MTÜ Kriisiuuringute Keskus

Join the Nõmme Crisis Network Training Sessions

kruk — Mon, 27 Jul 2026 15:35:34 +0000

Join the Nõmme Crisis Network Training Sessions

We invite active Nõmme residents to join the district’s community crisis network and take part in free training days that will provide the essential knowledge and practical skills needed to support their neighbours and wider community.

The aim of the new crisis network is to bring together people who wish to contribute voluntarily to crisis preparedness and emergency response in their local area. The training will introduce the initial concept behind the network, the principles of crisis preparedness in Tallinn and Nõmme, and provide an overview of the current state of civil protection in Estonia. We will also discuss the role each person can play in supporting their community.

The programme will include practical first aid training led by paramedic Andrus Lehtmets. The autumn training sessions will take place in Nõmme at weekends. All training days will cover the same content, and participants may choose one date.

The training sessions will take place in Nõmme on the following weekend dates:

September 20, 2026, 10.00–18.00, register HERE;
October 18, 2026, 10.00–18.00, register HERE.

The exact venue will be communicated to registered participants. The training is intended for people who would like to remain involved in the district’s crisis network and contribute to making Nõmme better prepared for potential emergencies.

🔸The activities of the KRAKO project are carried out by the Crisis Research Centre, the project is co-funded by the City of Tallinn and the Tallinn Municipal Police, together with the NGO Crisis Research Centre.

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Join the Mustamäe Crisis Network Training Sessions

kruk — Mon, 27 Jul 2026 15:29:52 +0000

Join the Mustamäe Crisis Network Training Sessions

We invite active Mustamäe residents to join the district’s community crisis network and take part in free training days that will provide the essential knowledge and practical skills needed to support their neighbours and wider community.

The training sessions will take place in Mustamäe on the following weekend dates:

October 10, 2026, 10.00–18.00, register HERE;
November 8, 2026, 10.00–18.00, register HERE;
November 22, 2026, 10.00–18.00, register HERE.

The exact venue will be communicated to registered participants. The training will introduce the idea behind the new crisis network and the principles of crisis preparedness in Tallinn and Mustamäe. It will also provide an overview of the current state of civil protection in Estonia. Participants will learn why local people’s knowledge, skills and preparedness are so important during emergencies and explore the role each person can play in supporting their community.

The programme will also include practical first aid training led by paramedic Andrus Lehtmets. Participation is free of charge, and participants may request a certificate of completion.

The training is intended for people who would like to remain involved in the district’s crisis network and contribute to making Mustamäe better prepared for potential emergencies.

🔸The activities of the KRAKO project are carried out by the Crisis Research Centre, the project is co-funded by the City of Tallinn and the Tallinn Municipal Police, together with the NGO Crisis Research Centre.

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Launch of the Haabersti Crisis Network Training Programme

kruk — Mon, 27 Jul 2026 15:22:36 +0000

Launch of the Haabersti Crisis Network Training Programme

Last year, the civil protection training sessions held in Väike-Õismäe proved highly popular. This year, we are inviting active Haabersti residents to join the district’s community crisis network and take part in free training days. The sessions will provide the essential knowledge and practical skills needed to support neighbours and the wider community in an emergency.

The training sessions will take place in Väike-Õismäe on the following weekend dates:

September 12, 2026, 10.00–18.00, register HERE;
November 29, 2026, 10.00–18.00, register HERE;
December 6, 2026, 10.00–18.00, register HERE.

The exact venue will be communicated to registered participants. The training will introduce the principles of crisis preparedness in Tallinn and Haabersti and provide an overview of the current state of civil protection in Estonia. We will discuss why local people’s knowledge, skills and preparedness are so important during emergencies, as well as the role each person can play in supporting their community. Participants will also gain practical first aid skills that may be needed in unexpected situations. Participation is free of charge, and participants may request a certificate of completion.

The training is intended for people who would like to remain involved in the Haabersti community crisis network and contribute to making the district better prepared, more resilient and more supportive in the event of a crisis. Before the training sessions begin, an information session will be held for everyone interested. The session will introduce the content and objectives of the training and provide an opportunity to ask questions.

The information session will take place on Tuesday, August 25, 2026, from 17.30 to 18.30, in the large hall on the third floor of the Haabersti Leisure Centre, Ehitajate tee 109a/2. You are warmly invited to attend, learn more and discover how you can contribute to your community.

🔸The activities of the KRAKO project are carried out by the Crisis Research Centre, the project is co-funded by the City of Tallinn and the Tallinn Municipal Police, together with the NGO Crisis Research Centre.

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CRISIS LENS | Can the Cyprus crisis fit on an envelope?

kruk — Fri, 10 Jul 2026 15:30:11 +0000

CRISIS LENS | Can the Cyprus crisis fit on an envelope?

Crisis management is often understood as response: evacuation, supplies, rescue operations, command centres, sheltering, communications, logistics, and so on. The Cyprus Refugee Fund stamp reveals a different dimension: crisis management does not end when the weapons fall silent. Sometimes the most difficult part begins precisely then: how to hold together a society whose territory, memories, and property relations have been cut apart? This edition of Crisis Lens examines how a small postage stamp became one of the most enduring symbols of Cyprus’s long crisis.

In the early hours of July 20, 1974, Cyprus turned into a battlefield within a matter of hours (see Video 1 below).^A Turkish radio announced the start of the military operation at around five o’clock in the morning. Soon afterwards, low-flying fighter jets were seen north of the Kyrenia Mountains, followed by Turkish paratroopers descending from the sky. At the same time, landing units approached the northern coast from the sea. Within a few hours, it became clear that this was no longer another escalation of tensions between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, but a military turning point that marked the beginning of Cyprus’s division and a large-scale refugee crisis.¹

The immediate background to the military intervention was the attempted coup in Cyprus five days earlier, backed by the Greek junta (see Video 2 below).^B Ankara justified its intervention by referring to its right under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee to protect Turkish Cypriots, while Greek Cypriots and much of the international community regard it as an invasion. The operation took place in two phases and resulted in Turkey gaining control over approximately one third of the island.^1,2 Cyprus was de facto divided into two parts (see Figure 1): the south, controlled by the internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus, and the north, controlled by Turkey. Between the two sides lay the UN-controlled buffer zone, also known as the Green Line.²

Figure 1: Cyprus after the events of 1974

This crisis left behind far more than a territorial dispute. For many local people, it meant the loss of home, property, community, and their previous way of life. In Cyprus’s official and collective memory, these people are not merely displaced persons, but refugees within their own homeland. One of the smallest, yet most enduring, symbols of this experience became an object that most people would otherwise barely notice: the Refugee Fund stamp.

The Refugee Fund stamp is not an ordinary postage stamp

The Cyprus Refugee Fund Tax Stamp, often referred to in Greek as prosfigosimo,^C is not a conventional postage stamp. It does not cover the basic cost of postage, but is added as a mandatory levy to every postal item. The stamp remains in use today, and its purpose is to raise funds to support refugees and the nearly 200,000 people directly affected by the 1974 invasion.^3-4

In Cypriot postal history, 1974 became a year of destruction and reorganisation. As a result of the Turkish invasion, the postal system lost a significant part of its network and assets: among other things, 16 Cyprus Post offices were left in the occupied areas. At the same time, the state had to organise assistance for refugees quickly. For this purpose, the Refugee Fund was established, and a 5-mil stamp from 1971 was overprinted with a value of 10 mils. This became the first Refugee Fund Tax Stamp of the Republic of Cyprus.³

The logic was simple: the state needed a small but continuous source of revenue. Postal items became a form of micro-payment in support of refugees, illustrating crisis management at the time in a highly everyday form: not a large one-off aid package, but a solidarity mechanism built into daily life.

