Dr Mariia Tyschenko (Ukraine), head of Poruch, one of Ukraine’s largest NGOs, gave a presentation on cooperation between the third sector and local government in Ukraine at the final seminar of the Crisis Research Centre’s K-24 project “Crisis Preparedness of Communities – Where do we stand?” on May 28.

Anne-May Nagel, co-founder of the Crisis Research Centre, will introduce the presentation with an overview of the organization’s 2024 Tallinn and Kohtla-Järve community-based population protection projects. The video is in English.

Part of the last event of the Crisis Research Centre’s Spring 2025 Community Based Civil Protection initiatives was the panel discussion With Maria Derlõs (City of Tallinn), Dr. Mariia Tyschenko (NGO Poruch, Ukraine), Hannes Nagel (Crisis Research Centre), and Dr. Kadi Luht-Kallas (Estonian Ministry of Interior) joining the conversation, the goal was to compile experts with various points of view on communities and crisis readiness.

The panellists considered at the start of the conversation what we might define as community in Estonia nowadays. The main description given was people working together in the same area, for the same goal; but, communities based on interests were also emphasised: for instance, people engaged in a particular hobby in the same area can also establish a community. Dr. Luht-Kallas underlined that in times of crisis, the community close by is quite crucial since it can be challenging to get persons living far away.

“People living in large apartment blocks and prefabricated housing are particularly vulnerable in an urban environment because of their reliance on basic services such electricity, water and heating,” said head of the Crisis Research Centre Hannes Nagel. Given many people live together, both individual initiative and the management of the housing association’s crisis readiness are equally crucial. Maria Derlõs emphasised her own experience serving on a board of a housing association and noted that, in order to effectively involve residents—including on crisis readiness—the boards of housing associations require particular support and training. Participants observed that, in terms of crisis preparedness and crisis management, the communication among residents—whether or not it occurs in housing associations—is rather crucial.

Dr Tyschenko, who shared her experience of more than ten years of war in Ukraine, echoed this point underlining the need of housing associations having a messaging app allowing for quick messaging—be it Facebook Messenger, Signal, or another group chat system. Furthermore mentioned by Dr Tyschenko was the so-called “social networking” should guide those in the building who cannot or do not know how to use such applications for whatever reason”. Should some members of the house find themselves unable to use these applications for some reason, it is advised that they use the traditional approaches of either knocking on the door or, for messages less time-sensitive, writing them on the stairwell notice board. Therefore, it is crucial that the residents’ or the management of the housing association have a general awareness of the neighbours who might require this type of information-sharing help.

Civil protection has received more funding for the period 2024-2027. Last autumn, there were also headlines celebrating the promise of permanent funding for civil protection.

However, this meant EUR 101 million for the period 2024-2027, with only EUR 68 million going directly to the Estonian Ministry of the Interior. Given the sector’s needs and the current state of civil protection, €17 million per year is a reasonable amount. It should be noted that the framework document on civil protection of the population, published last year, described the state of the sector and its actual capabilities as follows: neither the state nor the local authorities are prepared to protect the population in the event of a serious crisis, i.e. a threat of war.

It is clear that €17 million per year is decreasing alongside military defense budgets. Even more problematic is the fact that this money is classified as ‘temporary permanent funding’ because it is only granted for a limited number of years. Temporary funding is a problem with practical examples; for example, there has been a problem within the industry (which we hope has now been resolved) in which money has been found for the procurement and installation of, say, threat sirens, but it is unclear how the running costs of maintaining the system – air raid drills – will be covered.

Other ongoing fixed costs in civil protection require ongoing funding to keep the system running, such as running various training courses, acquiring supplies (at least some of which will need to be maintained, as in the Estonian Defence Forces), organizing exercises, or possibly some monitoring functions, such as assessing the true engineering suitability of shelters being built in Estonia one day, or even current shelters. Furthermore, the field of civil protection requires more full-time staff to take the lead in developing it, as it cannot be developed solely through voluntary and project-based efforts.

The sector’s needs outweigh the available opportunities. However, the future development of civil protection will determine how many people in the field survive and recover in the event of a major disaster. The more resources the civil protection system has – for example, to evacuate people, feed them when food supplies run out, warn of the threat, and so on – the less our people will suffer the horrors of a full-fledged crisis.

It is worth noting that women, children, and the elderly are disproportionately affected, raising fundamental questions about whether and to what extent we value women and children in our society. At the same time, the rear is what keeps the national economy running. The rear is also important for morale and keeping hope alive that we will overcome whatever crisis comes our way.

At the end of the day, it’s a very simple mathematical equation: the more resources, the more gain or life and the less loss; the less prioritization, the more cost or death.

Perhaps no one will argue, at least not openly, whether civil protection for the population, and internal security in general, is important. However, this perception must be strongly reflected in the national budget, with more visibility and strength than 17 million euros per year, and only for four years. We believe that the area does not have true permanent funding, but has been given more money for a number of years, but it is unclear whether or not this will continue.

