This is not an ordinary administrative relocation, but a decision with direct implications for civil protection and the state’s crisis management capacity. If such a move is treated purely as a real estate matter, rather than assessed through security considerations, the priorities are fundamentally misplaced. The Estonian Ministry of the Interior oversees the police, rescue services and crisis response system. Civil protection is not only about instructions and public communication; it also means ensuring that leadership of the state’s most critical internal security functions can physically operate during an emergency. The location of the ministry, as a key internal security crisis manager, must guarantee uninterrupted access, evacuation options and operational response.

The selected area, the Kopli peninsula, is a location with restricted access. Traffic congestion in the area is not decreasing; with new developments, it is growing rapidly. There are only a few routes for entering and leaving the peninsula, and their capacity is already under pressure. By car, access is effectively limited to Sõle Street and Kalaranna Street. Even a minor traffic accident on one of the main connections can halt movement and prevent rescue and police units from arriving or leaving quickly. If an ordinary rush-hour accident can paralyse traffic, the impact in a crisis — for example during a large-scale evacuation or simultaneous incidents — would be far greater.

Civil protection leadership cannot rely on infrastructure whose functioning depends on a few easily blocked nodes, especially when new developments are planned and traffic pressure is set to increase further. Nor should it be forgotten that the Kopli peninsula is home to the Mine Harbour, which has strategic significance. The proximity of military infrastructure as a strategic target increases the area’s vulnerability in crisis scenarios. A basic principle of national defence is to disperse critical functions, not concentrate them in an area whose strategic importance makes it a higher-risk zone.

The government’s lack of crisis awareness, and its failure to set a credible example in civil protection, is also illustrated by the fact that the Ministry of the Interior closed the Kopli rescue unit only in 2024 — a unit that would have been able to respond first on site in a crisis. Outside the capital, however, the new norm has become the construction of joint internal security buildings, where the police, rescue services and possibly other functions are placed under one roof. This is a classic case of putting all eggs in one basket to save on real estate costs, but in a crisis the price may be severe.

Crisis Lens is not a daily news section. Its focus is slower and more in-depth analysis: why a conflict, political confrontation, humanitarian crisis, technological risk, or state vulnerability develops into a crisis; which historical, political, and societal factors intensify it; and what can be learned from such cases for understanding, preventing, and managing crises.

Over the years, our researchers have published dozens of analytical overviews on geopolitical crises, security-related phenomena, and key issues in international politics. Several of these analyses have previously appeared in print in the Estonian Defence League’s magazine Kaitse Kodu!. Since March 2026, the Crisis Research Centre has been bringing these analyses systematically to its website, accompanied by specially created illustrations.

Because the level of individual crisis preparedness in Estonia remains regrettably low, a company’s resilience cannot be viewed separately from the people who work there. When a crisis affects an individual, their first priority is the safety of their family and meeting basic needs. This is precisely where workforce-related risks emerge for employers, alongside uncertainty regarding the availability of resources and increased pressure on organisational continuity.

Our recommendation to business leaders is simple: view the company as a small community. If the members of that community — its employees — are not prepared for crises, the organisation cannot realistically expect to operate flexibly under difficult circumstances. Employers should therefore invest far more in strengthening the individual crisis preparedness of their workforce through training, practical guidance and recommendations that help people cope more effectively during emergencies. This community-based approach to crisis preparedness within the private sector is still relatively new in Estonia, but in our view it is becoming increasingly necessary.

The programme also highlighted a broader trend: the role of the private sector in strengthening crisis preparedness is inevitably growing. The reason is straightforward. At present, the state lacks sufficient capacity, resources and, in some areas, readiness to address this issue systematically. As a result, companies cannot afford to wait for solutions to come from outside; they must increasingly develop their own preparedness culture that supports both employees and organisational continuity as a whole.

Erki Mägi emphasised that crisis preparedness begins with recognising risks. According to him, companies should first focus on tangible threats that are directly relevant to their operations, such as cyberattacks, staff shortages, supply-chain disruptions and power outages. Organisations that have already considered potential crisis scenarios and planned their responses are in a clear advantage compared to those that have not.

The programme also explored organisational adaptation to crises, risk insurance and lessons from the war in Ukraine. One of the key conclusions of the discussion was that crisis preparedness is no longer a peripheral issue or a formal compliance requirement; it is a direct component of an organisation’s ability to continue operating under challenging conditions.

We invite you to listen to the programme, as the discussion clearly illustrates why organisational resilience begins with people’s preparedness and why community-based crisis preparedness in the private sector is no longer a topic for the future, but a necessity today.