Figure 2: The photograph used for the stamp and MiZ2/1974

Permanent funding for mitigating the effects of the refugee crisis

The idea of the Cyprus Refugee Fund stamp reached the government on 12 September 1974, only 54 days after the start of the invasion. The Council of Ministers approved a proposal to introduce a separate additional postal levy to raise money for the Refugee Fund. The first stamp was issued on 1 October 1974 (see Figure 2). It did not yet feature the child sitting behind barbed wire, which later became iconic, but instead depicted a wooden icon of Saint George.⁵

The first issue sold out quickly. As early as 2 December 1974, a new stamp was issued (see Figure 3), depicting a mother and child.⁵ In 1977, the design by which the Refugee Fund stamp is still known today entered circulation: a child sitting in front of barbed wire.³ The woodcut “Cyprus 74” (Κύπρος 74) by the Greek graphic artist and woodcut master Tassos Alevizos (Τάσσος Αλεβίζος) became one of the most visible forms of national memory in Cyprus. The image still passes through hundreds of hands every day, often unnoticed, yet it carries a message of lost homes and the expectation of return.⁵

This is where the Refugee Fund stamp begins to move from tax to symbol. Its deeper role is to keep the crisis visible even after the immediate shock has faded from public attention. When refugee camps disappear from public space and negotiations stretch on for decades, the stamp remains a quiet reminder: the refugee question has not been resolved.

Figure 3: The artwork used for the stamp and MiZ3/1977

From a temporary solution to a permanent measure

The year 1984 became a turning point in the story of the Refugee Fund stamp. After the 1974 overprint, the special issue of December that same year, and the 1977 design, the Refugee Fund stamp began to be issued regularly on an annual basis. At the time, its denomination was one Cypriot cent; after the adoption of the euro in 2008, the denomination became two euro cents (see Figure 4).^6,7

This is the political force of a small amount. One cent, later two cents, is almost imperceptible to the individual and precisely for that reason politically durable. For the state, however, it creates a permanent and broad-based funding channel. More important still is its institutional effect: the refugee question remains present not only in speeches and commemorative days, but as a legally embedded routine within a public service.

This raises an important question for crisis management: when does a temporary crisis response become a permanent institution?

The Refugee Fund stamp can therefore be interpreted as a long-term crisis management measure: over time, a humanitarian aid mechanism became a political and symbolic instrument. The state did not treat the consequences of 1974 as a closed event, but incorporated them into the everyday machinery of public administration.

Figure 4: Types I-III of the Cyprus Refugee Fund stamp

Did 1983 make the crisis permanent?

n 1983, the northern part of Cyprus declared itself the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti in Turkish). UN Security Council Resolution 541 declared the attempt to create a separate state in northern Cyprus legally invalid and called on all states not to recognise any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus.^8,9 To this day, the quasi-state in northern Cyprus is recognised only by Turkey.

This step changed the crisis’s time horizon. After 1974, the Refugee Fund stamp could be understood as a rapid crisis response to support people who had lost their homes. After the unilateral secession of the north, however, it became increasingly clear that the crisis would not be resolved in the near future. The refugee question was no longer merely an immediate humanitarian consequence of the invasion, but part of a long-term locked political conflict. The declaration of secession in the north therefore helps explain why the Refugee Fund stamp did not remain a temporary levy, but became embedded as a permanent practice.

In this context, the Refugee Fund stamp was no longer an ordinary additional tax. It became a form of institutionalised crisis memory: an everyday sign that the state did not treat the consequences of 1974 as a closed chapter. Every postal item therefore carried the message that this experience belonged not only to history, but also to the sphere of continuing state responsibility.

The Refugee Fund stamp as crisis management infrastructure

The Refugee Fund stamp operates on several levels. First, it is a funding mechanism: every postal item contributes to the Refugee Fund. The price of a single stamp is small, but its effect lies in scale and repetition.^3,4 Second, it is an administrative routine. The stamp does not depend on the donor’s emotions or the success of a campaign, but is linked to a specific public service.⁴

Third, it is a communication tool. The image of a child sitting in front of barbed wire is simple, painful, and politically legible. It requires no lengthy explanation: the refugee question is not an abstract statistic, but a question of losing one’s home.^3,5 Fourth, it is a state practice of memory. The stamp makes the refugee question recurring and everyday, preventing society from fully becoming accustomed to the fact that some homes remain inaccessible. In this way, the Refugee Fund stamp becomes a point of contact between crisis management and statehood.

n 2026, the Refugee Fund stamp is still in use and costs 2 euro cents.^10-11Nearly half a century after the invasion, this is where the paradox of two cents lies: financially, it is almost invisible; politically, it is highly visible. Adding the stamp to a letter in Cyprus is a kind of ritual whose message is simple: the refugee question is not the past.

A similar logic also appears in other Cypriot refugee funding mechanisms. For example, in 2022, a 0.4% levy on property transactions entered into force, with the revenue directed towards supporting refugees of the 1974 war and towards a mechanism for the fairer distribution of burdens.¹² The current property transaction levy is estimated to generate 20–25 million euros per year.¹³ In addition, in 2026, the Cypriot parliament also discussed an additional compensation mechanism for the loss of the ability to use property located in the north.

The Refugee Fund stamp therefore belongs to a broader politics of sharing the post-crisis burden. Even decades later, the state is still trying to distribute the costs of war, occupation, and forced displacement across society.

Could the Refugee Fund stamp ever disappear?

The Refugee Fund stamp could disappear if the Cyprus conflict were to reach a political settlement: if the island were reunified, if property and compensation issues were resolved, and if the state decided that a separate refugee fund was no longer needed. There are several reasons, however, why this may not happen immediately. First, the consequences of a crisis do not disappear at the moment a political agreement is signed. Property restitution, compensation, residence and ownership rights, documentation, and the sense of security within communities would likely require a long transition period. For this reason, the Refugee Fund stamp could remain in place even after reunification, although its function might change: from an instrument for assisting refugees into a source of funding for transitional justice or reconciliation.

Second, the stamp has strong symbolic value. Tassos Alevizos’s image of the child is one of the most recognisable visual symbols of Cyprus’s recent history. Removing such a symbol could be politically sensitive, as parts of society might interpret it as forgetting the crisis or diminishing the experience of the victims. Third, the stamp could remain even if its fiscal role declines. The mandatory additional levy could disappear, while the Refugee Fund stamp could continue as an annual commemorative issue. In that case, it would move from the infrastructure of crisis management into the sphere of cultural memory.

The most likely scenario, therefore, is not an abrupt end, but a change in function. As long as the Cyprus problem remains unresolved, the disappearance of the Refugee Fund stamp is unlikely. If a settlement is ever reached, the stamp may either disappear as a symbol of a crisis that has ended or remain as a warning that the consequences of state rupture last longer than the war itself.

Cyprus teaches the long view of crisis management

Civil protection is not only a matter of shelters, sirens, continuity of services, crisis supplies, and the like. After a major crisis, another question always emerges: how can mechanisms be created that keep those affected visible even after public attention fades?

The example of Cyprus highlights three broader lessons. After a prolonged crisis, there needs to be a funding logic that does not depend solely on donations or projects. Society needs a symbol that keeps the experience of those affected visible. And that symbol must be connected to routine, because repeated everyday actions sustain public attention longer than a single campaign or commemorative day.

This also raises a question for Estonia: in the case of a future long-term crisis, could a calibrated small levy work here as a way of linking funding, solidarity, and social memory? Or does such a solution belong to an era when the relationship between the state and the citizen still passed through envelopes and stamps? In a digital state, the postage stamp may no longer be the right medium, but the Cypriot example points to a broader principle. The issue is not only funding, but also how to keep the consequences of a prolonged crisis publicly visible.

Cyprus’s two-cent stamp shows that crisis management can be both material and moral. It does not resolve the conflict or bring refugees back home, but it keeps the consequences of war present in public space and affirms that the loss of home is not an administratively closed file for the state. In this sense, the Cyprus Refugee Fund stamp is one of the smallest yet most telling instruments of crisis management in Europe. It fits in the corner of an envelope, but carries the story of an entire divided island.

Images: the historical photographs have been restored and colourised using artificial intelligence (Μεταρρύθμιση, 2025 / Crisis Research Centre, 2026).

🔺The use, distribution, modification, or publication of the text and figures is permitted only with the prior written agreement of NGO Crisis Research Centre; unauthorised use is not permitted.

Video 1: The invasion by Turkish forces

Video 2: The coup attempt in Cyprus

Remarks

^A Frontline by ITN. (20.07.2024). Turkish invasion of Cyprus: Battle footage captures first days of fighting (1974) [Video]. YouTube.

^B Frontline by ITN. (08.07.2024). 1974 Cypriot Coup D’etat – Chilling Footage of Cyprus on Eve of Turkish Invasion (1974) [Video]. YouTube.

