On the occasion of the important day, we discussed a number of key issues confronting the civil protection sector:

• Specifically, today the country is testing for the first time the functioning of the nationwide air raid siren network, and we discussed the fact that today is a big step forward (we are finally going to test it!), but civil protection is not finished with today, there is still a lot to do;;
• The draft law amending the Emergency Act, 635 SE, initiated by the Ministry of the Interior, should be adopted as soon as possible to establish requirements for civil protection in our legal area. This includes requirements for public and private shelters, as well as shelters in new buildings based on their size and preparedness.
• Across Estonia, 15%, with 3% in panel houses (and they are the vulnerable target group we work with in the organisation).

We also discussed the salaries of police officers, rescuers, and emergency services, as they provide daily civil protection for many people. We discussed the need for a pay increase because it is obvious that it must be done! Rescuers do not need to work two jobs to provide a decent living for their families.

Every member of the internal security forces is as important to national defense as the military because they remain behind to assist people in the field. They do it on a daily basis in our cities, towns, villages, and farms, risking their lives in the process. It should not be forgotten that those in the front have loved ones in the back, and they, too, want their loved ones to be safe.

🎙️ You can listen the show in Estonia here.

Civil protection has received more funding for the period 2024-2027. Last autumn, there were also headlines celebrating the promise of permanent funding for civil protection.

However, this meant EUR 101 million for the period 2024-2027, with only EUR 68 million going directly to the Estonian Ministry of the Interior. Given the sector’s needs and the current state of civil protection, €17 million per year is a reasonable amount. It should be noted that the framework document on civil protection of the population, published last year, described the state of the sector and its actual capabilities as follows: neither the state nor the local authorities are prepared to protect the population in the event of a serious crisis, i.e. a threat of war.

It is clear that €17 million per year is decreasing alongside military defense budgets. Even more problematic is the fact that this money is classified as ‘temporary permanent funding’ because it is only granted for a limited number of years. Temporary funding is a problem with practical examples; for example, there has been a problem within the industry (which we hope has now been resolved) in which money has been found for the procurement and installation of, say, threat sirens, but it is unclear how the running costs of maintaining the system – air raid drills – will be covered.

Other ongoing fixed costs in civil protection require ongoing funding to keep the system running, such as running various training courses, acquiring supplies (at least some of which will need to be maintained, as in the Estonian Defence Forces), organizing exercises, or possibly some monitoring functions, such as assessing the true engineering suitability of shelters being built in Estonia one day, or even current shelters. Furthermore, the field of civil protection requires more full-time staff to take the lead in developing it, as it cannot be developed solely through voluntary and project-based efforts.

The sector’s needs outweigh the available opportunities. However, the future development of civil protection will determine how many people in the field survive and recover in the event of a major disaster. The more resources the civil protection system has – for example, to evacuate people, feed them when food supplies run out, warn of the threat, and so on – the less our people will suffer the horrors of a full-fledged crisis.

It is worth noting that women, children, and the elderly are disproportionately affected, raising fundamental questions about whether and to what extent we value women and children in our society. At the same time, the rear is what keeps the national economy running. The rear is also important for morale and keeping hope alive that we will overcome whatever crisis comes our way.

At the end of the day, it’s a very simple mathematical equation: the more resources, the more gain or life and the less loss; the less prioritization, the more cost or death.

Perhaps no one will argue, at least not openly, whether civil protection for the population, and internal security in general, is important. However, this perception must be strongly reflected in the national budget, with more visibility and strength than 17 million euros per year, and only for four years. We believe that the area does not have true permanent funding, but has been given more money for a number of years, but it is unclear whether or not this will continue.

However, the protection of Estonian citizens deserves more than the announcement of 0.04% of GDP for four years as ‘permanent funding’. The sector requires percentage funding, similar to NATO’s 2% principle (soon to be increased), agreed upon by all parties, and this funding must be stable, predictable, and transparent. Taking the siren network as an example, it is clear that we require not only sirens and their installation (a one-time cost), but also their operation and testing (a fixed cost).

