emergency preparedness - MTÜ Kriisiuuringute Keskus

KRAKO project brings crisis preparedness knowledge to Tallinn communities

kruk — Mon, 18 May 2026 11:22:12 +0000

KRAKO project brings crisis preparedness knowledge to Tallinn communities

The Crisis Research Centre will launch the KRAKO project on August 1, 2026 focusing on strengthening community crisis preparedness and empowering local leaders in Tallinn.

The Crisis Research Centre is launching the KRAKO project (Knowledge and Resilience Alliance of Key Organisers) in Tallinn to support people’s ability to cope better in emergencies and crises, and to help carry crisis preparedness knowledge forward at the local level. The project is part of the Crisis Research Centre’s wider 2026 programme, which focuses on empowering community crisis preparedness through practical discussions, learning activities and local-level cooperation.

KRAKO does not approach crisis preparedness only as a matter of supplies, guidelines or institutional responsibility. Instead, it treats preparedness as part of a broader question: how communities can better understand their strengths, vulnerabilities and opportunities for cooperation. The project’s central starting point is that official plans alone are not enough in crises — people also need knowledge, skills, contacts and trust to rely on in difficult situations.

“Crisis preparedness often starts with very simple things: whether people know what to do in the first hours, whether they know other active people in their community, and whether they are able to communicate information calmly. KRAKO helps strengthen exactly this local level, where official preparedness and people’s everyday capacity to act come together,” said Hannes Nagel, Head of the Crisis Research Centre.

KRAKO is aimed at residents of the Haabersti, Mustamäe and Nõmme districts in Tallinn and will run from August 1 to December 31, 2026.

The project is co-funded by the City of Tallinn and the Tallinn Municipal Police, together with the NGO Crisis Research Centre.

As part of the project, community-based crisis preparedness activities will be carried out in Tallinn for adult residents and local leaders. The aim is to train up to 160 people who want to contribute to the safety of their community, share crisis preparedness knowledge and strengthen neighbourhood cooperation. The project builds on the Crisis Research Centre’s previous practical experience and learning materials, helping to broaden the foundation of community-based crisis preparedness in Tallinn.

More broadly, KRAKO is also linked to the impacts of climate change, extreme weather, disruptions to vital services and other societal crises. These developments have made it increasingly clear that crisis preparedness should be understood not only through national plans, but also through people’s everyday environments, community ties and local capacity for cooperation “Community-based crisis preparedness does not mean shifting responsibility onto people. On the contrary, it means giving people better opportunities to understand their role, notice risks and cooperate both with each other and with local institutions. A well-functioning community does not replace public-sector crisis management, but in a crisis it can provide very important support to it,” Nagel added.

Through KRAKO, the Crisis Research Centre will continue working to make crisis preparedness understandable, practical and connected to local life. The project supports community awareness, strengthens the role of local leaders and helps make preparedness part of everyday cooperation, rather than only an exceptional task when a crisis occurs.

Photo: community crisis preparedness training and the KRAKO project logo (KRUK, 2026).

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2026 Fuel Crisis | What is the “Lion City’s” secret weapon in the fuel crisis?

kruk — Sat, 18 Apr 2026 18:06:00 +0000

2026 Fuel Crisis | What is the “Lion City’s” secret weapon in the fuel crisis?

Singapore’s fuel crisis does not primarily appear as empty petrol stations, but in prices, electricity bills, shipping, and the question of whether an energy-import-dependent city-state can maintain its role as a hub during a crisis. Singapore is vulnerable because it lacks a large domestic energy base, but strong because it is one of the world’s most important port, refining, and bunkering centres. This paradox is precisely what makes the Singapore case useful for Estonia: it shows why small-state crisis resilience does not begin with reassuring statements about reserves, but with a precise understanding of which dependencies will actually continue to function during a crisis.

Singapore’s fuel crisis does not primarily appear as empty petrol stations. It appears in prices, electricity bills, shipping, refining, regional demand, and in the question of whether a small city-state dependent on energy imports can keep both its domestic market and its role as an Asian energy intermediary functioning during a crisis. If Australia’s spring 2026 fuel shock became visible through long distances, diesel prices, and local supply disruptions, Singapore’s story is different: the country is vulnerable not only because it depends on imports, but also because others depend on it.

Singapore’s smallness is deceptive. On the map, it is a Southeast Asian city-state located between the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea, with a population of just over 6 million people: 4.20 million residents and 1.91 million non-residents.¹ But from the perspective of an energy crisis, Singapore is not simply a small island state. It is a port, a trading hub, an intermediary for petroleum products, and one of the world’s most important centres for marine fuel, or bunkering. This is where Singapore’s paradox lies: the country is vulnerable because it lacks a large domestic energy base, but strong because it has built itself into a hub through which fuel, goods, capital, and trust move.

Singapore’s protection does not come from independence in the classical sense, but from controlled interdependence: it depends on the world, but the world also depends on it — more than one might assume. This means that an energy crisis affects not only the domestic market or households, but the wider system through which goods, services, and capital move across the region. In Singapore’s case, the decisive question is therefore not only how much fuel the country itself consumes, but also how much the functioning of other countries, companies, and supply chains depends on Singapore’s reliability.

Major energy intermediary

Singapore’s role is best understood through energy flows. In 2024, the country imported 149 million tonnes of oil equivalent in energy products, 59% of which were petroleum products. At the same time, Singapore exported 78 million tonnes of oil equivalent in energy products, almost all of which were also petroleum products.² These figures capture Singapore’s specificity: it imports on a very large scale, but it is not merely an end consumer. Singapore processes, stores, trades, and redirects fuel to regional and global markets. At the same time, the country’s everyday functioning depends heavily on imported energy. This is illustrated by the fact that in 2024, 94% of Singapore’s electricity generation fuel mix came from natural gas.² As a result, a fuel crisis does not affect only cars, buses, or ships. It affects the entire technosphere of the city-state: from air-conditioning systems to hospitals and shopping centres, as well as the products and services that rely on them. If gas prices rise or supply becomes less certain, the pressure quickly reaches the ordinary functioning of the whole city.

Bunkering, or refuelling ships, is not a side service for Singapore; it is part of the country’s international role. Since most global trade moves by sea, it constantly needs fuel, insurance, maintenance, port services, and reliable logistics. Singapore’s strategic importance is especially visible in maritime activity, as shown by last year’s records: in 2025, the port reached a new high, with vessel arrival tonnage at 3.22 billion GT, container throughput at 44.66 million TEU, and almost 57 million tonnes of marine fuel sold to ships.³ These are figures of a scale that would give any maritime state confidence. This is also what makes Singapore’s crisis position difficult. The state must maintain domestic supply, keep the port and bunkering system functioning, and preserve its reputation as a reliable energy centre. If it restricts fuel exports too sharply, it damages its role as a regional hub. If its domestic buffer is too weak, pressure returns to the home market. The core of Singapore’s crisis management lies in this balance: protecting its own supply security without losing trust in its role as an international energy intermediary.