^C Under Cypriot law, the Refugee Fund stamp must be affixed to every postal item in addition to regular postage. Over the years, stamps with the same design have been reissued several times with different denominations and slight colour variations; the dates indicate the period of a specific issue. There is currently no indication that the design is intended to be fully replaced or phased out.

Sources

¹ Morelli, V. 2012. Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive. Congressional Research Service.
²[Anon.], 2025. Events in the Summer of 1974. About the buffer zone.United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus.

³ [Anon.]. 2026a. Republic of Cyprus, 1960 – until the accession to the European Union in 2004. 01.02.2026, Cyprus Post.

⁴ [Anon.], 2026b. Cyprus Stamps 2026 Refugee Fund Tax – MINT. 04.07.2026, Cyprus Stamps.

⁵ Philippou, E. 2023. Cyprus refugee stamp: the story of a symbol. 23.03.2026. Cyprus Mail.

^6-7 [Anon.], 2026c. Cyprus Greek – Tax stamps, 1974–2026. 10.07.2026, StampWorld.

⁸ United Nations Security Council. 1983a. Resolution 541. 18.11.1983, UNSCR.

⁹ United Nations Security Council. 1983b. Security Council resolution 541 (1983) [Cyprus]. 18.11.1983, Refworld.

¹⁰ [Anon.], 2026d. Refugee Stamp 2026.Cyprus Post.

¹¹ [Anon.], 2026e. Cyprus Greek – Tax stamps – 2026 – Refugee Fund. 10.07.2026, StampWorld.

¹² [Anon.], 2021. Cyprus imposes 0.4% levy on sales of immovable property. Andersen Tax Cyprus.

¹³ Morphakis, J. 2026. Parliament considers minimal compensation for refugee property loss. 10.03.2026, Cyprus Mail.

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The post CRISIS LENS | Can the Cyprus crisis fit on an envelope? first appeared on MTÜ Kriisiuuringute Keskus.

Overview of the Crisis Research Centre’s Activities in 2025

kruk — Wed, 01 Jul 2026 05:12:00 +0000

Overview of the Crisis Research Centre’s Activities in 2025

Last year, we worked on community-based civil protection, crisis preparedness, and the development of resilience hubs through practical projects, research, and public communication. Here is an overview of the Crisis Research Centre’s main activities and results in 2025.

For the Centre, 2025 was an active and successful year, shaped by two main areas of work: project activities and research. Communication of the work carried out was an integral part of both. In project activities, we implemented Estonia’s largest community-based civil protection development projects through the KÜSK Innovation Fund measure, supported by the Ministry of the Interior, as well as one international project funded by the Swedish Institute. Research was mainly carried out within the international project, focusing on how lessons from the war in Ukraine can support the more systematic development of resilience hubs in Estonian and Swedish municipalities.

In 2025, the Crisis Research Centre also co-organised its first international conference, held at the end of October at Malmö University in Sweden. In addition, we organised our first larger seminar in Estonia, focusing on community crisis preparedness. We are grateful to Miltton New Nordics for supporting the event by providing the venue free of charge. We also held the Centre’s first online discussion on sheltering, which attracted strong interest. The year was also marked by the Centre’s participation in several academic conferences. The Centre was an active public voice in its field, and we also consider it an important achievement that we brought our “Kriisioskused” podcast to the Delfi Tasku platform in order to reach a wider audience. We grew our social media following: in addition to our existing Facebook and Instagram accounts, we also opened a LinkedIn account.

Overall, the Crisis Research Centre developed further in several areas in 2025. We are especially proud of implementing the country’s largest projects funded through the KÜSK Innovation Fund measure, and, from the perspective of the Centre’s research work, of the PIMA project, which enabled us to collect and analyse data on the development of civil protection for future academic publications.

Projects and development activities

In 2025, with the support of the National Foundation of Civil Society and the Ministry of the Interior, the Crisis Research Centre implemented two national projects, which were the largest in scope within the measure. Among the national projects, the aim of the K24 project was to strengthen community-based civil protection preparedness in the Väike-Õismäe district of Haabersti. As part of the project, initial crisis supplies were procured and community capacities were developed to improve coping in crisis situations. In addition, approximately 400 apartment association members and board members received basic knowledge on how to act in different types of crisis situations. As a result of the project, the initial prerequisites were created in Väike-Õismäe for forming a resilience hub and supporting the community during a crisis within the limits of available supplies.

The K36 project supported the civil protection preparedness of communities in Kohtla-Järve districts. Project activities included procuring initial crisis supplies, developing community capacities, and training 50 apartment association members and board members on how to cope with different types of crisis situations. As a result of the project, additional capacity was created for the community to form a resilience hub and support residents during a crisis within the limits of available supplies. With the support of the National Foundation of Civil Society, the “Apartment building community crisis preparedness textbook” was published by Hannes Nagel, Head of the Crisis Research Centre. The handbook helps people living in apartment buildings improve their preparedness for different crises. It is intended both for individuals who want to strengthen their own preparedness and for those who wish to initiate broader crisis preparedness activities in their apartment building. The content of the handbook has been coordinated with the Estonian Rescue Board.

As an externally funded project, supported by the Swedish Institute, the PIMA project — Points of Invincibility for Multi-level Adaptation — was implemented. The project brought together actors involved in the development of local-level resilience hubs in Estonia, Sweden, and Ukraine in order to create a network and prepare a concept document for developing Points of Invincibility. The aim of the project was to support local governments by providing a practical guide for better understanding the creation, equipment, and management of such centres. The project also included a research component, mapping the current state and best practices of resilience hubs through local-level case studies from the three countries. The initial results were presented at an international conference held at Malmö University in Sweden. As part of the project, a practical report was prepared to support the further conceptualisation and development of resilience hubs. The report helps local governments better understand how to create, equip, and manage these centres in a way that takes into account the experiences shared by Ukrainian municipalities during the project. We also gave a presentation on the PIMA project at the EUSBSR Annual Forum held on Gotland.

Research and expert work

In 2025, the Crisis Research Centre’s research and expert work focused mainly on civil protection, community crisis preparedness, resilience hubs, post-crisis learning, and crisis governance. Our research examined, among other topics, how community-based civil protection has been developed in Estonia through collaborative governance, what practical solutions communities tend to prioritise when strengthening crisis preparedness, and which institutional and administrative factors may limit communities’ room for decision-making.

One research direction focused on the 2023 Innovation Fund projects, analysing how communities often preferred material solutions, especially the procurement of crisis supplies, and how regional preparedness levels and cooperation needs differed across Estonia. Another research direction examined the public framing and securitisation of civil protection. This work analysed how public-sector representatives shaped the meaning of civil protection through the ERR news portal in 2022–2024, and how threats were translated into the language of policy, funding, and preparedness measures. The research showed that a gap may emerge between strategic-level decisions and the practical guidance that reaches citizens.

In addition, we studied post-crisis learning and organisational crisis memory. The focus was on the After Action Review method as a tool that helps municipalities and crisis units systematically analyse experiences gained during crises, identify areas for improvement, and turn lessons learned into a more permanent part of organisational work processes. This research direction emphasised that in crisis management, operational response alone is not enough; organisations must also be able to learn from crises and institutionalise those lessons.

We are also proud that in 2025 we regularly published geopolitical crisis and event analyses in the Estonian Defence League magazine Kaitse Kodu!. Overall, the Centre’s research articles and studies in 2025 contributed to our core focus: how to strengthen the crisis resilience of Estonian society through the local level, communities, the public sector, and collaborative governance.

Conferences, seminars and discussions

In 2025, researchers from the Crisis Research Centre took part in five conferences, seminars, and professional discussions in Estonia and abroad. At the international level, we gave presentations at the IIAS-DARPG 2025 conference in New Delhi, India, and at the IRSPM 2025 Annual Conference at the University of Bologna in Italy. The presentations addressed research topics related to crisis management, multi-level governance, team sensemaking, and community-based crisis response. In addition, we participated in a crisis management discussion at Tampere University in Finland, where crisis management was discussed from the perspective of learning, adaptation, and recovery. In Sweden, we took part in the PIMA project final conference at Malmö University, which brought together local-level crisis management actors from Estonia, Sweden, and Ukraine and focused on the development of resilience hubs and the role of communities in crisis preparedness.