However, the protection of Estonian citizens deserves more than the announcement of 0.04% of GDP for four years as ‘permanent funding’. The sector requires percentage funding, similar to NATO’s 2% principle (soon to be increased), agreed upon by all parties, and this funding must be stable, predictable, and transparent. Taking the siren network as an example, it is clear that we require not only sirens and their installation (a one-time cost), but also their operation and testing (a fixed cost).

In order to protect the civil protection sector from political whims of the day, an agreement on a fixed percentage of permanent funding that falls within a certain percentage is also required.

Let us recall that, strangely enough, extra money does not protect against cuts in this area. In fact, at a time when the sector was supposed to have more funds (2024-2027), the professional rescue unit in Kopli was liquidated.

It could be argued that the (internal security) commands are budgeted separately from civil protection. However, how this is practically possible is beyond me; just look at the work of Ukrainian rescue services, which are frequently the first (and sometimes the last) element of civil protection that civilians in distress encounter. We believe that a unit percentage agreement would make it more difficult to dismantle civil protection elements in an optimal manner.

Until there is real permanent funding and political agreement on a special status for the sector, it is worthwhile to remain vigilant and monitor what is happening in our overall internal security. What about the salaries and morale of police officers and rescuers, who are essential for civil protection?

What is certain is that securing truly sustainable, percentage-unit funding for civil protection remains a goal that the sector must urgently pursue. Unfortunately, there is no time to delay this decision, nor should the value space permit it. It is obvious that we must do better than admit that, as things stand, neither the state nor any of Estonia’s local authorities can protect those who have been left behind.

× The op-ed (by Hannes Nagel) was first published on April 15, 2025 on the Delfi portal. Photo: rescue worker in Ukraine.

The Crisis Research Centre invites you to participate in the web discussion “Sheltering as part of civil protection” on April 29th from 18:00-19:00 in the Microsoft Teams environment. Registrants will receive a link to join the day before the event. The discussion will cover when and where to seek refuge in an emergency, the distinction between a public hiding place and a shelter, and how taking informed action can help protect yourself and your loved ones.

1. Mental Health First Aid During a Crisis (in Estonian, trainers from NGO Peaasjad clinical psychologists):

The Crisis Research Centre’s civilian defence Crisis Skills Training Programme aims to provide critical knowledge and skills for dealing with crisis situations. 

“This is the Haabersti City District’s first civil defence project, with the goal of empowering the community through various trainings held in collaboration with experienced specialists in their field. By the end of May this year, we will have trained a number of housing association members and leaders to deal with various types of crises, as well as created a pool of basic resources for the community and City District administration to use in different crises,” said Hannes Nagel, head of the Crisis Research Centre.

🟧🟦 The opening seminar and the project of the crisis skills training programme of the Crisis Research Centre in Väike-Õismäe is funded by the Ministry of the Interior through the Civil Society Foundation.

Photos and a video bite from the opening seminar in Väike-Õismäe on January 16. (KRUK, 2025).

The session also covered what supplies every person and family should have in the home, followed by a discussion about how to add to this list and tailor it to their specific needs. It was emphasised that it is critical to stock up on items that are truly used. For example, if you don’t eat fish, it’s not worth stockpiling canned fish; instead, focus on what your family is used to eating.

You should also stock 3 litres of water per person every day. It is also worth checking the supply of medicines, first aid kits, and sanitary supplies. In addition, cash for the family’s basic requirements, and if the family owns a car, keep the tank at least half full. There should be a battery-powered radio for information and a battery bank to keep your phone charged.

The training emphasises the significance of individual readiness, as the state and public services cannot always be relied on in a crisis. This is why it is critical to be prepared beforehand, as it will tremendously benefit local authorities and civil defence specialists.

🟧  The Civil Society Foundation is supporting the Kopli 93 project on behalf of the Estonian Ministry of the Interior.

Photo: Fourth training day (Crisis Research Centre, 2024).

In the programme, we reiterated that the Estonian state’s defence consists of two components: civil defence and military defence. The first part has received almost no attention, which is why there is no system and no possibility of creating one due to a lack of long-term funding.

At the same time, there is still no political consensus in the country that the protection of Estonian citizens, or the reservoir from which the Estonian Defence Force draws reserves and resources to defend the republic, is a priority. Ukraine’s experience in the defence war against Russia demonstrates the critical importance of protecting the rear.

To make things clearer, we used simple examples, such as how a bomb shelter and a public hiding place are not the same thing, and why reaching an agreement on permanent financing is critical:

• public hiding places are areas in public spaces where people can seek temporary shelter;
• Bomb shelters are underground structures with unique engineering requirements, making them unsuitable for extended stays; 
• without permanent funding, it is impossible to establish a real and functional civil defence system in Estonia.