In order to protect the civil protection sector from political whims of the day, an agreement on a fixed percentage of permanent funding that falls within a certain percentage is also required.

Let us recall that, strangely enough, extra money does not protect against cuts in this area. In fact, at a time when the sector was supposed to have more funds (2024-2027), the professional rescue unit in Kopli was liquidated.

It could be argued that the (internal security) commands are budgeted separately from civil protection. However, how this is practically possible is beyond me; just look at the work of Ukrainian rescue services, which are frequently the first (and sometimes the last) element of civil protection that civilians in distress encounter. We believe that a unit percentage agreement would make it more difficult to dismantle civil protection elements in an optimal manner.

Until there is real permanent funding and political agreement on a special status for the sector, it is worthwhile to remain vigilant and monitor what is happening in our overall internal security. What about the salaries and morale of police officers and rescuers, who are essential for civil protection?

What is certain is that securing truly sustainable, percentage-unit funding for civil protection remains a goal that the sector must urgently pursue. Unfortunately, there is no time to delay this decision, nor should the value space permit it. It is obvious that we must do better than admit that, as things stand, neither the state nor any of Estonia’s local authorities can protect those who have been left behind.

× The op-ed (by Hannes Nagel) was first published on April 15, 2025 on the Delfi portal. Photo: rescue worker in Ukraine.

The Crisis Research Centre invites you to participate in the web discussion “Sheltering as part of civil protection” on April 29th from 18:00-19:00 in the Microsoft Teams environment. Registrants will receive a link to join the day before the event. The discussion will cover when and where to seek refuge in an emergency, the distinction between a public hiding place and a shelter, and how taking informed action can help protect yourself and your loved ones.

In the programme, we reiterated that the Estonian state’s defence consists of two components: civil defence and military defence. The first part has received almost no attention, which is why there is no system and no possibility of creating one due to a lack of long-term funding.

At the same time, there is still no political consensus in the country that the protection of Estonian citizens, or the reservoir from which the Estonian Defence Force draws reserves and resources to defend the republic, is a priority. Ukraine’s experience in the defence war against Russia demonstrates the critical importance of protecting the rear.

To make things clearer, we used simple examples, such as how a bomb shelter and a public hiding place are not the same thing, and why reaching an agreement on permanent financing is critical:

• public hiding places are areas in public spaces where people can seek temporary shelter;
• Bomb shelters are underground structures with unique engineering requirements, making them unsuitable for extended stays; 
• without permanent funding, it is impossible to establish a real and functional civil defence system in Estonia.

We reiterate our call to Estonian political parties: there is an urgent need to agree on the development of civil defence and its permanent funding. You can watch the news episode (interview starts at 00:09:08 and ends 00:14:14) here! 

If it seems that preparing for a crisis has been talked about loudly for years, how is it possible that an average storm can knock out a large part of Estonia for a week? Are we prepared for a serious crisis at all?

In the programme, we pointed out that Estonia’s crisis management and civil defence today can only be measured on the axis of problematic to inadequate. The recent storms in October, which left many people without electricity for a week, showed that we are already struggling to cope with storm crisis management.

Separately, the absurdity of the closure of the Kopli fire depot that has special capacities, which has been repeatedly pointed out by the Estonian Rescue Workers Union, as well as the City of Tallinn and one of the largest companies in the Northern Tallinn district, BLRT (Baltic Ship Repair Works), was also discussed.

For national defence to be comprehensive, it is necessary to see the protection of the state and its people as a whole, rather than as two completely different and unrelated areas. One complements the other, neither can exist without the other. Unfortunately, Estonia is practising the latter, a completely contradictory approach, where people are without a civil defence system and civilians seem to be encouraged to be for themselves.

If such an approach is ruled out in the military for obvious reasons, then for some reason the leadership of the country believes that civil defence is a self-perpetuating phenomenon that can emerge and organise itself from nothing.  Well it doesn’t quite work like that. 