In Estonia, the Crisis Research Centre organised the final seminar of the Väike-Õismäe Community Crisis Skills project, titled “Community Crisis Preparedness – How Are We Doing?”. The seminar included experts from Estonia and Ukraine and focused on the role of communities in preparing for crises, as well as cooperation opportunities between local governments, civil society, and communities before and during crises. At the seminar, we presented the results of the Kohtla-Järve and Väike-Õismäe civil protection projects funded by the National Foundation of Civil Society. The keynote presentation was given by Dr Mariia Tyshchenko, Executive Director of the Ukrainian NGO Poruch. The seminar can be watched on the Crisis Research Centre’s YouTube channel.

We also participated in the Opinion Festival in Paide in the panel discussion “Infrastructure of Trust: Are Libraries Our Most Underrated Defence System?”, which was part of the programme organised in the area of the Nordic Council of Ministers’ Office in Estonia. In April, we organised an online discussion evening for 70 participants, focusing on sheltering, with experts from the Ministry of the Interior and the Estonian Rescue Board as guest speakers. Sharing our knowledge, learning from others, and networking at different events supported the Crisis Research Centre’s research and development activities, strengthened our international cooperation network, and helped present the Centre’s research and practical experience in the fields of community crisis preparedness, resilience hubs, and multi-level crisis management.

Expert advice and knowledge transfer

In 2025, we actively contributed to knowledge transfer, public discussion, and the sharing of practical expertise in the fields of civil protection and crisis preparedness. Representatives of the Centre took part in several media appearances and radio programmes, discussing the current state of civil protection in Estonia, gaps in crisis preparedness, the functioning of public warning systems, the role of local governments and communities, and the broader need to strengthen societal resilience.

An important part of our knowledge transfer activities was the continued development of the Crisis Research Centre’s podcast, Kriisioskused. In 2025, the second season of the podcast was recorded and brought to the Delfi Tasku platform to reach a wider audience. The episodes featured experts from different fields and addressed practical crisis preparedness topics, including psychological first aid, the protection of Tallinn residents, the state of civil protection in Kohtla-Järve, the crisis experiences of Ukrainian communities, community crisis preparedness in apartment buildings, crisis preparedness among residents of the capital, and how to prepare an evacuation bag.

Through expert advice and public communication, the Crisis Research Centre helped share research-based and practical knowledge on crisis preparedness with the wider public, communities, local governments, and other stakeholders in the field. The Centre’s activities supported a better understanding of civil protection, helped strengthen crisis preparedness, and contributed to the view that preparing for crises requires both institutional readiness and the informed contribution of communities and individuals.

The Crisis Research Centre was also pleased to welcome international guests. In February, we hosted a delegation from IRIDeS, the International Research Institute of Disaster Science at Tohoku University in Japan, to identify possible areas of cooperation focused on the community-level management of human-made crises. At the community crisis preparedness seminar held in May, we had the honour of hosting Brigadier General Oleksandr Potii, Head of the State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine, who spoke about the importance of protecting critical infrastructure in improving communities’ ability to cope during a serious crisis.

We were an active public voice in our field. We appeared twice on Kuku Radio, were featured more than 20 times in online media, and eight times in print media. We also appeared as guests on the National Library’s radio programme to discuss the important role of libraries in national security. We brought the Kriisioskused podcast to the Delfi platform, and in 2025 new episodes were released featuring experts from different fields. The 2025 episodes of the podcast were funded by the Ministry of the Interior through the National Foundation of Civil Society. The episodes can be listened to on Delfi Tasku.

We also received a letter of appreciation from the Tallinn Municipal Police Department for our contribution to the development of civil protection and crisis preparedness. On 17 October, Anne-May Nagel, researcher at the Crisis Research Centre, received a letter of appreciation from the Tallinn Municipal Police Department for active and effective cooperation. The letter of appreciation was presented at the formal celebration of the Municipal Police Department’s 22nd anniversary, where cooperation partners who have made a significant contribution to strengthening the safety, crisis preparedness, and community cooperation of the City of Tallinn were recognised.

🧡 We would also like to separately thank Airgate Tallinn OÜ for its support to our organisation, which contributes to the sustainable development of the Crisis Research Centre’s activities.

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KRAKO Training Programme Launched for Western Tallinn’s Crisis Network

kruk — Mon, 29 Jun 2026 11:49:06 +0000

KRAKO Training Programme Launched for Western Tallinn’s Crisis Network

Registration is now open for the free 2026 civil protection crisis network training programme for residents of Nõmme, Mustamäe and Haabersti. Join the programme if you would like to contribute to the crisis preparedness of your community, district and city.

The Crisis Research Centre’s training sessions are designed specifically for adult residents of the area who are interested in contributing to the crisis preparedness of their community, district and city. You are warmly invited to become a member of the network — together, we can make the capital more resilient to crises.

The training sessions will be held on Saturdays and Sundays between September and December 2026, in cooperation with experienced specialists in their fields. The programme includes the following training days, covering these topics:

The district administration will introduce the principles of crisis preparedness at the city and district level, as well as expectations for the crisis network;
Paramedic Andrus Lehtmets will provide training on how to give first aid effectively and safely;
The Crisis Research Centre will discuss the importance of the community’s role in crisis preparedness.

There will also be a lunch break during the day. The detailed agenda will be sent only to registered participants, and the training sessions will be held in Estonian only. Participants will also receive a certificate of attendance.

Training schedule by city district:

Nõmme, district administration building, Valdeku 13:

September 20, 10:00-18:00
October 18, 10:00-18:00

Mustamäe, district administration building, E. Vilde tee 118:

October 10, 10:00-18:00
November 8, 10:00-18:00
November 22, 10:00-18:00

Haabersti, venues to be confirmed:

September 12, 10:00-18:00
November 29, 10:00-18:00
December 6, 10:00-18:00

REGISTER FOR THE CRISIS NETWORK TRAINING HERE

We invite you to take part if you would like to contribute to your community’s crisis preparedness and better prepare yourself for unexpected situations. For further questions, please contact us by email at: info[at]kruk.ee.

🟧🟦 The activities of the KRAKO project are carried out by the Crisis Research Centre, the project is co-funded by the City of Tallinn and the Tallinn Municipal Police, together with the NGO Crisis Research Centre.

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EPICENTRE | How realistic is a devastating earthquake in Denmark?

kruk — Wed, 17 Jun 2026 08:25:26 +0000

EPICENTRE | How realistic is a devastating earthquake in Denmark?

Denmark is not usually associated with earthquakes. In recent years, the country’s perception of risk has been shaped more by storms, floods, power outages, cyberattacks, and, increasingly, drone-related security threats. Yet the earthquake that occurred in the Køge Bay area showed that even a seemingly calm country can move. With a magnitude of 3.9, the earthquake was rare and noticeable enough in the Danish context to raise the question: how realistic is an earthquake there that does not merely cause alarm, but also results in actual damage?

Denmark is not a seismically active country in the same sense as Italy, Japan, Turkey, or the Philippines. Major tectonic plates^A do not meet there as they do in many of the world’s most dangerous earthquake zones. Denmark is located within the Eurasian Plate, in an area generally considered stable, but this does not mean that earthquakes are impossible there. Even within more stable parts of the Earth’s crust, stresses accumulate and may occasionally be released as minor or moderate earthquakes.

At the same time, Denmark’s earthquake risk is considered low in global comparison. Even in the case of a stronger earthquake, estimated to occur on average once every 475 years, ground motion in Denmark would remain relatively limited, and the largest possible natural earthquake is currently estimated at a magnitude of 5.3.¹ For this reason, a major earthquake is not treated as a separate key crisis scenario in Denmark’s national risk assessment, as its likelihood in Denmark and the surrounding area is low.² This provides a fairly precise framing of Denmark’s situation: an earthquake is a real natural phenomenon there, but based on current knowledge, a devastating major earthquake is highly unlikely.