The Hormuz shock reaches Singapore through prices

Geographically, Singapore is far from the Strait of Hormuz, but in terms of energy flows it is much closer. In 2024, around one-fifth of global oil and petroleum product consumption and about one-fifth of global LNG trade passed through the Strait of Hormuz. For Singapore, the Asian dimension matters most: 84% of the crude oil and 83% of the LNG that moved through Hormuz went to Asian markets.⁴ This affects energy prices, shipping, insurance, refining, and electricity generation across the region. Even if Singapore’s port is operating and petrol stations have fuel, the shock still travels through prices. When crude oil, diesel, aviation fuel, or LNG become more expensive, the impact eventually reaches pump prices, electricity bills, transport costs, and the price of goods.

In spring 2026, this quickly became visible in Singapore. By late March, diesel prices had risen above S$4 per litre. On 30 March, Shell, Esso, and Caltex were selling diesel at S$4.13 per litre, SPC at S$3.92, and Sinopec at S$3.72. At the same time, 95-octane petrol remained at around S$3.40–S$3.42 per litre.⁵ The change was significant because, as recently as late February, diesel had been clearly cheaper than petrol at the major fuel retailers.⁶ Diesel price increases are central from a preparedness perspective. Petrol mainly affects private consumers and everyday car use, but diesel keeps goods, people, and services moving. In Singapore, this means buses, minibuses, vans, logistics companies, refrigerated goods, and a wide range of services.

The same price pressure also reaches electricity. Singapore depends on energy imports, and around 95% of its electricity is generated from imported natural gas.⁷ When oil and gas prices rise, the full impact does not appear immediately, because electricity and gas tariffs reflect earlier fuel costs. This makes energy crises deceptive: society may already be inside the crisis, while part of the cost pressure reaches consumers only later.

Protected, but not untouched

Singapore’s strength lies in the fact that its preparedness does not rest on a single solution. The country has diversified gas sources, fuel reserves, power plants that can switch to diesel, a strong port, energy trading capacity, refining capability, and diplomatic relationships. This does not make Singapore invulnerable, but it gives it more room for manoeuvre than a country dependent on a single terminal, pipeline, or supplier. Singapore cannot cut itself off from the global market. Its system reduces the risk of a sudden physical shortage, but it does not shield consumers from higher prices. This is especially visible in the electricity system. Natural gas reaches Singapore both through pipelines from Malaysia and Indonesia and as LNG from global markets. Power generation companies are required to maintain gas reserves and diesel reserves as an alternative fuel. If necessary, power plants can switch from natural gas to diesel and use the Standby LNG Facility.⁸

A contingency plan therefore does not only mean that there is a storage tank somewhere. It also means having the technical ability to switch the system. The same logic applies to national crisis management. Following the Middle East crisis, the Homefront Crisis Ministerial Committee was activated to coordinate the government’s response to energy, food, supply-chain, security, communication, and diplomatic risks.⁹ This matters because an energy crisis does not stay within the boundaries of one ministry. It touches foreign policy, ports, internal security, food supply, household coping, and public trust at the same time. In Singapore’s case, it is therefore necessary to distinguish between supply security and price security. The country has built a system in which a sudden physical shortage is less likely. But this does not mean that price increases will not reach consumers. Reserves, contracts, and diversified supplies help keep the system functioning, but they do not make a global crisis cheap. Preparedness does not make the world market cheaper. It helps avoid the worst.

Refining and bunkering as a layer of protection

Singapore’s protective layers are not limited to reserves. The country is the world’s third-largest oil trading centre and the sixth-largest exporter of refined products.⁹ This position is the result of deliberate industrial and trade policy. Refining gives Singapore a role that a purely consuming country does not have: it participates in the chain where crude oil becomes diesel, petrol, aviation fuel, marine fuel, and other chemical industry products. In a crisis, this gives Singapore access, weight, and information. The movement of large fuel volumes through Singapore means that the country is not at the edge of the market. Other countries’ need for Singapore’s refined products creates reciprocal relationships. Being at the centre of energy trading and port activity also gives Singapore early signals about where the market is moving.

The same capability also creates vulnerability. Refining requires feedstock, shipping, insurance, labour, electricity, and a functioning market. If crude oil, middle distillates, or semi-finished products become harder to obtain, a refinery cannot save itself on its own. If pressure on the Strait of Hormuz or other maritime chokepoints persists, it will eventually reach the refining hub as well. Singapore therefore cannot be only an intermediary or an observer in a crisis. It must seek alternative sources, maintain reserves, use diplomatic relationships, and ensure that domestic needs do not collide with international obligations. The same applies to bunkering. Readers often think of a fuel crisis through cars or petrol stations, but in Singapore’s case, it is also necessary to think about ships. When a container ship, tanker, or bulk carrier enters the Port of Singapore, it needs fuel to reach the next port. If fuel becomes more expensive or bunkering is disrupted, the impact quickly reaches logistics, insurance costs, and eventually the price of goods.

Singapore is protected by a balanced network

Singapore’s geopolitical position makes an energy crisis especially sensitive. The city-state cannot rely on one great power, one supply chain, or one political guarantee. Its economy needs open sea routes, rules-based trade, functioning relations with both the United States and China, strong ties with Australia and New Zealand, and a solid position within the ASEAN regional system. This is not neutrality in the sense of indifference, but deliberate balancing. Singapore cooperates with Western countries on defence and security, maintains economic relations with China, links itself closely to Australian and New Zealand supply chains, and seeks to preserve its role as a reliable, rules-abiding trading hub. In an energy crisis, this position becomes a practical layer of protection: when a country does not have large natural resources of its own, relationships, reputation, and agreements become part of supply security.

This is illustrated by Singapore’s relationship with Australia. One is a continental state and a major resource producer, but also a vulnerable importer of refined fuels. The other is a small city-state, but a major refining and trading hub whose electricity generation depends on imported gas. In a crisis, this relationship becomes a form of mutual energy insurance: Australia is an important LNG supplier for Singapore, while Singapore is a key source of refined fuels for Australia. This is not an ordinary seller-buyer relationship, but a mutual dependence between supply chains. It shows that fuel security is not only about what is located within a country’s own territory. It also depends on which relationships, agreements, and dependencies have been built before the crisis. When disruption comes, these links become practical: Australia can turn to a country with refining and trading capacity, while Singapore can rely on a politically close and reliable LNG supplier. The broader strategic partnership matters, but in a fuel crisis the question becomes very concrete: who can provide which critical resource to whom.

The same network also sets limits. Singapore cannot simply close the market during a crisis and keep everything for itself, because doing so would damage its credibility as a port, refining, and trading hub. At the same time, it cannot ignore domestic price pressure.

Singapore’s crisis management therefore depends on holding two levels together: the country must function internally while remaining reliable externally.

Lesson for Estonia: the state must know where its reserves will actually start working

Singapore’s example does not provide Estonia with a model to copy. Estonia cannot adopt Singapore’s strengths, such as refining capacity, the role of a bunkering hub, or a position in global energy trade. This is precisely why the lesson is sobering: if Estonia does not have the protective layer of a Singapore-type hub, it must know much more precisely what it can actually rely on in a crisis.