You can listen the programme here!

(Photo: Kirke Ert/ERR).

In the podcast, we pointed out that Estonia has done a good job of presenting itself as a NATO frontrunner in terms of military spending, but has neglected other commitments that need to be fulfilled too. Specifically, Estonia is not fulfilling all its NATO obligations, such as those set out in article 3.

We also went into details with simple examples, e.g. a shelter and a hiding place are two very different things:

• “public hiding places“ (an Estonian local surrogate from Scandinavian and European shelters) are places in public spaces where people can temporarily take cover. However, they are not suitable for long-term stays;
• a shelter is an underground structure with specific engineering and technical requirements. There are none in Estonia.

This state of affairs is the result of the political decisions of the last 30 years, which have unfortunately been continued by the last two governments at a time when Russia is waging a full-scale war of conquest in Europe against Ukraine.

The non-existence of civil defence in Estonia urgently needs attention and real action. You can watch the podcast episode here!

The aim of the petition, launched on the rahvaalgatus.ee portal, is to request a halt to the closure of the Kopli fire depot. “Considering the current security situation, but also the location of North Tallinn and the special characteristics of the peninsula district, with its wooden houses, gas heating and large-scale industry, this is an inappropriate and thoughtless decision,” said Manuela Pihlap, Mayor of Northern Tallinn.

“We need a fast-response command centre in Koplis, and extending the Lilleküla service area here is not the solution,” says Toomas Suigusaar, a member of the board of the Estonian Rescue Workers Trade Union. “Putting an extra burden on the Lilleküla fire depot means that situations may arise where there is no one to respond quickly to an accident. For example, Lilleküla rescuers are busy elsewhere and have to wait for help from further away. This results in loss of life, destroyed homes and jobs,” he added.

The decision to close the Kopli fire depot is also worrying in terms of civil defence and broad national defence. “The experience of the war in Ukraine shows that rescuers have a crucial role to play in the field, they are the ones who get people out of the rubble — NATO does not do that for us. Leaving a population comparable to the size of the third largest city in Estonia without a fire depot is a short-sighted decision, it makes it more difficult in real terms to protect the population,” said Hannes Nagel, head of the Crisis Research Centre. The petition also points to the fact that the country’s only naval port, used by NATO allies, is also located in Northern Tallinn.

The petitioners consider that to exchange the security of 60 000 people for 737 000 euros — pennies in terms of the Estonian state budget — as a result of a reckless policy of cuts is short-sighted and irresponsible.

The petition can be read and signed on the portal rahvaalgatus.ee, the text of the petition is also available in Estonian and Russian. The petition will be open for signatures until 27 October, and 1000 signatures are needed to send it to the Riigikogu. The number of signatures collected can be monitored directly on the same portal, rahvaalgatus.ee. The petition is initiated by the Mayor of Northern Tallinn district, the Estonian Rescue Workers Trade Union and the NGO Crisis Research Centre.

Photo: flag of the Kopli fire depot (Sergei Larionov, 2023).

Crisis allocations from the supplementary budget and the reserve are, in essence, survival grants. They are not intended to build capacity on a permanent, long-term basis. The money given to internal security, which has been spent in recent crises, for example, on reintroducing temporary border controls, dealing with war refugees from Ukraine or buying air raid sirens, has become a kind of strange bargaining chip.

One could even say that, in the recent rhetoric of the Estonian Minister of Finance, it has become like a loan from the reserve to the Ministry of the Interior, which now has to be repaid through budget cuts. Because – jackals, how dare you get more money than the others?

When we talk about the capabilities and salaries in the field of internal security, we have to understand that we are talking about jobs where people risk their lives every day and are also responsible for the lives and health of others. Even outside a crisis. For rescue workers to be able to do this, we need really excellent and motivated people.