On 20 May 2026, at 16:14 local time, an earthquake occurred in the Køge Bay area, with an estimated magnitude of 3.9. The earthquake’s epicentre was located approximately 37 kilometres southwest of Copenhagen (see Figure 1), and it was recorded by all seismic stations in Denmark, as well as by stations in southern Sweden and Norway.^3,4

Figure 1: The epicentre of the Køge earthquake

The societal impact of the earthquake, which caused no casualties or damage, stemmed from its location: the epicentre was close to Denmark’s most densely populated area (see Figure 2). More than one million people live in the Copenhagen area, and Køge is located in the southern part of the capital region, where daily mobility, working life, and transport connections closely link the area to Copenhagen.^5,6,7 As a result, even a moderate earthquake can attract considerable attention and generate a large number of emergency calls. When an earthquake occurs in an area where people are not accustomed to such events, it also quickly becomes a matter of communication: people need to understand quickly what exactly happened and where.

Figure 2: Population density within a 150 km radius of the epicentre

To understand the Køge earthquake, it is important to distinguish between the size of an earthquake and its impact. While magnitude describes the amount of energy released at the earthquake’s source, the impact experienced by people also depends on other factors: the depth of the earthquake, soil conditions, the condition of buildings, and where a person is located during the earthquake. Local geology can either weaken or amplify the effects of an earthquake, and under certain conditions, even a smaller earthquake can be clearly felt locally.⁸

In the case of the 2026 Køge Bay earthquake, people on higher floors may have felt the earthquake more strongly than those at street level.⁴ Therefore, the societal impact of an earthquake cannot be assessed by magnitude alone. In Denmark’s case, it is also important whether an earthquake occurs in a densely populated area and what condition the local building stock is in.

Denmark’s history indicates the possibility of local damage, not a pattern of major catastrophe

Earthquakes in Denmark are rare, but not impossible. Smaller earthquakes are recorded in the country every year, but most of them are so weak that people do not feel them, and they remain mainly visible in seismic station data.^9,10 Danish earthquakes do not occur on an active plate boundary, but within a more stable part of the Earth’s crust. Even in such areas, stresses can accumulate in the crust and occasionally be released as smaller earthquakes.

The general stress field is influenced, among other factors, by the Mid-Atlantic Ridge, but the location of a specific earthquake is determined by the local structure of the Earth’s crust, old faults, and weaker zones within the crust.¹ The Sorgenfrei–Tornquist Zone in northeastern and northern Denmark is a geologically important area, but this does not mean that strong or frequent earthquakes necessarily occur there.¹¹ The distribution of earthquakes (see Figure 3) shows that in Denmark and its surrounding areas, they tend to cluster in certain regions rather than being evenly distributed across the country.

Figure 3: Earthquakes in Denmark and surrounding areas²³

Earthquakes in Denmark are not distributed entirely randomly in space. Many epicentres are located offshore, particularly in the Kattegat, Skagerrak, and North Sea areas. On land, northwestern Jutland and northern and central Zealand have been more active, including the area around Roskilde Fjord and the broader Copenhagen–North Zealand–Isefjord region.^8,12 In the case of historical earthquakes, however, it must be kept in mind that the exact location of older earthquakes is not always certain. Before modern digital monitoring, much of the data was based on people’s descriptions, damage reports, and later reconstructions.

More recent data are significantly more accurate: all earthquakes of at least magnitude 3.0 that have occurred on land in Denmark since 1960 have been recorded by seismic stations, and since 2000, the detection of smaller earthquakes has also improved.¹³ Denmark’s historical experience shows that earthquakes can cause local damage, but so far they have not indicated a realistic threat of widespread urban destruction. One of the most important earthquakes was the 1759 North Kattegat earthquake, whose magnitude has retrospectively been estimated at up to 5.6 and which has been associated with strong ground motion and damage to buildings; the best-known example is the collapse of the upper part of Budolfi Church in Aalborg.^1,13

The second strongest earthquake, with a magnitude of 4.5, occurred near the coast of Thy in 1841 and also left traces on buildings, including collapsed chimneys, cracks in walls, and minor ground ruptures.¹³ Both earthquakes are significant in the Danish context, but their damage was limited and local, and does not resemble the destruction known from active plate-boundary regions. More recent earthquakes have followed the same pattern, although they have been weaker. For example, the 2001 Holbæk earthquake had a magnitude of 2.8, but it was felt locally, as was the 2004 Køge Bay earthquake with a magnitude of 2.9.

The 2008 Skåne earthquake in Sweden, with a magnitude of 4.8, was also felt in Denmark. Ten years later, the 3.6 magnitude Holstebro earthquake attracted attention because it occurred in an area where earthquakes were not usually expected.¹⁴ The 2026 Køge Bay earthquake also fits this pattern (see Figure 4): strong and noticeable to the public in the Danish context, but not devastating.

Figure 4: Major earthquakes in Denmark

Earthquake preparedness in Denmark

In Denmark’s crisis preparedness, earthquakes are not a central risk, but this does not mean that the country lacks the capacity to respond to unexpected physical incidents. Denmark’s national risk assessment focuses primarily on threats whose likelihood or impact is more significant for the country: storms, floods, infectious diseases, infrastructure disruptions, cyber incidents, and threats arising from the security environment. A major earthquake is not addressed as a separate key scenario, because such an earthquake is considered highly unlikely in Danish conditions.²

This does not mean denial, but rather the prioritisation of risks. At the same time, Denmark’s general crisis preparedness is still relevant in the event of an earthquake. Residents are advised to be prepared to manage independently for at least three days. Such preparedness is not intended for one specific threat only, but helps people cope with different disruptions: temporary interruptions to electricity, water, communications, transport, or services.¹⁵ A moderate earthquake, including one caused by the explosion of a ballistic missile or glide bomb, may also create the need to inspect buildings, temporarily close some streets, reassure people, or resolve disruptions. For this reason, general household resilience is sensible even when an earthquake is not the primary risk.

One of Denmark’s strengths is also seismic monitoring, which also uses data from neighbouring countries and, when necessary, helps refine the location, depth, and magnitude of earthquakes.^9,10 Such a system is necessary not only for earthquakes, but also for clarifying other sudden incidents. After the Nord Stream explosions in 2022, seismic monitoring played an important role, as monitoring stations helped distinguish an explosion from an earthquake and provide information to the national operational level.¹⁶ In a country with low earthquake risk, this capability is particularly important: when the ground shakes unexpectedly, it is necessary to clarify quickly and reliably what has happened.

In terms of rescue capacity, Denmark also has experience in collapse rescue and international search and rescue operations. Exercises have included practising the search for people in collapsed buildings, and the international MODEX exercises held in Tinglev have used a strong earthquake and extensive building damage as a scenario.^17-19 This does not mean that Denmark is preparing for a domestic major earthquake in the same way as countries with high seismic risk. Rather, it shows that collapse rescue skills are needed more broadly: they can be used on international assistance missions, but also in domestic situations involving explosions, building collapses, or major accidents.

Earthquakes have not been entirely disregarded in building standards either. The Danish national annex to Eurocode 8 includes the consideration of seismic loads, and under the simplified Danish alternative, the horizontal seismic load must not be taken as less than 1.5% of the vertical load.²⁰ This shows that earthquakes are not treated as a zero-risk issue, but they do not shape Danish building practice to the same extent as in countries with high seismic hazard. The most vulnerable elements are likely to be older masonry structures, chimneys, façade elements, plaster, and other non-load-bearing parts of buildings. Historical damage confirms the same pattern: damage has been associated mainly with individual building components and the older built environment, rather than widespread building collapse.^1,13 The scale of Denmark’s earthquake hazard can be better understood by comparing it with the world’s stronger earthquakes. On 8 June 2026, a magnitude 7.8 earthquake occurred in the Mindanao region of the Philippines, sadly causing many casualties and extensive destruction.^21-22

Denmark’s experience shows why low risk should not be equated with non-existent risk, even when the likely impact of an event is primarily emotional and alarming. The ground can move even in an area where earthquakes are not among the usual crisis threats. The same also applies to Estonia. This does not mean that Denmark or Estonia should prepare for earthquake disasters of the kind associated with the Mediterranean region. In a country with low seismicity, the impact of an earthquake is often reflected in public reaction, the need for rapid information exchange, building inspections, and general preparedness, rather than in extensive physical destruction.

At the same time, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has shown that high-destructive-power weapons used in civilian environments can create a damage pattern comparable to that of an earthquake in cities: damaged buildings, the need for evacuation, and a sudden disruption of everyday life. For this reason, preparedness messages directed at residents of Denmark and other Baltic Sea region countries are not linked to one specific threat alone. The region must also take into account a kind of earthquake that has no seismic epicentre: a crisis arising from aggression, which can shake society just as unexpectedly and forcefully.