Reserves do not help enough if it is unclear how they will start moving during a crisis. The existence of fuel reserves is necessary, but it is not the same as functioning crisis capability. Reserves may exist in national accounting, but the practical questions in a crisis are different: how will fuel reach the places where it is actually needed, which sectors will receive it first, and how will this decision reach the petrol station network, companies, and local-level crisis managers? If these questions have not been thought through, a gap may emerge between official supply security and actual continuity of services. The state may have reserves, but a local service may still fail to access them in time. A municipality may have the task of opening an evacuation site, but no guaranteed access to generator fuel. Social transport may be listed in a crisis plan, but its contracted provider may not have assured refuelling access. In that case, the problem is not only the quantity of fuel, but the usability of the reserve.

This is where overly reassuring messages such as “crisis reserves exist” should be avoided. That may be true, but it does not yet answer how the reserve will work during a crisis. The public needs to know whether petrol stations will remain open, whether the state will restrict sales, whether critical services will receive priority access, and what ordinary people should do to avoid intensifying panic buying. Decision-makers need an equally clear situational picture: where commercial stocks are located, which petrol stations are critical, which regions are more vulnerable, and which transport corridors must remain operational. Without that information, crisis management quickly becomes guesswork.

“Fuel” must be broken down into concrete needs in crisis plans. The general word “fuel” can be deceptively convenient in a crisis plan. In reality, diesel, petrol, aviation fuel, generator fuel, and gas are not simply interchangeable. They keep different activities running and create different vulnerabilities. Diesel is critical for freight transport, agriculture, heavy machinery, waste management, generators, and many services that support continuity. Petrol is more closely linked to everyday mobility and some service providers. Aviation fuel is connected to connectivity and evacuation capacity. Generator fuel becomes critical when electricity supply is disrupted or when evacuation sites, communication points, care homes, or other critical facilities must remain operational.

For Estonia, this means that crisis plans should not merely ask stakeholders how much fuel they have stored. They need to ask more uncomfortable questions: what exactly is the fuel needed for; which services would fail first if, for example, diesel became harder to access; and which local government tasks depend on contractors who may not themselves have crisis-time refuelling rights? It also needs to be discussed which services are resilient on paper, but in practice depend on a single petrol station, a single carrier, or the assumption that the market will continue to function during a crisis.

If these questions are not addressed, responsibility can quickly shift downward in a crisis. The state may assume that municipalities will reorganise services locally. Municipalities may assume that service providers will find their own solutions. Service providers may assume that petrol stations will continue to operate. Residents may assume that the state will intervene before the situation affects them directly. This chain of assumptions may appear to work under normal conditions, but in a crisis it can reveal that each level has been relying on someone else’s capacity.

Estonia must also plan according to what it does not have. The most sobering lesson from Singapore is the need to recognise limits. In a crisis, Singapore can rely on its role as a hub for energy trading, refining, port services, and bunkering. Estonia does not have that position. This does not mean that international cooperation is unimportant. On the contrary, Estonia depends on it. But cooperation must not be treated as a vague sense of reassurance. It is necessary to distinguish between binding agreements, political promises, realistic supply channels, and wishful thinking. International belonging is necessary, but it does not replace a practical supply plan. In a crisis, concrete details matter: which ports are operating, which transport routes are usable, which companies can deliver, which fuel types are prioritised, which countries are competing for the same resources, and which agreements provide real access rather than general political support.

A fuel crisis cannot be treated only as a question of the size of reserves or international membership. It must be understood as a question of distribution capacity, local continuity, priorities, and responsibility. The most important thing is not to say that reserves exist. It is to know when, to whom, and how they become usable in practice. Domestic and regional layers of protection therefore become more important: clear prioritisation, rehearsed distribution decisions, a realistic role for municipalities, mapping the fuel needs of critical services, understanding the vulnerability of the petrol station network, and honest communication with residents. Small-state resilience does not begin with imagining the country as larger or more central than it is. It begins with knowing exactly when official assumptions no longer hold.

Photoe: Singapore fuel crisis illustrations (KRUK, 2026) and Singapore highrises (Pexels/Ethan Tran, 2023).

Sources

¹ [Anon]., 2026. Latest news and data: Population and population structure. Singapore Department of Statistics.

² [Anon]., 2025. Singapore energy statistics 2025. 24.10.2025, Energy Market Authority.

³ [Anon]., 2026. Singapore sees record port performance in 2025. 13.01.2026, Channel NewsAsia.

⁴ Dunn, C. & Barden, J. 2025. Amid regional conflict, the Strait of Hormuz remains critical oil chokepoint. 16.06.2025, U.S. Energy Information Administration.

⁵ Ganesan, N. 2026a. Diesel surges past S$4 a litre: Singapore businesses caught between rising costs and reluctant customers. 31.03.2026, Channel NewsAsia.

⁶ Ganesan, N. 2026b. CNA explains: Why is diesel now more expensive than petrol? 02.04.2026, Channel NewsAsia.

⁷ [Anon]., 2026a. Middle East conflict’s impact on prices of electricity and town gas. 31.03.2026, Energy Market Authority.

⁸ [Anon]., 2026b. How Singapore’s energy supply affects you. 10.04.2026, Energy Market Authority.

⁹ Shanmugam, K. 2026. Ministerial Statement on the impact of the Middle East situation on Singapore. 07.04.2026, Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore.

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PIMA report published: recommendations for policymakers on developing resilience centres

kruk — Wed, 11 Mar 2026 11:29:00 +0000

PIMA report published: recommendations for policymakers on developing resilience centres

The recently published PIMA project report presents international recommendations for developing local and community-level resilience centres.

The PIMA project brought together local government representatives from Estonia, Sweden and Ukraine to explore how community-based crisis centres providing essential services — such as water, food, heating, electricity, internet access and reliable information — can strengthen local resilience. The project was not simply about transferring Ukraine’s experience, but about understanding how elements of Ukraine’s Points of Invincibility model could be adapted to different socio-cultural contexts in order to build comparable capacity in the Baltic Sea Region. Particular attention was given to inclusiveness, accessibility and the effective use of existing local needs and resources.

The example of Ukraine clearly shows that resilience is not something achieved once and for all. On the contrary, it is repeatedly tested over time. Continued power outages and pressure on infrastructure in 2025 further underline that resilience centres must remain flexible, community-based and integrated into the everyday practices of local governance. Through research, webinars and international knowledge exchange, participants explored how municipalities can establish and maintain such centres together with communities and partner organisations. The project resulted in a concept paper on good practices for resilience centres, a thematic webinar on inclusive crisis centre development and an international conference held in Malmö.

The initiative also led to the creation of the PIMA+ network — the first local-level civil protection initiative of its kind in the region, promoting cross-border cooperation and supporting the shared goal of strengthening community-based societal resilience.

To join the PIMA+ network, please contact here the Crisis Research Centre, which coordinates the network’s development and cooperation in Estonia.

