running for the Riigikogu, promise Estonia? His election pledge is that “the most important issue is security, and it must be ensured by making wise and well-considered decisions on a broad basis“.4 The latter being the most important issue for the politician on which he asked people to vote for him. The finance minister is now also expected to walk his talk.

Immediately after the spring elections to the Riigikogu, the Reform Party’s explicit and unequivocal promise has been forgotten: “We will raise the salaries of police officers, rescue workers and health care workers, because they are on the front line of crises.“. We will also raise teachers’ salaries, because the future of Estonia is in their hands.” Listening to the latest speeches by Minister Võrklaev and the Reform Party, we can only say that is it not amazing how quickly and radically politicians’ promises and principles can change? Where are those broadly based, wise and thoughtful decisions now?

Politicians’ promises, but also society’s expectations, are based on values. In the same way, the national budget and cuts are all about values – who do we take from when money is scarce?

Budget negotiations are a trade on values, and more honest in their outcome than words. So it is worth wondering what value is being communicated by the urge to cut 11 million euros7 from vital services as a pittance in the face of a deficit of more than a billion?

What is the cost of protecting our people’s lives and health in this (Excel) formula, how much is it worth?

It’s painful to put on paper, but for some politicians, you may need actual victims to really understand the role of internal security. The crises of the last few years do not seem to have been enough, and the principle of ‘learning from others‘, based on the Ukrainian experience, is reactionary, useless and falls on deaf ears. We can all see how important the role of policemen, rescuers, deminers, emergency services and many others is in a military crisis – can we really learn from it?

All that remains is to say that, on the current course, we will have to experience all of it for ourselves before change will occur. Cutting back internal security and civil protection is just as illogical as taking money away from defence. The planned cuts must be cancelled, they will have a direct impact on both national security and people’s everyday security – there is still time to fix the moral compass and think about values, promises made and common sense. Let’s also try to get on with our budget in a way that does not please Moscow.

× The joint op-ed (by Hannes Nagel, Head of the Crisis Research Center & Kalle Koop, Chief Trustee of the Estonian Rescue Workers Union) was first published on September 13, 2023 at Delfi news portal. Photo: rescue worker (David Peinado/Pexels, 2022).

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Crisis allocations from the supplementary budget and the reserve are, in essence, survival grants. They are not intended to build capacity on a permanent, long-term basis. The money given to internal security, which has been spent in recent crises, for example, on reintroducing temporary border controls, dealing with war refugees from Ukraine or buying air raid sirens, has become a kind of strange bargaining chip.

One could even say that, in the recent rhetoric of the Estonian Minister of Finance, it has become like a loan from the reserve to the Ministry of the Interior, which now has to be repaid through budget cuts. Because – jackals, how dare you get more money than the others?

When we talk about the capabilities and salaries in the field of internal security, we have to understand that we are talking about jobs where people risk their lives every day and are also responsible for the lives and health of others. Even outside a crisis. For rescue workers to be able to do this, we need really excellent and motivated people.

There are strict criteria for a reason – not everyone is cut out to be a policeman or a rescuer. The training is extensive, and if anyone thinks that rescuers sit idle between deployments, they are mistaken. You have to keep your equipment in good condition, but you also have to make sure that you know how to carry out all the tasks you need to do – that means constant training.

It’s their everyday job, but let’s not forget what happens in a crisis. To recall, in recent years they have had to deal with the temporary reintroduction of border patrols, but also, for example, the management of the isolation between Saaremaa and the mainland during the acute COVID-19 crisis, not to mention snowstorms, oil spills and so on.

Police officers have had to deal with social distancing control, but also, for example, with incidents such as MEM Cafe, or helping Ukrainian war refugees. The emergency call centre is also overwhelmed, for example, an acquaintance called in the middle of the night to hear an “you’re on hold, we’ll call you back” style automated response.

Rescuers and policemen are not unskilled workers

It cannot be assumed that the volunteer forces will solve all the human resources problems in the field of rescue, not all tasks can be delegated to them. For example, certain tasks cannot be performed by volunteer rescuers, and there are limits to the activities that can be performed by auxiliary police officers.

There is a reason for this – an auxiliary force that has undergone 40 hours of training cannot be the equivalent of a specialist who has spent years in in-depth training. Consequently, these auxiliaries are not entitled to carry out all the tasks (which is how it should be, also for their own safety), nor is it possible to build up an internal police force on a purely voluntary basis.

Think about this the next time you see an ambulance passing by – there are at least 8 large cabinets with all sorts of tools that the team, both individually and collectively, must be able to use in their sleep.

While for health workers the acute crisis was brought on by the last big waves of COVID, rescue workers are directly affected by the war in Ukraine. This is both in terms of the need to assist refugees and to increase the capacity of their own sector.

If you talk to rescuers or policemen, there is a real concern – how are we supposed to move forward with our normal work and the capacity we need to do it, if the sector is expected to cut back?

In a situation where the real evacuation capacity of the country is estimated at 10 000 people, there are no shelters, and there is no increase in the capacity for specific rescue work (e.g. rescuing people from rubble or demining), the planned cut is in no way in touch with reality. On the contrary, as Minister of the Interior Läänemets said, more money is needed.

Hang in there, Excel can handle anything

To make cuts in the area of internal security in the current security situation based on an Excel spreadsheet is seriously puzzling, to say the least. It seems that Excel is a kind of alternate reality, where anything is possible in the budget lines, and what happens in the budget discussions in the cells is a masterclass in bureaucratic magic. 