For Denmark, the central question is not whether to fear an earthquake, but whether society can quickly recognise a rare threat, explain it clearly, and respond without either overestimating or underestimating it. This requires functioning monitoring, clear public communication, general civic preparedness, and the capacity to inspect and, where necessary, temporarily close damaged buildings. The broader lesson, however, is larger: crisis preparedness does not mean preparing only for the most likely threat, but also having the capacity to act when society is struck by a rare, unexpected, and initially difficult-to-understand situation.

Remarks

^A A plate tectonics map helps explain why Denmark is not among the most earthquake-prone regions. Strong earthquakes are concentrated mainly along plate boundaries, while Denmark and Estonia are located in the more stable interior of the Eurasian Plate. This reduces the likelihood of a strong earthquake, but does not rule out smaller and locally perceptible earthquakes.

Figures: earthquake maps and dataset visualisations (Crisis research Centre, 2026).

🔺The use, distribution, modification, or publication of the text and figures is permitted only with the prior written agreement of NGO Crisis Research Centre; unauthorised use is not permitted.

Figure 5: Tectonic plates of the world

Sources

¹ Voss, P., Dahl-Jensen, T. & Larsen, T.B. 2015. Earthquake hazard in Denmark. GEUS.

² [Anon.], 2017. Nationalt risikobillede.Beredskabsstyrelsen.

³ [Anon.], 2026a. Earthquake information: Magnitude 3.9, Denmark. 20.05.2026, EMSC.

⁴ [Anon.], 2026b. Jordskælv på 3,9 ryster Danmark. 20.05.2026, GEUS.

⁵ [Anon.], 2026c. Flere bor i Hovedstadsområdet og større byer. 21.05.2026, Danmarks Statistik.

⁶ [Anon.], 2026d. Kommunedetaljer: København. Danmarks Statistik.

⁷ [Anon.], 2026e. Kommunedetaljer: Køge. Danmarks Statistik.

⁸ Sandersen, P., Binderup, M., Larsen T.B. & Nilsson, B. 2021. Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland. 2021. Studies of geological properties and conditions for deep disposal of radioactive waste, Denmark. Phase 1, report no. 7: Evaluation of long-term stability related to glaciations, climate and sea-level, groundwater, and earthquakes. GEUS.

⁹ [Anon.], 2026f. Overvågning af seismisk aktivitet. GEUS.

¹⁰ [Anon.], 2026g. Registrerede jordskælv i Danmark. GEUS.

¹¹ Gregersen, S., Larsen, T., & Voss, P. 2011. Jordskælv i Sorgenfrei-Tornquist zonen? Geoviden – Geologi og Geografi, (1), pp. 18–19.

¹² Gravesen, P., Stig, S.A., Midtgaard, P. & Midtgaard, H.H. 2021. Studies of geological properties and conditions for deep disposal of radioactive waste, Denmark. Phase 1, report no. 2: Geological setting and structural framework of Danish onshore areas.GEUS.

¹³Larsen, T.B., Voss P.H. & Dahl-Jensen, T. 2020. Seismology in relation to safe storage of CO2 (GEUS Rapport 2020/41). GEUS.

¹⁴ [Anon.], 2018. Jordskælv ved Holstebro. 16.09.2018, GEUS.

¹⁵ [Anon.], 2024. Forberedt på kriser – sådan klarer du dig selv i tre døgn under en krise. Beredskabsstyrelsen.

¹⁶ [Anon.], 2022. GEUS overvåger for rystelser.27.09.2022, GEUS.

¹⁷ [Anon.], 2015. Beredskabsstyrelsens redningshold til FN-eksamen. 29.09.2015, Beredskabsstyrelsen.

¹⁸ [Anon.], 2023. Planlagt jordskælv rammer Tinglev. 19.01.2023, Beredskabsstyrelsen.

¹⁹ [Anon.], 2026h. Redningsspecialister fra hele Europa samlet til katastrofeøvelse i Danmark. 27.01.2026, Beredskabsstyrelsen.

²⁰ [Anon.], 2020. DS/EN 1998-1 DK NA:2020: Nationalt anneks til Eurocode 8: Konstruktioner i seismiske områder – Del 1: Generelle regler, seismiske påvirkninger og regler for bygninger. Bygningsreglementet.

²¹ [Anon.], 2026i. Primer on the 08 June 2026 magnitude 7.8 offshore Sarangani earthquake. 08.06.2026, Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology.

²² [Anon.], 2026j. M 7.8 – 26 km SW of Kablalan, Philippines. 08.06.2026, U.S. Geological Survey.

²³ Lehmann, I. 1956: Danske jordskælv (Danish Earthquakes). Bulletin of the Geological Society of Denmark 13(2), pp. 88-103.

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Presentation in Finland: resilience hubs are more than places with generators

kruk — Sat, 13 Jun 2026 09:18:09 +0000

Presentation in Finland: resilience hubs are more than places with generators

Our researcher Anne-May Nagel gave a presentation at the Finnish Political Science Association’s Annual Conference 2026 as part of the panel “Resilience politics and governance in an age of polycrisis”. The presentation focused on learning from Ukraine in local municipalities in Estonia and Sweden as part of broader efforts to strengthen civil defence capacities.

“The value of this panel was in bringing together crisis researchers from the Baltic Sea region, allowing us to focus on some of the most important issues facing our region: societal resilience to Russian hybrid warfare, crisis preparedness, and, importantly, the climate crisis, including the need to ensure water security in our societies,” noted Nagel, who is also a Doctoral Researcher at Tallinn University of Technology, TalTech.

Her presentation examined how learning from Ukraine has influenced crisis preparedness efforts in Estonian and Swedish municipalities, based on the adoption and development of resilience hubs inspired by Ukraine’s Points of Invincibility. “Efforts to learn from Ukraine are visible in many Baltic Sea countries, both at the national and local levels. Yet this is not an easy task. While technical solutions, such as procuring generators for resilience hubs, are relatively straightforward, ensuring long-term staffing for these places and involving communities or the private sector remain difficult challenges to solve during the preparedness phase,” Nagel noted.

In discussions with the region’s crisis management and security scholars, the urgent need to raise preparedness levels in the Baltic Sea region was emphasised. At the same time, participants highlighted the importance of addressing both technical needs and the realities of limited human resources. In addition, the discussions underlined the need to plan and prepare by taking into account the resources available within communities. This also requires legal clarity: to what extent, and in what ways, can community members be effectively included in crisis preparedness and response activities?

Foto: Crisis Research Centre presentation in Tampere (KRUK, 2026).

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We highlighted on ERR that the pace of cities’ crisis preparedness needs to accelerate

kruk — Fri, 12 Jun 2026 08:16:55 +0000

We highlighted on ERR that the pace of cities’ crisis preparedness needs to accelerate

On June 12, ERR’s Russian-language news portal covered Tallinn’s first public modular shelter and the preparedness of Estonian cities and towns for crisis situations. The topic was also commented on by Hannes Nagel, Head of the Crisis Research Centre, who noted that although positive steps have been taken in developing sheltering capacity, the current pace remains insufficient.

We highlighted on ERR that the situation has improved following the adoption of legislation setting requirements for shelters and public sheltering spaces in new buildings. At the same time, Estonia’s existing sheltering infrastructure remains insufficient. The issue concerns not only Tallinn, but also other Estonian cities and regions, where people’s actual access to shelter may depend heavily on the type of building, the period in which it was built, and the local spatial context.

For example, there are areas in Tallinn where the standard designs of high-rise buildings do not include basement floors. In such buildings, it is not possible to create shelters in the usual way or to adapt existing basement spaces for this purpose. This means that, due to the building type alone, part of the population may be left without a realistic nearby sheltering option in a crisis situation.

Tallinn’s initiative to establish modular shelters is an important and necessary step. However, individual pilot solutions cannot replace the systematic and broader development of sheltering infrastructure. More public sheltering spaces are needed, and their development should not remain only a question for the capital. Similar solutions are also needed in other Estonian cities and densely populated areas.

We also emphasised the issue of funding. If an apartment association wants to adapt a basement or a lower floor into a safer sheltering space that better meets requirements, this often requires significant investment. Many apartment associations do not have such resources. Therefore, isolated small-scale support measures are not enough. What is needed is a clear funding mechanism from the state and local governments that would help apartment associations and communities genuinely improve their sheltering capacity.