Photos: PIMA report (Crisis Research Centre, 2026).

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National food reserve only for a few: sounds like The Hunger Games

kruk — Wed, 28 Jan 2026 17:15:16 +0000

National food reserve only for a few: sounds like The Hunger Games

The National Audit Office has audited the state of the country’s food reserves: whether the reserves exist and to what extent they can be put into use in a crisis. It emerged that even in 2026 the country does not have food reserves to the extent the government has set as a goal—14 days’ worth of food for the entire population, i.e. about 1.3 million people. Instead, the managers of the Estonian Stockpiling Centre have come up with their own goal—a food reserve for a small part of society.

Food reserves are a critically important part of food security—compared to the healthcare system, they are like emergency medical services, which must be immediately available in a crisis. The National Audit Office’s aim was precisely to verify the existence of the food reserves and how quickly they can be brought into use. The report shows that the country still does not have food reserves to the extent the government has set as a goal. There is no 14-day food reserve for the entire population, the creation of which the government has tasked the Estonian Stockpiling Centre (ESC) with.

ESC has, on its own initiative, instead pursued a different target, under which ca 130,000 people—i.e. only a few, just 10% of the population—are covered by food reserves for 30 days. The National Audit Office also doubts whether even this reserve aligns with reality: it has stated clearly that “the set target level does not take into account the possible needs of any specific emergency or national defence crisis,” meaning that as a goal it is, as Auditor General Janar Holm noted, “plucked out of thin air.”¹ In the post-audit counter-communication by the Estonian Stockpiling Centre (ESC), however, there is an attempt to divert attention away from the very serious lack of reserves, talking about everything other than the lack of reserves itself.²

To illustrate the seriousness of the situation, it is appropriate to use a few real-life examples. Applied to a similar situation in a family, this would mean that although the plan was to buy a food reserve for the entire family, only, for example, the father buys it for himself. The remaining family members can figure out on their own how to cope. Probably no further explanation is needed to understand that this is not a normal way to behave.

One can also imagine a parallel from military, national defence, where the Ministry of Defence gives the Estonian Centre for Defence Investments (ECDI) the task of procuring 100 000 shells, 155mm calibre. ECDI decides instead to procure something else altogether, and in a different quantity—for example, 122mm calibre and 500 000 pieces—saying that “it’s almost the same anyway” or that it is some kind of “interim goal”. Since the Estonian Defence Forces cannot actually use what was purchased (because the 122mm howitzers were long ago given to Ukraine; with the wrong calibre there is nothing you can do) and the client’s assignment was ignored, at least two things would likely happen: non-performance would be established and someone would be held responsible. It is obvious that such an error cannot be left uncorrected in any serious way. Otherwise, if indifference is also the norm on the military national defence side, one must ask—where is the credibility of national defence?

Lack of food reserves means hunger

Food reserves are important in themselves: their existence affects every person’s life and the functioning of society at the start of a crisis, when the risk of panic is greatest and, in the case of war, the state could even collapse. From a longer-term perspective, concern about the entire food-security chain is of course justified. Local production and the movement of goods across the border are important, but the risks associated with those, too, are mitigated at the beginning of a crisis by that same on-site food reserve. Therefore, shortcomings in food reserves must not be buried under the argument that there are problems in areas X and Y as well and that we shouldn’t talk only about food reserves. We must talk about them, because they are also independently very important.

At this point it is important to emphasise that most of the national food reserve must be deployable relatively quickly (preferably immediately). If food cannot be obtained from shops and household supplies run out, dissatisfaction inevitably arises, followed by panic. If the reserve requires energy and large-scale processing (turning grain into flour) or complex distribution, it may exist on paper but still fail to reach people in time.

Food shortages during a crisis, however, pose an internal security threat, because the risk increases of moving toward theft and looting. A food reserve is therefore also a very important objective for internal security, as it helps prevent a large share of the problems that tend to arise quickly in crises when food is scarce. Thus, a food reserve is a very important objective for the state in order to ensure the state’s ability to function and the continued functioning of society even in the most difficult times.

High-paid insubordinate freelancing

It is also important to note that ESC was created precisely to end a situation where each ministry dealt with reserves on its own and the result was uneven capability and diffuse responsibility.³ The idea of a central system was to consolidate tasks and responsibility in one place. However, no one seems to have foreseen that the central administrator, a “strategic enterprise”, would begin rewriting the government’s objectives itself, once it becomes clear that it cannot cope with meeting those objectives.

In addition, if you independently dilute the objective, you can of course also say that we coped, we got it done! This is how one can read in ESC’s 2024 annual report that “the tasks set upon the company’s establishment to form the state’s operational reserves have by now been fulfilled.”⁴ As regards food reserves, that task has not been fulfilled, as the National Audit Office has pointed out. Someone is lying, or ESC has created for itself a complete parallel world with its own objectives that has no contact with reality.

At the same time, ESC is, among state-owned enterprises, the institution with by far the highest average salary—nearly 5700€ per month. Alongside their other tasks, they have also found time to conduct satisfaction surveys, from which they have learned that “partners assess ESC as a professional, fast-acting and competent organisation, staffed by helpful people who take into account the needs of society and partners, who are open and have good communication skills”.⁴

Unfortunately, the highly paid managers there have overlooked the client’s expectation—and, more broadly, society’s as well: not to starve to death in the event of a crisis.

A body that considers itself a centre of competence, however, unfortunately radiates a lack of competence and highly paid, insubordinate ineptitude. If the food reserve has not been created in line with the assignment given by the state and with actual needs, then there is indeed reason to speak of a loss of trust in the management. In any other field, an insubordinate, highly paid manager who engages in freelance improvisation would be sent to the Unemployment Insurance Fund (not to run it). The substantive absence of food reserves for most of society affects everyone. Taking responsibility for the resulting Russian-style bardak is entirely appropriate—perhaps even expected—though it will probably once again require a signal from somewhere above (if it comes at all). Will anyone actually take that responsibility?

There is a leadership crisis in civil protection

The food-reserves case is a symptom of a leadership crisis in the field of civil protection. It shows what happens when different ministries and agencies have to cooperate on a single task—the creation of a food reserve. ESC is indeed under the area of governance of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications, but the input for the food reserve comes from the Ministry of Regional Affairs and Agriculture. On the one hand, this is a bureaucratic nightmare in which responsibility is lacking; on the other, it is an ideal scenario for an aggressor, where, to knock over the house of cards of food security, the defenders do the preparatory work themselves, doing the work at best half-heartedly, in a slapdash manner.

There has also been talk of “exiling” the food-reserves field under the Ministry of Regional Affairs and Agriculture as a way to solve the problem.⁵ This is not a solution and will not produce results; it is the last place to take the field. More broadly, however, the problem is that civil protection in general is scattered helter-skelter across the silo towers of ministries and agencies, and this has not produced results elsewhere either—for example, according to the Rescue Board’s latest data, evacuation capability is 1.5% of the population—again, for very few. Narva alone has more people living there.