🟠 You can listen to the full discussion on crisis preparedness here (in Estonian). 

We have previously pointed out that the Estonian Stockpiling Agency does not fulfill the task given by the government: a nationwide 14-day state food reserve covering the entire population has not been established, and in reality the existing reserves amount to only approximately three days. We emphasise that although the state has begun supplying shops and fuel stations with generators and working to improve the resilience of food producers, an audit by the National Audit Office has revealed serious shortcomings and inexplicable ad-hoc practices in the activities of the Stockpiling Centre.

We stress that it is important for every person, according to their means, to have at home at least a one-week supply of food, and preferably a two-week supply. At the same time, it is unthinkable that the responsibility for building crisis reserves should rest solely on ordinary citizens. If we look at the average Estonian, they live in an apartment where space is inevitably limited. This places clear constraints on how much and what type of emergency supplies can realistically be stored at home. Therefore, it is not realistic to expect the average Estonian resident—especially in the context of rising living costs—to begin stockpiling months’ worth of food and drinking water in their apartment.

Unfortunately, the highly paid managers there have overlooked the client’s expectation—and, more broadly, society’s as well: not to starve to death in the event of a crisis.

Ukraine is not living through a hypothetical crisis. Russia has deliberately and systematically attacked thermal power plants, boiler houses, substations, and pumping stations — infrastructure objects that are critically necessary for providing essential services. The goal is not to cause isolated disruptions, but to make cities uninhabitable in a systematic way: cold, darkness, and stalled infrastructure.² In such conditions, the crisis is no longer about whether a building has electricity for a circulation pump, but whether heat can be produced at all and fed into the network.

This leads to an inevitable question: if the solution were truly this simple and cost only a few hundred euros, why has it not resolved the cold-season hardships of Ukraine’s civilian population? The answer is uncomfortable but honest. This solution works only under one very specific condition — the heating plant must still exist and be able to produce heat. Ukraine’s experience shows that in a crisis, this is not a condition you can reliably count on.

If the solution cost only 300 euros, Ukraine wouldn’t have a problem with the cold

Concerns are often met with the argument that production plants have black start capability and that air defence protects the infrastructure. But here too we must look at reality. Ukraine’s air defence is strong and effective, yet even there it cannot intercept all attacks, and the reliability of energy infrastructure remains a constant struggle. Moreover, the primary task of air defence is to protect military units and critical military assets. In our geopolitical reality, energy production inevitably remains vulnerable.

Getting heat into people’s homes is not rocket science for specialists in the field, but large Vital Service Providers (VSP) should recognise that in a military crisis they are key targets — the kind that will be blown up. This too is not rocket science, but a method designed to inflict maximum damage in the rear at minimal cost. For this reason, crisis preparedness cannot be limited to a scenario in which electricity is temporarily down but everything else continues to function

We must also ask the essential, more difficult questions that have so far been left unasked. What happens if the thermal power plant no longer exists? If the boiler house has been physically destroyed, not just taken offline?

If the network cannot be restored for days or even weeks? It must be understood that the greatest enemy of a district heating network is a flying object filled with explosives, not a mild power outage that merely stops water circulation. In such a situation, a plug in the basement or a small generator will not help. They may buy time, but they do not replace production. Indeed, generators, battery solutions, and temporary systems are widely used in Ukraine as well. But they are used knowingly as limited tools, not as a promise that the problem is solved in all possible scenarios.

Evacuation is one of the real scenarios

There is another nuance that is rarely discussed. Crisis preparedness does not only mean technical solutions but also the readiness to make the hardest decisions, including evacuation. Honest crisis planning must take into account the possibility that an essential service may be disrupted for an extended period. The message “don’t worry, a plug in the basement will fix everything” creates a false sense of security.

Saying that nothing can go wrong with heating in panel buildings if a 300–500€ solution is installed works at least partly against the efforts of the Rescue Board and municipal authorities, whose aim is to make people acknowledge disruptions, prepare for them, and think through very uncomfortable scenarios. Preparing for a crisis cannot be based on reassuring people at any cost — it must include an honest explanation of what could happen in scenarios A, B and C, and what must be done then. This applies even when Vital Service Providers (VSP) are targeted from the first days of a conflict and are therefore unable to provide services for a prolonged period.

Indeed, a few hundred euros can improve preparedness and buy extra time in the case of a simple power outage. A backup plug and generator are useful tools in more limited crises. Unfortunately, they are of no help when the heating plant simply no longer exists. This is precisely the question that should be asked and considered — what is the plan in such a case, rather than believing in convenient miracle solutions.