We reiterate our call to Estonian political parties: there is an urgent need to agree on the development of civil defence and its permanent funding. You can watch the news episode (interview starts at 00:09:08 and ends 00:14:14) here! 

Crisis allocations from the supplementary budget and the reserve are, in essence, survival grants. They are not intended to build capacity on a permanent, long-term basis. The money given to internal security, which has been spent in recent crises, for example, on reintroducing temporary border controls, dealing with war refugees from Ukraine or buying air raid sirens, has become a kind of strange bargaining chip.

One could even say that, in the recent rhetoric of the Estonian Minister of Finance, it has become like a loan from the reserve to the Ministry of the Interior, which now has to be repaid through budget cuts. Because – jackals, how dare you get more money than the others?

When we talk about the capabilities and salaries in the field of internal security, we have to understand that we are talking about jobs where people risk their lives every day and are also responsible for the lives and health of others. Even outside a crisis. For rescue workers to be able to do this, we need really excellent and motivated people.

There are strict criteria for a reason – not everyone is cut out to be a policeman or a rescuer. The training is extensive, and if anyone thinks that rescuers sit idle between deployments, they are mistaken. You have to keep your equipment in good condition, but you also have to make sure that you know how to carry out all the tasks you need to do – that means constant training.

It’s their everyday job, but let’s not forget what happens in a crisis. To recall, in recent years they have had to deal with the temporary reintroduction of border patrols, but also, for example, the management of the isolation between Saaremaa and the mainland during the acute COVID-19 crisis, not to mention snowstorms, oil spills and so on.

Police officers have had to deal with social distancing control, but also, for example, with incidents such as MEM Cafe, or helping Ukrainian war refugees. The emergency call centre is also overwhelmed, for example, an acquaintance called in the middle of the night to hear an “you’re on hold, we’ll call you back” style automated response.

Rescuers and policemen are not unskilled workers

It cannot be assumed that the volunteer forces will solve all the human resources problems in the field of rescue, not all tasks can be delegated to them. For example, certain tasks cannot be performed by volunteer rescuers, and there are limits to the activities that can be performed by auxiliary police officers.

There is a reason for this – an auxiliary force that has undergone 40 hours of training cannot be the equivalent of a specialist who has spent years in in-depth training. Consequently, these auxiliaries are not entitled to carry out all the tasks (which is how it should be, also for their own safety), nor is it possible to build up an internal police force on a purely voluntary basis.

Think about this the next time you see an ambulance passing by – there are at least 8 large cabinets with all sorts of tools that the team, both individually and collectively, must be able to use in their sleep.

While for health workers the acute crisis was brought on by the last big waves of COVID, rescue workers are directly affected by the war in Ukraine. This is both in terms of the need to assist refugees and to increase the capacity of their own sector.

If you talk to rescuers or policemen, there is a real concern – how are we supposed to move forward with our normal work and the capacity we need to do it, if the sector is expected to cut back?

In a situation where the real evacuation capacity of the country is estimated at 10 000 people, there are no shelters, and there is no increase in the capacity for specific rescue work (e.g. rescuing people from rubble or demining), the planned cut is in no way in touch with reality. On the contrary, as Minister of the Interior Läänemets said, more money is needed.

Hang in there, Excel can handle anything

To make cuts in the area of internal security in the current security situation based on an Excel spreadsheet is seriously puzzling, to say the least. It seems that Excel is a kind of alternate reality, where anything is possible in the budget lines, and what happens in the budget discussions in the cells is a masterclass in bureaucratic magic. 

As a vivid example, in the field of internal security, money can be saved on commanders of the fire depots by sharing one commander between two or more fire depots. The fact that a commander’s time is significantly consumed by bouncing between two sites and two teams, and there is a solid negative impact on the long-term performance of both teams, is a small matter that does not fit into Excel’s formula.

Paper can take it all, and so can Excel

Have these Excel lines ever taken into account what happens when an overworked civil servant who also works in the private sector comes on shift to make ends meet? Probably not, because in the world of Excel, there are only average people on average salaries, working in just one organisation.

The budget cutting process is nothing more than a decision-making process to try to find a solution to the lack of money. However, this cannot be done with blinders on, without taking into account the reality that the current security situation in itself precludes any cuts in the area of internal security.

Finally, it is worth asking – if we are talking about every state institution is in need to make proportionate cuts, is the Estonian Ministry of Defence expected to do the same? Nobody even dares to talk about taking anything away from national defence. That is how it should be, but if the whole concept of national defence is build on the word front and the people of Estonia are told, taking the example1 of former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev – просто денег нет, вы держитесь здесь, вам всего доброго, хорошего настроения и здоровья! (there’s just no money, you hang in there, all the best to you, good mood and health!), we are dealing with a serious and antidote-needing Excel overdose.

× The opinion piece was first published on 31.08.2023 on the Postimehe web portal and on 01.09.2023 as an article in paper format. Photo: euro shirt (Pexels, 2016).

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