Shuttling the field back and forth between ministries and chopping it up has not produced the desired results in any aspect of civil protection. Strengthening comprehensive national defence can be done effectively, for example, in the Swedish manner, where both military national defence and civil protection have been placed under the Ministry of Defence, with each of the two fields having its own responsible minister.^A

The never-ending ‘let’s patch the potholes’ dress rehearsal for civil protection is about to enter its fifth year—with the targets still nowhere in sight. Until civil protection and national defence are brought together under the Ministry of Defence, as in Sweden,⁶ there is no real solution and there will not be one. Managing comprehensive national defence from a single ministry is indispensable for achieving real results, because then the front-line and rear-area perspectives—and their mutual support—gain a strategic outlook in practice. In that case, the resource base is also shared. The Ministry of Defence’s situational-awareness radar sees clearly to the horizon, knows what needs to be done, and does not live in a fantasy world. But if the leadership crisis in civil protection is not resolved, then we will find ourselves in the new decade still having to state that the state remains unable to help its residents.

Remarks:

^AIn Estonia’s context, these ministers inevitably have to come from the same party; otherwise, the result is the all-too-familiar tradition of day-to-day politics overriding the state’s and society’s strategic objectives.

Sources:

🟠 The op-ed (by Hannes Nagel) was first published in Delfi’s opinion portal on January 27 in Estonian and January 28 in Russian. Photo: food-reserve cartoon (Kriisiuuringute Keskus, 2026).

¹Hallismaa, M. 2026. Riigi ootused varude keskusele irduvad tegelikkusest. 16.01.2026, ERR.

²Metsalu-Nurminen, I. 2026. Riigi tegevusvaru eesmärk on jätkuvalt täitmata. 23.01.2026, ERR.

³[Anon.], 2021. Valitsus toetas Eesti Varude Keskuse loomist. 11.03.2021, Vabariigi Valitsus.

⁴ [Anon.], 2025. Majandusaasta aruanne 2024. AS Eesti Varude Keskus.

⁵ Ojakivi, M. & Peegel, M. 2026. Terras: minu vastutus on tuua rasked teemad arutellu. 22.01.2026, ERR.

⁶ [Anon.], 2026. Ministry of Defence. Government Office of Sweden.

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We discussed the state of civil protection and crisis preparedness in Estonia on Äripäev radio’s morning program

kruk — Fri, 05 Dec 2025 18:27:44 +0000

We discussed the state of civil protection and crisis preparedness in Estonia on Äripäev radio’s morning program

On December 5, Hannes Nagel, head of the Crisis Research Center, gave an overview of the state of civil protection and crisis preparedness on Äripäev’s morning program, focusing on the actual situation of Estonia’s sheltering and bomb shelter capacity. Several details emerged during the talk: the core problem with the system is not individual shortcomings, but overall preparedness.

We talked on the programme about the actual state of civil protection in Estonia and focused on the main points of concern. We began with (bomb) shelters. Nothing has changed since spring – not a single technically engineered shelterhas been built in Estonia to this day. Although the law requires new buildings whose construction permits are issued from July 1, 2026 onward to include a shelter, builders still cannot act, because the technical implementing acts have not yet been released. In practice, this means there is an obligation, but the substance of that obligation remains unknown.

The draft requirements for shelters and hiding places that do exist have not been approved. As long as precise requirements are missing, the construction sector has no way of knowing what the real content of these requirements will be.

Public hiding places have been chosen “intuitively”

Next, we discussed the topic of hiding places, which in existing buildings are the only practically feasible solution. However, Estonia also lacks a final regulation on hiding places. As long as the requirements are unknown, each property owner can essentially decide for themselves what should be considered a “hiding place.”

The selection of public hiding places, which according to the explanatory memorandum to the amendment of the Emergency Act has been chosen by the Estonian Rescue Board, is based on fire safety considerations and the intuitive assumption that these places would protect people. No engineering assessment has been carried out to evaluate their actual protective capacity. For example: even if a building appears strong, this does not automatically mean it can withstand blast-wave pressure or protect against fragments. Nevertheless, this intuitive judgment is currently the basis for selecting such places.

In addition, there is a contradiction in the law that effectively nullifies the entire solution. The obligation to establish a hiding place is formulated conditionally – only “if possible.” If an owner concludes that it is not possible to establish a hiding place (which is easy to justify, since buildings were not designed with this principle in mind), they can simply prepare a hiding plan (which does not include a hiding place), and the obligation is considered fulfilled. This results in a capability that exists only on paper but not in reality. It is an example of a formal obligation that is, in practice, voluntary.

We then moved on to the question of how vulnerable Estonia actually is. The (bomb) shelter requirement does not apply to buildings whose construction permit applications are submitted before July 1, 2026. This creates two parallel worlds: strict requirements for future buildings, while more than 90% of Estonia’s housing stock will remain without (bomb) shelters even in the future. And even if the implementing acts were published tomorrow, the first buildings with (bomb) shelters would likely be completed only in 2029–2030. If delays continue, the timeline will shift to 2031–2032. By that time, the war in Ukraine will have lasted an entire decade – a parallel that illustrates how naïvely unrealistic it is to hope that threats will wait for our procedural timelines. In the programme, we proposed the following order of solutions:

first, the implementing acts that set out the requirements for hiding places and (bomb) shelters must be approved and published without delay;
second, the state must allocate significantly more resources to programmes that help adapt existing buildings for hiding. The support scheme for apartment associations in Tallinn (and the similar scheme planned by the state) shows that solutions are possible, but the current scale is marginal compared to the actual need. The amount of support per residential building must be higher than 10,000 euros in order to carry out meaningful structural reinforcements;
third, a clear political message is needed: (bomb) shelters can and must be built immediately, not only once the legal deadline arrives. This is especially important for schools, kindergartens, and care institutions – they cannot be left waiting until the middle of 2030. However, this depends on the previous two points: the regulations that define the requirements must accompany the law, and adequate support measures are needed for those who want to move faster on sheltering.

Finally, we assessed the outlook for 2026 – (bomb) shelters are still lacking; in a military crisis the state will not have the capacity to assist the population; the best thing individuals can do is maintain personal crisis preparedness, which should serve as the foundation for building community-level capability to help one another; the core problem lies in the absence of political will and understanding, and in decisions that have been repeatedly postponed.

🎙️ Listen to an excerpt from the program here.

Photo: Visit to Äripäev radio (Kriisiuuringute Keskus, 2025).

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Japanese bear crisis

kruk — Sat, 22 Nov 2025 11:50:15 +0000

Japanese bear crisis

Akita Prefecture, with its 880,000 residents, has become the epicenter of Japan’s bear crisis. The main troublemakers are the persimmon-loving Asian black bears, weighing around 180 kilograms. The crisis has driven people to carry bells and spray cans, and it has forced local governments to close parks, halt postal services, and even send soldiers to patrol the mountains.