As a vivid example, in the field of internal security, money can be saved on commanders of the fire depots by sharing one commander between two or more fire depots. The fact that a commander’s time is significantly consumed by bouncing between two sites and two teams, and there is a solid negative impact on the long-term performance of both teams, is a small matter that does not fit into Excel’s formula.

Paper can take it all, and so can Excel

Have these Excel lines ever taken into account what happens when an overworked civil servant who also works in the private sector comes on shift to make ends meet? Probably not, because in the world of Excel, there are only average people on average salaries, working in just one organisation.

The budget cutting process is nothing more than a decision-making process to try to find a solution to the lack of money. However, this cannot be done with blinders on, without taking into account the reality that the current security situation in itself precludes any cuts in the area of internal security.

Finally, it is worth asking – if we are talking about every state institution is in need to make proportionate cuts, is the Estonian Ministry of Defence expected to do the same? Nobody even dares to talk about taking anything away from national defence. That is how it should be, but if the whole concept of national defence is build on the word front and the people of Estonia are told, taking the example1 of former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev – просто денег нет, вы держитесь здесь, вам всего доброго, хорошего настроения и здоровья! (there’s just no money, you hang in there, all the best to you, good mood and health!), we are dealing with a serious and antidote-needing Excel overdose.

× The opinion piece was first published on 31.08.2023 on the Postimehe web portal and on 01.09.2023 as an article in paper format. Photo: euro shirt (Pexels, 2016).

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Mass data collection under the guise of science with a political slant has ended badly before. An example is the 2018 Cambirdge Analytica case,1 which also involved the fishing of data on millions of Americans in what was originally presented as a scientific study.

What happened next is well known to all – accusations of influencing the 2016 US presidential election,2 Russian manipulation5 of public opinion and populist Donald Trump’s victory over Hillary Clinton.

The way in which the data was collected and later converted into votes was, simply put, as follows – the initial data was also collected in in-depth questionnaires (120 questions), then an app was attached to the Facebook accounts of the questionnaire respondents to retrieve all the data.

An important nuance is that the data of all the person’s friends was also retrieved, so that in total the detailed data of 87 million people was retrieved, which allowed for skilful and personalised manipulation of the electorate. It should be stressed once again that this action was also launched under the cover of science.

A new way to manipulate democracy

It later emerged that the data obtained was used in Donald Trump’s presidential campaign in the form of psychographic profiling, which allowed for more precise targeting of political messages and increased the likelihood of the desired outcome. The consequences of this scandal were shocking, particularly for Americans, but also gave new meaning to the possibilities of manipulating democracy.

By the way, the latest news from the Cambridge Analytica scandal front came relatively recently, at the end of 2022, when Facebook agreed to pay $725 million in settlements to the victims of the misuse of personal data.3

This, by the way, was preceded in 2019 by a US Federal Trade Commission fine of nearly $5 billion (sic!) for disclosing personal data to third parties,4 the largest in history for misuse of personal data. However, to get an idea of the scale, it is worth noting that Facebook’s turnover in the first quarter of the year in question was $15 billion,4 so the impact of the penalty has been compared to a parking fine.

Data collected illegitimately under the name of the University of Tartu can also be used in combination with survey responses to create psychographic profiles of the data subjects (i.e. people), which opens the way for easy manipulation of public opinion and thus also for targeting election results.

Let us consider that one of the results of the study ordered is a situation today in which a politically funded think-tank has at its disposal considerable information on all aspects of the lives of both childless women and women with children, which can be used for any manipulation it wishes, should the opportunity arise.

This sounds like the dream of any authoritarian state or politician, where a dirty game can be played under an outwardly democratic façade without violence, while giving the impression of science to those involved. The Cambridge Analytica story was also presented as innocent research, and the consequences of the latter the world still does not fully understand.

The Estonian state’s response cannot resemble a parking fine

The Estonian state’s reaction to the misuse of data must not be too lenient and must be proportionate to the seriousness of the infringement. Otherwise, the long-term consequences of the situation will be severe. This is a precedent; if we fail to react, we will make data hacking legal and attempts to illegally obtain data will become the new public norm.

It’s not an “oops, I didnt mean to do that” situation, and crisis communication along the lines of “but no one was hurt and no damage was caused to property,6 yet how was I supposed to know7 that the law forbids it” shows that the seriousness of the situation is not understood.

Not knowing the law does not exempt one from complying with it. Furthermore, the act has damaged the reputation of Estonian universities, as well as the Estonian scientific landscape – it would be interesting to know what the Estonian Ministry of Education and Research, as well as the Estonian Ministry of the Interior, which is in charge of the Population Register, thinks of this lack of responsibility.

After all, it is the Ministry’s job to safeguard the data and to be responsible for the well-being and security it provides. Unfortunately, some political parties will have to be explained at this point – yes, even if these data subjects are childless. It is a sad state of affairs because, unfortunately, once digital information has been given, it cannot be permanently erased without leaving a digital footprint, and to date, despite the suspended survey, the data of 1 000 women is somewhere on a hard or network disk.7

The depth of the problem is illustrated by the fact that, without law enforcement involvement, there is no way to control where this data goes. Yet we need to know – what happens to data that should never have been collected in the first place? And whether or not the state is putting itself in place to protect its citizens’ data? If we fail to do so, then there is no point talking about the more serious aspects of the civil defence.

× The op-ed (by Anne-May Nagel, co-founder of the Crisis Research Centre, Junior Researcher at Taltech) was first published on August 13, on Delfi web portal. Photo: woman in data stream (Pexels, 2019).

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