🟠 This op-ed (Hannes Nagel) was originally published on December 16, 2026 in the Delfi portal. Photo: large apartment building blocks in Lasnamäe (Kriisiuuringute Keskus, 2025).

Sources:

¹ Raig, T. & Reivart, A. 2025. INTERVJUU | Utilitase kaugküttejuht: Lasnamäe külmumise jutt on jama. Soojakriisi lahendamiseks piisab fööni jagu elektrist. Ärileht, 16.12.2025. 

² Harding, L. 2025. ‘They decided to kill us with cold’: Ukrainians struggle against Russian assault on power network. The Guardian, 22.11.2025.

The new programme offers tools for understanding, preventing, and strategically managing these interconnections — skills for which demand is growing across the entire Northern European security space.

How did you end up studying in Tampere University’s SAFER programme?

I was still in the final year of my bachelor’s studies when it was time to look a bit into the future and also inward, to consider what I would like to pursue after graduating from the University of Tartu. I searched for master’s programmes both in Estonia and abroad, and Tampere University’s SAFER programme — Security Management and Politics — caught my attention. There were two tracks to choose from: Security Governance within administrative sciences and International Security within social sciences. I chose the latter as my preference and was selected in a highly competitive admissions process. I moved to Finland already in mid-August this year and so far I have been very satisfied with my studies.

Which topics or courses have so far had the greatest impact on your understanding of crisis management and resilience?

Our curriculum includes a course specifically focused on crisis management and resilience, but more broadly these themes run through all courses. In lectures and seminars we acquire new “tools” for understanding different crises, but applying them in the era of polycrises — where, for example, ageing populations, high inflation, and military threats must be addressed simultaneously — is far from simple. Every crisis requires definition, management, and stakeholder engagement. Most importantly, it matters how a situation is framed as a crisis, and even more so, who does the framing. President Donald Trump’s efforts to deploy National Guard forces primarily to Democrat-led cities to combat alleged high crime rates are, in my view, a clear example of failed framing. Defining crises in ways that are not grounded in facts only adds complexity to assessing crises and their management appropriately.

What has surprised you or made you rethink crisis management?

Crisis management is often thought to concern only how leaders respond during a crisis and how organizations implement decisions once a crisis is underway. In reality, a very large part of crisis management lies in prevention and in building resilience. An organization’s first priority should be to avoid the emergence of crises: to identify potential risks to its operations, develop plans to mitigate them, and practice based on those plans. However, crises cannot always be prevented, which is why crisis managers must also think about how to make institutional processes as resilient and at the same time flexible as possible in order to cope with different types of crises.

Looking to the future — in what role or field do you see yourself applying your crisis management education?

I believe that both professionally and personally it is beneficial to test oneself in a variety of roles and fields. Fortunately, as a student I have already been able to gain experience in all three sectors, and in each of them the nature of potential crises differs. I have been most drawn to experience in the public sector, where impact and responsibility are greatest. Seeing the existential threat posed by Estonia’s eastern neighbour, I also feel a strong personal motivation to help prevent the outbreak of a military crisis. For this reason, I hope to be working in foreign and defence policy–related roles in the future.

The questions were answered by Hendrik Priisaar, a student in Tampere University’s SAFER programme. 

Published in May, the textbook covers three core pillars of crisis preparedness in apartment buildings: relationships, supplies, and skills. It is based on the premise that achieving crisis preparedness in an apartment building is most effective at the community level — primarily within the housing cooperative. Until now, the state has focused on individuals’ personal supplies and skills, where major gaps still remain, but the community dimension of crisis preparedness has been largely overlooked.

The textbook is intended for people who want to begin developing crisis preparedness in their apartment building. It addresses both strengthening individual preparedness and initiating community-level preparedness within the cooperative. The emphasis is on communication, creating a shared crisis plan, and mobilising human resources — large buildings house many people who, with thoughtful organisation, could support one another.

The textbook also discusses personal crisis preparedness as a prerequisite for helping others. Chapter by chapter, it explains the importance of preparing for crises in an urban environment, the role of the community in a city setting, and how to begin building community-level preparedness. It also covers what to do if living in the city becomes impossible due to a crisis and evacuation becomes necessary.

The textbook can be ordered in print HERE for the cost of postage. Its development and printing were supported through the Väike-Õismäe community civil protection project by the National Foundation of Civil Society and the Estonian Ministry of the Interior, and the content has been reviewed and approved by the Estonian Rescue Board.

Photo: Estonia’s first apartment building community crisis preparedness textbook (Kriisiuuringute Keskus, 2025).