In 2025, Japan is facing one of the most serious human–wildlife conflicts in its recent history. The country is home to two major bear species: the Hokkaido brown bear, a large and powerful northern species, and the Asian black bear, which inhabits the mountainous regions of Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu. Both species typically stay away from populated areas, but this year their behavior has shifted — the surge in attacks, and the growing number of bears appearing in residential areas and even indoors, shows that the usual distance between humans and wildlife is rapidly disappearing.

Bear-related incidents are escalating into a cross-prefectural crisis. In October alone, 88 attacks and seven fatalities were recorded — the bleakest monthly figure in a decade. Between April and October, 13 people were killed and 184 injured by bears across 21 prefectures, with the highest numbers reported in Akita, Iwate, and Fukushima.1

The increase in attacks is the result of several interacting factors. Experts link the situation to both climate change and a growing bear population: storms and shifting weather patterns have damaged the harvest of beech nuts and other forest crops that make up the bears’ main autumn food supply. This year’s acorn and nut yield was particularly poor, leaving mountain-dwelling bears without enough food before hibernation.

Hunger is driving them downhill, where easily accessible food sources — fruit trees, waste, garden produce, and livestock feed — lie at the very edge of villages and towns. As a result, bears are entering settlements more frequently, becoming bolder, and remaining active longer, which increases the risk of encounters and attacks throughout the autumn–winter season.

The impact on local residents is severe

Where villages were once separated from the mountains by a buffer zone of farms and fields, that protective layer has now faded, and bears are moving ever closer to inhabited areas. At the same time, the state has responded forcefully — special units have been dispatched to support local hunters, drones patrol above parks, and researchers have developed a “bear-encounter prediction map” that uses artificial intelligence to forecast risks. Yet tension persists, and everyday routines have changed.

Children are no longer sent to school alone, shops open later, walks are taken only while carrying defensive tools, and tourism has suffered. In communities shaken by bear incidents, fear, exhaustion, and resistance to drastic measures intertwine — some traditional matagi hunters oppose aggressive culling, while some residents demand harsher steps. Amid all this, a shared feeling has taken hold: after years of restrictions and crises, people long for a sense of security, yet now they must live with the knowledge that a bear may be waiting just around the corner.²

The increasing appearance of bears near populated areas is already disrupting several essential services, including postal and courier work. When the police or local authorities declare an area bear-dangerous, or when employees consider the situation unsafe, all delivery services in that area are suspended. To reduce risk, Japan’s postal service has stopped evening motorcycle deliveries to dangerous zones and asks customers to allow postal vans to enter their property so that workers do not have to proceed on foot.³The result has been delays and temporary closures at post offices.

Akita Prefecture’s warning to residents on 10 November illustrates the gravity of the situation: in Kazuno City, an Asian black bear attacked a person right outside their home — one of many such incidents that have become more frequent this year. The local government cautions that bears are being spotted far more often than usual even near residential areas, and urges people to make noise while walking outdoors and remain alert to their surroundings to avoid unexpected encounters. Three days earlier, the municipality had issued another notice, reminding residents that bears may not enter hibernation if they continue to find food. For that reason, people are asked to remove late-autumn fruits from trees, collect fallen branches and fruit, and thin out trees if necessary, so that food scents do not keep bears lingering around populated areas.

The bear crisis has also driven innovation in crisis management

ts seriousness is reflected in the involvement of other countries: the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom have recently issued travel advisories regarding bear-related risks in Japan, and the U.S. Embassy in Japan released an official safety alert to American citizens,⁴ highlighting Hokkaido, Sapporo, and Akita as particularly affected. The recommendations urge people to avoid roads and parks near bear habitats, not travel alone, make noise in nature, carry bear spray, and report encounters directly to local authorities. These guidelines mirror those issued by Japanese municipalities themselves: keep doors and sheds closed, avoid leaving food waste outdoors, clear fruit from trees, protect fields with electric fencing, and improve visibility around homes and farmland.

The rapid escalation of the bear crisis has become both a threat and a catalyst for innovation in Japan. To understand the multifaceted risk landscape and support more effective crisis management, researchers from Sophia University’s Applied Data Science Program developed a predictive model that estimates the likelihood of bear encounters in Akita Prefecture.⁵ The model achieves nearly 64% accuracy and incorporates previous sightings, time and date, land use, population distribution, weather conditions, road networks, elevation, and the availability of beech nuts. Using SHapley Additive exPlanations (SHAP) analysis, a method in Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI), the researchers found that bear appearances are most strongly influenced by patterns of past sightings, land-cover types (such as built-up areas, rice fields, and bamboo forests), the concentration of elderly residents, and terrain elevation. The findings were published on July 22, 2025 in the International Journal of Data Science and Analytics, illustrating how a crisis can accelerate the development of scientific and technological solutions.⁶

A dedicated crisis map has also been developed for Akita Prefecture to support the management of the bear crisis.⁸

The bear crisis has also shown how rising demand for practical safety solutions can rapidly generate entirely new innovations. As bears increasingly appear near homes, schools, and camps, a concrete need has emerged for temporary public hiding spaces. Responding to this demand, the company Jacacon, working together with researchers, developed a bear-resistant shelter container — a reinforced, shipping-container-based structure capable of withstanding the force of a brown bear attack and providing people with a safe place to take cover during danger.⁷ The product is aimed at both private users and municipalities seeking to strengthen protection measures in high-risk areas, and in the Estonian context it is analogous to what is defined as a public hiding place.

Japan’s decision to deploy the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF, 自衛隊) to Akita Prefecture marks a step previously regarded as extreme, prompted by the deepening bear crisis. According to the Ministry of Defense, units are being sent into mountainous areas to set up traps and assist with the removal of dead animals, as local resources are becoming exhausted and the prefectural governor formally requested state support.⁹However, the soldiers themselves do not take part in hunting bears — that responsibility remains with local hunters — not because of a lack of capability, but because of constitutional limitations. The JSDF is permitted to use weapons only for self-defense in situations that meet strict criteria related to military attack; they are not allowed to apply force against animals. As a result, soldiers may carry weapons to protect themselves and local residents, but not for bear hunting, and they also lack the training required for such activity. Thus, the state’s intervention in the bear crisis takes shape primarily as logistical and technical support, helping affected regions manage the threat while remaining within the bounds of the constitution.¹⁰

The bear crisis also shows the need for resilience hubs

Japan’s 2025 bear crisis is an example of how ecological, demographic, and social factors can erode the balance that once existed in landscapes shared between humans and wildlife. Vegetation damaged by storms and climate change — particularly the poor harvest of beech nuts and acorns — has left bears without food and pushed them toward villages, towns, and farmland. At the same time, rural depopulation and the declining number of hunters have weakened the “buffer” that once existed between people and the mountains, expanding high-risk areas and increasing the number of attacks.

The intrusion of bears into residential neighbourhoods, the disruption of essential services, and the need to involve both the police and the Self-Defense Forces show how a natural hazard can quickly develop into a societal crisis felt across multiple sectors. It is precisely in such situations that the role of resilience centres becomes essential — not merely as places to shelter, but as coordinated support hubs that bring together information, communities, services, and decision-making.