In the view of the Crisis Research Centre, civil protection must be treated as a permanent public responsibility, not as a project-based or temporary activity. Developing sheltering capacity, strengthening local-level crisis preparedness, and supporting communities require sustained political attention, sufficient funding, and a clear division of responsibilities between the state, local governments, and building owners.

🟠 Read and watch the ERR story here.

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CRISIS LENS | Time as a Weapon: The Logic of Iranian Warfare

kruk — Mon, 01 Jun 2026 10:15:37 +0000

CRISIS LENS | Time as a Weapon: The Logic of Iranian Warfare

In this instalment of the Crisis Lens series, we examine a country that appears again and again in Middle Eastern crises: Iran. The former empire is no longer what it once was, yet since the 1979 Revolution, Tehran has consistently sought to shape regional politics to its advantage. This raises two questions that haunt every new escalation: what does Iran actually want, and is it a strategically consistent state capable of playing the long game? A closer look at Iran’s confrontations with Israel offers little convincing evidence of overwhelming Iranian power or extraordinary cunning. Yet almost everyone in the region feels the extent of its influence. That influence does not need to be all-powerful to be sufficiently dangerous.

To understand Iran’s contemporary confrontation with the United States and Israel, one must look back not only to the 1979 Revolution, but also to an earlier period when the country’s relationship with the West became deeply contradictory.

The discovery of oil in the early twentieth century suddenly transformed Iran into a strategic resource hub and brought with it significant foreign influence, particularly from Britain. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (today’s BP) exercised extensive control over Iran’s oil industry, leaving the country itself with a relatively small share of the revenues. This generated widespread public dissatisfaction and reinforced the perception that Iran’s wealth was effectively in the hands of foreign powers.^1,2

Tensions culminated in 1953 when Iran’s democratically elected Prime Minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, decided to nationalise the oil industry in an effort to restore the country’s control over its principal natural resource. In response, the United States and the United Kingdom orchestrated a coup that removed Mossadegh from power and re-established the authority of the pro-Western Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.³

The event left a deep imprint on Iran’s political consciousness. It reinforced the belief that Western powers were willing to interfere in Iran’s domestic affairs to protect their economic and strategic interests, and that the country’s sovereignty was ultimately conditional. In the decades that followed, the Shah sought to modernise Iran and integrate it more closely with the West. However, this process unfolded in an authoritarian manner and produced a profound structural contradiction. On the one hand, extensive reforms were implemented, including industrialisation, the expansion of education and the development of infrastructure. On the other hand, political participation was restricted and the regime relied heavily on a repressive security apparatus, most notably the secret police known as SAVAK (Sazeman-e Ettela’at va Amniyat-e Keshvar; Persian: سازمان اطلاعات و امنیت).⁴

Modernisation proceeded without political liberalisation, meaning that while Iran became more modern on the surface, it also became more fragile internally. This was further reinforced by what has been described as the “sovereignty paradox”: the regime emphasised Iran’s national greatness and independence while simultaneously depending heavily on American political and military support.⁵

Alongside economic and political tensions, a deeper identity conflict emerged. The Pahlavi regime promoted a secular form of nationalism and emphasised Iran’s pre-Islamic heritage, whereas a large segment of society—particularly the clergy and more traditional social groups—viewed this as the marginalisation of Islam’s role in public life.⁴ As a result, modernisation did not represent progress for everyone. For many, it signified cultural alienation and political repression. Over the decades, pressure accumulated that found no meaningful outlet through institutional politics.

The 1979 Revolution was the explosive culmination of these tensions. With the rise of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran became an Islamic Republic—a system that consciously defined itself in opposition both to the Shah’s rule and to Western influence more broadly. The revolution was not merely a change of regime but an ideological turning point centred on the belief that Iran needed to free itself from external domination and restore its political and cultural autonomy.⁶ The seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the subsequent 444-day hostage crisis were not isolated incidents but symbolic acts that cemented the revolution’s anti-Western identity and severed the strategic partnership that had previously existed with the United States.⁷

Since then, Iranian foreign and security policy has been shaped by a deeply embedded logic of self-defence. Tehran views itself as a state that has repeatedly been subjected to external interference and attempts at destabilisation. This perceived threat has become a central driver behind both the construction of Iran’s regional network of influence and its enduring confrontation with the United States and its allies.⁸ Subsequent events, such as the killing of General Qassem Soleimani, have further reinforced this narrative and strengthened the belief that the conflict with the West is not temporary, but structural in nature.

Seeking Survival — and, If Needed, Escalation Advantage

Thus, over the decades, Iran-backed groups have built an extensive network of influence across the Middle East, which Tehran refers to as the “Axis of Resistance”. This is not merely a flexible network, but a partially integrated operational space in which the activities of different groups can be timed and coordinated. The central logic of this network is simple: to keep confrontation as far away from Iranian territory as possible, while, if necessary, supplementing indirect warfare with limited direct strikes. It is a strategy that does not seek to win a decisive battle, but to wear down the adversary and gradually test the limits of escalation.

Iran’s real strength no longer lies only in indirect warfare, but in its ability to connect proxy groups, direct strikes, maritime pressure, drone warfare and political signalling into a sustained architecture of pressure. The influence projected through Gaza, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen does not depend on weapons alone, but on a long-term ideological investment in which these groups are not simply mercenaries; they have become carriers of identity and narrative. More precisely, opposition to Israel, the United States and their closest allies forms part of a broader worldview that is not deterred by disruptions in arms supplies or the elimination of individual key figures. In an environment of sanctions and permanent crisis, Iran has built a system oriented toward endurance and adaptation.

Here lies one of the persistent misjudgements in strategies aimed at countering Iran: the assumption that eliminating key individuals can break the system. In reality, such strikes usually reduce only its coordination, tempo and strike capacity temporarily. They may not dismantle the system at all, but instead reinforce its own self-understanding: people can be replaced, facilities can be rebuilt, while the regime narrative constructed around resistance to an external enemy gains renewed legitimacy from the attack. The same applies to the Syrian front. Even if a key corridor has weakened, this does not yet mean the disappearance of Iranian influence, but rather its transformation into something more fragmented and harder to target. At the same time, it cannot be denied that recent years have also brought Iran serious setbacks. The weakening of Syria as a key land-connection hub directly restricts Iranian logistics and reduces the cohesion of its regional network, but the more likely response is not retreat, but dispersal, rerouting and more concealed recovery.

This is precisely where the particular nature of Tehran’s strategic culture becomes visible. Defeat does not necessarily mean withdrawal, but adaptation; and when direct influence declines, indirect pressure is applied instead. The rapprochement between Iran and Russia fits this pattern. It is not adorned by shared values, but driven by geopolitical objectives, where the parties need one another while never fully trusting each other. Iran receives at least partial military and diplomatic support from Russia and, in return, offers technological and defence-industrial cooperation. Yet this relationship does not fundamentally strengthen Iran’s strategic position. Rather, it indicates that Iran seeks both balance and escalation advantage depending on the situation, combining indirect and direct forms of attack. Even a possible ceasefire agreement or temporary arrangement between Washington and Tehran would not alter this basic logic; it would more likely mark an operational pause before the next cycle of adaptation and revenge.

From Indirect War to Nuclear Deterrence

In the long run, Iran could not afford a full-scale war. Yet the operation that began on 28 February 2026 shows that it may become drawn into one in a way that the regime later deliberately reinterprets as proof of its own survival. This situation has led — or may lead — not only to asymmetric responses, but also to limited symmetric retaliation: direct strikes, maritime pressure and a multi-layered strategy of attrition.

Symbolic missile strikes, drone attacks and the disruption of sea routes are not random acts. They are, for the most part, operationally calculated and riskier choices through which the boundaries of escalation are deliberately pushed. At the same time, the conflict no longer unfolds separately across military, economic or information-warfare domains, but simultaneously across all of them. Together, these form a single pressure complex whose impact must be assessed as a whole, not as isolated episodes.