There are strict criteria for a reason – not everyone is cut out to be a policeman or a rescuer. The training is extensive, and if anyone thinks that rescuers sit idle between deployments, they are mistaken. You have to keep your equipment in good condition, but you also have to make sure that you know how to carry out all the tasks you need to do – that means constant training.

It’s their everyday job, but let’s not forget what happens in a crisis. To recall, in recent years they have had to deal with the temporary reintroduction of border patrols, but also, for example, the management of the isolation between Saaremaa and the mainland during the acute COVID-19 crisis, not to mention snowstorms, oil spills and so on.

Police officers have had to deal with social distancing control, but also, for example, with incidents such as MEM Cafe, or helping Ukrainian war refugees. The emergency call centre is also overwhelmed, for example, an acquaintance called in the middle of the night to hear an “you’re on hold, we’ll call you back” style automated response.

Rescuers and policemen are not unskilled workers

It cannot be assumed that the volunteer forces will solve all the human resources problems in the field of rescue, not all tasks can be delegated to them. For example, certain tasks cannot be performed by volunteer rescuers, and there are limits to the activities that can be performed by auxiliary police officers.

There is a reason for this – an auxiliary force that has undergone 40 hours of training cannot be the equivalent of a specialist who has spent years in in-depth training. Consequently, these auxiliaries are not entitled to carry out all the tasks (which is how it should be, also for their own safety), nor is it possible to build up an internal police force on a purely voluntary basis.

Think about this the next time you see an ambulance passing by – there are at least 8 large cabinets with all sorts of tools that the team, both individually and collectively, must be able to use in their sleep.

While for health workers the acute crisis was brought on by the last big waves of COVID, rescue workers are directly affected by the war in Ukraine. This is both in terms of the need to assist refugees and to increase the capacity of their own sector.

If you talk to rescuers or policemen, there is a real concern – how are we supposed to move forward with our normal work and the capacity we need to do it, if the sector is expected to cut back?

In a situation where the real evacuation capacity of the country is estimated at 10 000 people, there are no shelters, and there is no increase in the capacity for specific rescue work (e.g. rescuing people from rubble or demining), the planned cut is in no way in touch with reality. On the contrary, as Minister of the Interior Läänemets said, more money is needed.

Hang in there, Excel can handle anything

To make cuts in the area of internal security in the current security situation based on an Excel spreadsheet is seriously puzzling, to say the least. It seems that Excel is a kind of alternate reality, where anything is possible in the budget lines, and what happens in the budget discussions in the cells is a masterclass in bureaucratic magic. 

As a vivid example, in the field of internal security, money can be saved on commanders of the fire depots by sharing one commander between two or more fire depots. The fact that a commander’s time is significantly consumed by bouncing between two sites and two teams, and there is a solid negative impact on the long-term performance of both teams, is a small matter that does not fit into Excel’s formula.

Paper can take it all, and so can Excel

Have these Excel lines ever taken into account what happens when an overworked civil servant who also works in the private sector comes on shift to make ends meet? Probably not, because in the world of Excel, there are only average people on average salaries, working in just one organisation.

The budget cutting process is nothing more than a decision-making process to try to find a solution to the lack of money. However, this cannot be done with blinders on, without taking into account the reality that the current security situation in itself precludes any cuts in the area of internal security.

Finally, it is worth asking – if we are talking about every state institution is in need to make proportionate cuts, is the Estonian Ministry of Defence expected to do the same? Nobody even dares to talk about taking anything away from national defence. That is how it should be, but if the whole concept of national defence is build on the word front and the people of Estonia are told, taking the example1 of former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev – просто денег нет, вы держитесь здесь, вам всего доброго, хорошего настроения и здоровья! (there’s just no money, you hang in there, all the best to you, good mood and health!), we are dealing with a serious and antidote-needing Excel overdose.

× The opinion piece was first published on 31.08.2023 on the Postimehe web portal and on 01.09.2023 as an article in paper format. Photo: euro shirt (Pexels, 2016).

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