The PIMA project, which focuses on mapping good practices for creating and developing resilience hubs based on Ukraine’s experience and applying them in municipalities in Estonia and Sweden, demonstrates that complex risks cannot be addressed through isolated warning messages or sector-specific measures alone.

What is needed is multi-level cooperation and a unified support structure that helps communities cope both with unexpected military situations and with seemingly “ordinary” environmental hazards that can escalate rapidly. Japan’s experience — where even bear-resistant shelter containers have entered the market as an extension of public services — illustrates how a crisis generates demand for solutions that ensure public safety and the continuity of daily life. Estonia’s own experience with wolf attacks shows similarly that a conflict does not need to reach the scale seen in Japan to require clear, community-aligned leadership. Both the Japanese and Ukrainian examples reinforce the core insight of the PIMA project: cooperation with communities and the establishment of resilience hubs are effective ways to strengthen the capacity needed to help communities withstand both natural and social crises, grounded in knowledge, collaboration, and local needs.

Could the same happen in Estonia?

In Estonia, conflicts between bears and humans have never escalated into a crisis comparable to Japan’s, but signs of tension in human–large carnivore coexistence are present here as well. Estonia’s brown bear population is one of the largest in Europe and has grown steadily over the past decade, leading to more frequent sightings on the edges of settlements and occasional incidents in which hungry or curious bears wander into yards or approach beehives. These cases have not been massive or widely dangerous, as Estonia’s natural food base for bears remains stable and bears are generally wary of humans, but each early-summer incident triggers noticeable public debate.

By comparison, wolves are a much more significant point of tension in Estonia: fluctuations in the wolf population, attacks on livestock, and disputes over hunting quotas have repeatedly drawn public attention and created strong friction between rural residents, conservationists, and authorities. Unlike bears, wolves rarely approach people, but their impact on households is more indirect — through livestock losses, fear, and broader effects on rural life. In both bear and wolf cases, Estonia’s experience shows that the conflict does not necessarily become a direct threat to human life, yet it brings social tension and a need for clear, science-based management that accounts for both community perspectives and nature conservation. This is also a key lesson from Japan’s crisis.

Japan’s solutions to the bear crisis require science-based population management, habitat restoration, and community preparedness, because as long as the mountains fail to provide bears with sufficient food and space, the human–bear conflict will remain a persistent and visible part of daily life in Japan.

Travelling to Japan? Here are 5 tips for staying safe in bear-prone areas::

avoid walking alone in areas where bears have been seen, and close doors so bears cannot enter buildings;
keep an eye on your surroundings at all times and avoid places with poor visibility;
make noise while moving (a bell, radio, phone) to deter bears;
report every bear sighting to the local municipality and police, and to the community if necessary;
keep food, feed, and waste containers securely closed or protected with electric fencing.

Images: guidance for residents (Akita Prefecture, 2025). Overview compiled by Hannes Nagel (Crisis Research Centre, 2025).

Sources:

¹ [Anon.]., 2025a. October bear attack casualties in Japan hit ten-year high. NHK, 17.11.2025.

² Hernández, J. C. & Notoya, K. 2025. The Hunt Is On for Bears in Japan After Deadly Attacks. The New York Times, 20.11.2025.

³ [Anon.]., 2025b. クマ出没等に伴う業務の見合わせについて. Japan Post, 5.11.2025.

⁴ [Anon.]., 2025c. Wildlife Alert: U.S. Embassy Tokyo. U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Japan, 12..11.2025.

⁵ [Anon.]., 2025d.クマとの遭遇リスクをAIで予測するモデルを開発 [Development of an AI model to predict the risk of bear encounters]. Sophia University, 20.11.2025.

⁶ Nakamoto, S. & Fukazawa, Y. 2025. Bear warning: predicting encounters using temporal, environmental, and demographic features. International Journal of Data Science and Analytics, 20, pp. 7107–7125.

^⁷Baseel, C. 2025. Bear attack shelters going on sale in Japan as country experiences record high number of incidents. Japan Today, 17.11.2025.

^⁸[Anon.]., 2025e. ツキノワグマ等情報マップシステム (クマダス). [Black bear information map system Kumadas].

^⁹ Hernández, J. C. & Kiuko Notoya, K. 2025. Japan to Send Troops to Help Stop Bear Attacks. The New York Times, 29.10.2025.

^¹⁰ [Anon.]., 2025f. Japan deploys Self-Defense Forces to counter a surge in bear attacks. The Mainichi, 06.11.2025.

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Presenting the PIMA project in Gotland: international cooperation to strengthen community resilience

kruk — Thu, 19 Jun 2025 10:00:00 +0000

Presenting the PIMA project in Gotland: international cooperation to strengthen community resilience

At the international follow-up meeting on crisis preparedness and resilience held in Gotland, Sweden, the Crisis Research Centre introduced its latest collaboration initiative: PIMA – Point of Invincibility for Multi-Level Adaptation, funded by the Swedish Institute.

The PIMA project aims to strengthen the capacity of local governments in Estonia, Sweden, and Ukraine to build and maintain community-level resilience. A key focus of the project is the development and support of resilience hubs – local centres that provide practical support, information, and safety during crises.

During the Gotland event, we highlighted how PIMA creates a cross-border learning platform, enabling municipalities from the three countries to share and adapt best practices in community preparedness. Particular attention is given to learning from Ukraine’s experience, where local governments have had to innovate under extreme conditions, offering valuable insights for the entire region.

Through PIMA, we aim to:

facilitate structured international knowledge exchange;
support local-level preparedness through shared learning and practical tools;
promote experience-based cooperation that values both success stories and hard-earned lessons.

The Crisis Research Centre is responsible for coordinating the Estonian activities within the project and is working closely with its partners to build sustainable solutions that improve community readiness and resilience in the face of both sudden crises and long-term change. The project is funded by the Swedish Institute.

Photos: security forum at Gotland (Crisis Research Centre, 2025).

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Crisis Research Centre represented Estonia at follow-up meeting on crisis preparedness and resilience in Gotland

kruk — Wed, 18 Jun 2025 10:00:54 +0000

Crisis Research Centre represented Estonia at follow-up meeting on crisis preparedness and resilience in Gotland

From 16 to 18 June, the island of Gotland in Sweden hosted the international event “Building a Resilient Baltic Sea Region – Perspectives and Possibilities”, a follow-up meeting to the Annual Forum of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (AF2024). This high-level gathering focused on crisis preparedness and resilience across the region. The Crisis Research Centre was proud to be the only organisation representing Estonia on site.

Throughout the three-day programme, participants engaged in workshops, presentations, and discussions exploring how governments, institutions, and communities can better anticipate and respond to crises. The Crisis Research Centre took part in a working group dedicated to individual-level preparedness, sharing insights from Estonia’s community-based resilience initiatives.

Our representative and co-founder Anne-May Nagel stated: “In our presentation, we shared the experience we’ve gained over two years while running some of the largest community-based civil protection projects in Estonia. We also introduced the newly published English-language version of our crisis preparedness handbook for apartment building communities and discussed how the rising cost of living directly impacts people’s ability to prepare for crises.”