The 2026 war against Iran has shown that drones are no longer merely a cheap supplement to missile capabilities, but an operational instrument in their own right. Their mass use makes it possible to increase the number of targets affected simultaneously, disperse launch platforms, pressure air defence systems and alter the adversary’s defence economy by forcing it to expend more expensive interceptors against cheaper attacking systems. The Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea are not only spaces of economic pressure, but also instruments of political fragmentation: the more costly and unpopular the conflict becomes beyond the circle of direct participants, the more likely Iran’s opponents are to become divided and less able to intervene as a unified coalition.

The same logic applies in the military dimension: the purpose of attacks is not only to hit targets, but also to gradually exhaust the adversary’s defensive systems. The experiences of Ukraine and Iran show that it is especially important to force the defender to rapidly consume its air and missile defence stocks, because the depletion of interceptors can open the way for subsequent, more dangerous waves of attack. Such a strategy is not aimed at victory in the classical sense, but at gradually breaking the adversary’s tolerance. In the past, this approach has produced results, because even Iran’s opponents cannot endlessly absorb the economic, political and logistical costs of war; the narrower the coalition becomes, the more the continuation of the war depends on the domestic political endurance of individual capitals.

If we look at Israel’s actions, they reflect an entirely different strategic culture and policyᴬ — the primacy of prevention and decisiveness. Israeli airstrikes against Iranian targets, whether in Syria, Iraq or elsewhere, are not random acts, but part of a sustained campaign aimed at keeping the hostile network under constant pressure and, where possible, creating a sufficient operational rupture to temporarily postpone the threat, though probably not to resolve the Iranian question once and for all. These strikes no longer necessarily go unanswered, but Iran’s responses are often dispersed, indirect or temporally delayed, and therefore less politically legible than Israel’s direct strikes. This creates a situation in which Iran is forced to absorb tactical losses in advance, hoping that the factor of time will eventually turn the strategic balance in its favour. But this is precisely where the question arises: how long can such a situation last?

The question sometimes arises whether an India–Pakistan type of nuclear deterrence could be conceivable in the Middle East. The 2026 war against Iran, however, points rather in the opposite direction: Israel does not accept the emergence of strategic parity and uses preventive force to avoid it. Nuclear deterrence may therefore appear tempting, but it is an overly simplified solution. It is true that the existence of nuclear weapons between India and Pakistan has created a certain “cold stability”: both sides know that a full-scale war would lead to mutual destruction. This has forced the conflict to remain limited, in a form where crises do occur but do not easily escalate into existential war. Such a logic, however, requires several preconditions: clear state borders, a direct bilateral confrontation, functioning communication channels and at least some mutual understanding of red lines.

In the Middle Eastern context, these preconditions are much weaker. Iran’s confrontation is not limited to one state, but involves an entire network: Israel, the United States, regional allies and several Iran-backed armed groups. This makes the classical deterrence model far more ambiguous: if the conflict does not take place only between states, but also through their “extensions”, then whom exactly does deterrence affect, and how? In addition, there is no direct and reliable crisis communication channel between Israel and Iran, which, despite tensions, does exist in the India–Pakistan case.

A second problem concerns the logic of decision-making. The India–Pakistan model assumes that both sides will ultimately behave rationally and avoid crossing the red line. But the question of what happens if Tehran consciously decides to accept a higher risk of escalation is not merely rhetorical. This does not necessarily imply irrational self-destruction, but rather a situation in which political pressure, internal crisis or miscalculation leads to a decision that the opposing side interprets as escalation. In such an environment, deliberate “madness” is not required; miscalculation is enough. The more complex the conflict environment, the greater the likelihood of such an error.

It must also be recognised that nuclear weapons would not resolve the existing conflict, but would change its nature. If Iran were to acquire nuclear capability, indirect war would not end; it would become a permanent crisis under a nuclear shadow, where each subsequent move would carry a higher price of miscalculation. This may reduce the likelihood of direct war, but it would increase the danger of continuous crisis and the cost of mistakes. The India–Pakistan scenario is therefore not directly transferable to the Middle East. It may temporarily create an illusion of stability, but it would not resolve the systemic instability arising from a multi-layered conflict and the absence of mutual trust. Rather, it would mean a situation in which all parties live under conditions of constant risk, never fully certain whether the next move will cross the line.

To understand the complexity of possible solutions — whether they involve ideas of nuclear deterrence or something else — it is useful to interpret the region through its recent history. The year 1979 did not only change Iran’s political system. Before the revolution, Iran was not a close partner of Israel, but it was a pragmatic one. With Khomeini’s rise to power, the confrontation became ideological. Israel was no longer treated merely as an adversary, but as a phenomenon whose very existence was seen as a problem. This distinction is decisive: one can negotiate with a geopolitical rival, but not with an existential enemy. Importantly, this did not remain merely an idea; the Islamic Republic began to shape its regional strategy around it.

The creation of Hezbollah and later support for Palestinian armed groups have been part of this strategy: to bring the confrontation to Israel’s borders without entering the war directly. This is where the core of Israel’s threat perception emerges. The issue is not only Iran’s capability, but its intent, which has remained consistent for more than four decades. If a state says that you should not exist and at the same time builds a system capable of gradually pressuring you, then this is no longer rhetoric, but a strategy that can be practically realised.

The current war gives the regime, in its own eyes, a kind of retrospective justification: the external enemy against which the system was built appears to have been confirmed. This makes the response less accidental and more structural. As the old Arabic saying goes, kama tadīn tudān (Arabic: كما تدين تدان) — as you do, so shall it be done to you. Iran’s system should therefore not be assessed only by how severely it is currently under pressure, but also by how it can turn that pressure into new legitimacy, renewed mobilisation and, sooner or later, a desire for revenge.

Remarks

^AThe Begin Doctrine is a principle of Israeli security policy which holds that hostile states must not be allowed to acquire weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, and that preventive military force should be used if necessary to stop them from doing so. The doctrine takes its name from Prime Minister Menachem Begin, under whose leadership the principle was clearly articulated, although its roots extend further back. As early as the 1960s, for example during Operation Damocles, Israel sought to hinder the weapons programmes of hostile states through covert operations. During the 1970s, this approach evolved into a more systematic policy that combined diplomatic pressure with clandestine activities aimed at limiting the spread of nuclear capabilities in the region. The Begin Doctrine reached its definitive form in 1981 with Israel’s strike against Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor, an action justified by Israel as a response to an existential threat. Since then, the doctrine has remained a central element of Israeli strategic thinking, guiding the country toward preventive action even in situations involving significant escalation risks when the strategic balance in the Middle East is perceived to be at stake.

× Hannes Nagel’s op-ed was previously published in the Estonian Defence League magazine Kaitse Kodu! (Issue 4, 2026, pp. 48–53). Photos: illustrative drawings depicting Iran (KRUK, 2026).

Sources

¹ Kinzer, S., 2008. All the Shah’s men: An American coup and the roots of Middle East terror. John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

² Abrahamian, E., 2008. A history of modern Iran. Cambridge University Press.

³ Gasiorowski, M. & Byrne, M., 2004. Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 coup in Iran. Syracuse University Press.

⁴ Keddie, N. R., 2006. Modern Iran: Roots and results of revolution. Yale University Press.

⁵ Bill, J. A., 1988. The eagle and the lion: The tragedy of American-Iranian relations. Yale University Press.

⁶ Arjomand, S. A., 1988. The turban for the crown: The Islamic revolution in Iran. Oxford University Press.

⁷ Bowden, M., 2006. Guests of the Ayatollah: The first battle in America’s war with militant Islam. Atlantic Monthly Press.

⁸ Takeyh, R., 2009. Guardians of the revolution: Iran and the world in the age of the Ayatollahs. Oxford University Press.

Jaga postitust:

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Join the Nõmme Crisis Network Training Sessions

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Join the Mustamäe Crisis Network Training Sessions

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Launch of the Haabersti Crisis Network Training Programme

Launch of the Haabersti Crisis Network Training Programme

🔸The activities of the KRAKO project are carried out by the Crisis Research Centre, the project is co-funded by the City of Tallinn and the Tallinn Municipal Police, together with the NGO Crisis Research Centre.

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🔺The use, distribution, modification, or publication of the text and figures is permitted only with the prior written agreement of NGO Crisis Research Centre; unauthorised use is not permitted.

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Video 2: The coup attempt in Cyprus

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Overview of the Crisis Research Centre’s Activities in 2025

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Figure 5: Tectonic plates of the world

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CRISIS LENS | Time as a Weapon: The Logic of Iranian Warfare

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