As the EUSBSR Action Plan is currently being revised, the meeting also provided an opportunity to influence future priorities. The Crisis Research Centre contributed input to the PA Secure policy area, emphasising the importance of local engagement, equity in preparedness, and science-based planning.

The event was organised by the Government Offices of Sweden, the Swedish Institute, Region Gotland, Foreningen Norden, and Gotlands Län. Their collaboration ensured a meaningful and well-rounded platform for regional cooperation, where both grassroots perspectives and institutional strategies were given space.

By actively participating in this international meeting, the Crisis Research Centre helped ensure that the community-based approaches to crisis resilience are shared, heard, and integrated into broader regional dialogue.

🟧🟦 Our participation in the forum was supported by the Estonian Ministry of the Interior through the National Foundation for Civil Society as part of the Haabersti community-based civil protection K-24 project.

Photos: Gotland forum (Crisis research Centre, 2025).

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The application of chaos theory to crisis management of epidemics

Kaisa Kukk — Mon, 06 Feb 2023 08:58:50 +0000

The application of chaos theory to crisis management of epidemics

Chaos theory is mainly known from the example of the Lorenz butterfly effect, where small changes can lead to significant, long-term and catastrophic consequences. What is this theory of chaos, though, and how does it relate to crisis management?

Chaos theory benefits many disciplines, but it still falls within the field of mathematics and is a tool that can define deterministic chaos – that is, seemingly random behavior that does not actually have a random cause. The study of the theory has led to the notion that seeming randomness can also conceal order, patterns, and underlying structure. Chaos theory has found countless applications, such as the study of planetary motion in the solar system, weather forecasts, population dynamics ecology, earthquake modelling, and the definition of the trajectories of space probes.

The aforementioned areas may seem light years away from crisis management, but as the theory focuses mainly on the beginning stages of processes and states that if a significant error is made at the beginning of the process, the rest of the process will be affected in unpredictable consequences. Through the prism of chaos theory, the COVID-19 crisis, which has been able to trigger lasting global change, can also be seen.¹ For example, the hypothetical flawed determination of the COVID-19 infection rate (R) and thus the introduction of mild restrictions in the early stages of the corona crisis could have led to harsh consequences for the medical system, increased infection numbers and mortality, thus ultimately leading to tougher restrictions and serious consequences for business. This, in turn, would also lower economic performance and could also lead to job losses, thereby increasing the number of people in need of social assistance and thus placing a long-term burden on the public purse. This, in turn, does not allow the state to invest in other initiatives in the desired amount, which will also have consequences for a much larger number of people. And all of this would have started with a calculation error in determining the R coefficient.

The global chain of events, which started from the miscalculation of the People’s Republic of China – the failure to recognize, localize, timely and adequately inform the world about the new virus quickly enough – continues to develop in a very unpredictable and chaotic way, and in its aftermath will no longer allow for a return to the usual year-round way of life. Chaos Theory makes it possible to explain the specifics of COVID-19² , and this in turn supports the use of the theory as a valid conceptual framework for studies aimed at examining the psychological, behavioural, social and systemic aspects of other viral epidemics.³ It should be mentioned here that such a global modeling approach, for example using chaos theory, has been a rather rare phenomenon in biological systems, but has been successfully implemented both during the West African Ebola epidemic (2013-2016) and during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, in countries in East Asia.Chaos Theory is particularly suitable for studying the explosive spread of infectious diseases, as it is suitable for modelling and researching unstable dynamic behaviour even when certain variables are unknown, which is often encountered in epidemiology.⁴ Knowledge and implementation of chaos theory is suitable for crisis management, especially because Postavaru et al. (2020) says that crisis responders face challenges in decision-making. One such example would be the importance of applying a mathematical model in assessing the impact of isolation on the population.⁵ If a mathematical model was applied in assessing the effects of isolation, unpredictable consequences could be avoided. In the initial stages of crises, it is also essential to organise access to relevant information to promote decisions and policy objectives based on scientific evidence, giving decision-makers quick, easy and effective access to the best predictions5, which in turn allow even more accurate prediction of the new stages of the pandemic, even across countries.⁶ One’s own point of thought is the availability of basic data, but also the concealment of data in communist societies – such a pattern of behaviour may be the starting point of a crisis with unpredictable consequences, according to chaos theory – COVID has been the case.

On the basis of models, different measures and restrictions have also been implemented in the current crisis in the world, but finding a solution that is unambiguously workable and also implementing it is difficult.⁷ In addition, COVID-19 has made it virtually impossible to make informed decisions without a forecast⁸ , which depend on good level of testing data8, but still does not allow to create a whole picture of the situation, but rather helps to answer specific questions⁹ that policy makers may have in decision-making processes.

Sources used:

¹Boon, I. S., Lim, J. S., Tracy, P. T. A. Y. & Boon, C. S. 2020. Digital healthcare and shifting equipoise in radiation oncology: The butterfly effect of the COVID-19 pandemic. Journal of Medical Imaging and Radiation Sciences, pp. 1–3. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmir.2020.10.002

² Resnick, B. 2020. How chaos theory helps explain the weirdness of the Covid-19 pandemic. VOX, May 23, 2020. [Leitav: https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2020/5/20/21257136/covid-19-future-pandemic-chaos kasutatud 15.06.2022]

³Piotrowski, C. 2020. Covid-19 Pandemic and Chaos Theory: Applications based on a Bibliometric Analysis. Journal of Projective Psychology & Mental Health, 27(2), pp. 1–5.

⁴ Mangiarotti, S., Peyre, M., Zhang, Y., Huc, M., Roger, F. & Kerr, Y. 2020. Chaos theory applied to the outbreak of COVID-19: an ancillary approach to decision making in pandemic context. Epidemiology and Infection, 148(E95), pp. 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0950268820000990

⁵Postavaru, O., Anton, S. R. & Toma, A. 2020. COVID-19 pandemic and chaos theory. Mathematics and Computers in Simulation, 181(C), pp. 138–149. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.matcom.2020.09.029

⁶ Gibney, E. 2020. Whose coronavirus strategy worked best? Scientists hunt most effective policies. Nature, 581, pp. 15–16. https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-020-01248-1

⁷ Stuart, E. A., Polsky, D., Grabowski, M. K & Peters, D. 2020. 10 Tips for Making Sense of COVID-19 Models for Decision-Making. Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, April 27, 2020. [Leitav: https://publichealth.jhu.edu/2020/10-tips-for-making-sense-of-covid-19-models-for-decision-making kasutatud 15.06.2022].

⁸ Schneider, E. C. 2020. Failing the Test — The Tragic Data Gap Undermining the U.S. Pandemic Response. The New England Journal of Medicine. 383(4), p. 301. https://doi.org/10.1056/nejmp2014836

⁹ McBryde, E. S. 2020. Role of modelling in COVID-19 policy development. Paediatric Respiratory Reviews, 35, p. 59. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.prrv.2020.06.013

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